1. Delight in them. The very tickling of our fancy by a sinful motion, though without a formal consent, is a sin; because it is a degree of complacency in an unlawful object. When the mind is pleased with the subject of the thought, as it hath a tendency to some ⟨p. 5⟩sensual pleasure, & not simply in the thought it self, as it may enrich the understanding with some degree of knowledge. The thought indeed of an evil thing may be without any delight in the evil of it; as Philosophers delight in making experiments of poisonous Creatures, without delighting in the poison, as it is a noxious quality. We may delightfully think of sin without guilt, not delighting in it as sin, but as God by his wise providential ordering extracts Glory to himself, and good to his Creature. In this case, though a sinful act be the material object of this pleasure, yet 'tis not the formal object: because the delight is not terminated in the sin, but in God's ordering the event of it to his own glory. But an Inclination to a sinful motion, as it gratifies a corrupt affection, is sin: because every Inclination is a malignant tincture upon the affections, including in its own nature an aversion from God, and testifying sin to be an agreeable object. And without question, there can be no inclination to any thing, without some degree of pleasure in it: because it is impossible we can incline to that, which we have a perfect abhorrency of. Hence it follows, that every inclination to a sinful motion is Consensus inchoatus, or a Consent in Embryo: though the act may prove abortive. If we think of any unlawful thing with pleasure, and imagine it either in fieri or facto esse, it brings a guilt upon us, as if it were really acted. As when upon the consideration of such a man's being my enemy, I fancy robbers rifling his goods, and cutting his throat, and rejoice in this revengeful thought, as if it were really done, 'tis a great sin: because it testifies an approbation of such a butchery, if any man had will and opportunity to commit it. And though it be a supposition, yet the act of the mind is really the same it would be, if the sinful act I think of were performed. Or when a man conditionally thinks with himself, I would steal such a man's goods, or kill such a person, if I could escape the punishment attending it, it is as if he did rob and murder him:
1. Delight in them. The very tickling of our phancy by a sinful motion, though without a formal consent, is a sin; because it is a degree of complacency in an unlawful object. When the mind is pleased with the subject of the thought, as it hath a tendency to some ⟨p. 5⟩sensual pleasure, & not simply in the thought it self, as it may enrich the understanding with some degree of knowledg. The thought indeed of an evil thing may be without any delight in the evil of it; as Philosophers delight in making experiments of poisonous Creatures, without delighting in the poison, as it is a noxious quality. We may delightfully think of sin without guilt, not delighting in it as sin, but as God by his wise providential ordering extracts Glory to himself, and good to his Creature. In this case, though a sinful act be the material object of this pleasure, yet 'tis not the formal object: because the delight is not terminated in the sin, but in God's ordering the event of it to his own glory. But an Inclination to a sinful motion, as it gratifies a corrupt affection, is sin: because every Inclination is a malignant tincture upon the affections, including in its own nature an aversion from God, and testifying sin to be an agreeable object. And without question, there can be no inclination to any thing, without some degree of pleasure in it: because it is impossible we can incline to that, which we have a perfect abhorrency of. Hence it follows, that every inclination to a sinful motion is Consensus inchoatus, or a Consent in Embryo: though the act may prove abortive. If we think of any unlawful thing with pleasure, and imagine it either in fieri or facto esse, it brings a guilt upon us, as if it were really acted. As when upon the consideration of such a man's being my enemy, I phancy robbers rifling his goods, and cutting his throat, and rejoyce in this revengeful thought, as if it were really done, 'tis a great sin: because it testifies an approbation of such a butchery, if any man had will and opportunity to commit it. And though it be a supposition, yet the act of the mind is really the same it would be, if the sinfull act I think of were performed. Or when a man conditionally thinks with himself, I would steal such a man's goods, or kill such a person, if I could escape the punishment attending it, it is as if he did rob and murder him:
