A treatise of divine providence I. In general, II. In particular, as relating to…

1. Difficulty, This cannot be: What difficulty can there be in a single word, or one Act of his will, which can be done by God without any molestation: Were there millions of Worlds as well as this? For still they would be finite, and so governable by an infinite Superior. May we not more reasonably think the forming such a Mass would require more pains then the government of ⟨p. 15⟩it? The right stringing an instrument is more trouble to a skilful Musician, then the tripping over the strings afterwards to make an harmony. What difficulty can it be to omnipotence? Is it a greater labour to preserve and govern then it was to create? Doth not the Soul order every part of the body, and all its functions without any pain to it, and shall not the God that made that Soul so indefatigable, much more manage the concernments of the World without labour to himself. Is it not as easy with God to guide all these things by one single act of his Will, as for me by an act of my Soul to do many things without a distinct act of cogitation or consideration before? Can it be more laborious to him, to govern the world, then it is to know all things in the world? He sees all things in an instant by one act of his understanding, and he orders all Creatures in a moment by one act of his will. Can one act of his will be more painful, then one act of his understanding? Can he with a word make this great Ball, and can he not with as much ease order all to conform to the law of his own righteous will? Can a continual ⟨p. 16⟩eruption of goodness be a difficulty to an infinite Being, which we find natural to the Sun, to the Fountains, to the Sea, to many works of that Omnipotent goodness? Or,

1. Difficulty, This cannot be: What difficulty can there be in a single word, or one Act of his will, which can be done by God without any molestation: Were there millions of Worlds as well as this? For still they would be finite, and so governable by an infinite Superior. May we not more reasonably think the forming such a Mass would require more pains then the government of ⟨p. 15⟩it? The right stringing an instrument is more trouble to a skilful Musitian, then the tripping over the strings afterwards to make an harmony. What difficulty can it be to omnipotence? Is it a greater labour to preserve and govern then it was to create? Doth not the Soul order every part of the body, and all its functions without any pain to it, and shall not the God that made that Soul so indefatigable, much more mannage the concernments of the World without labour to himself. Is it not as easie with God to guide all these things by one single act of his Will, as for me by an act of my Soul to do many things without a distinct act of cogitation or consideration before? Can it be more laborious to him, to govern the world, then it is to know all things in the world? He sees all things in an instant by one act of his understanding, and he orders all Creatures in a moment by one act of his will. Can one act of his will be more painful, then one act of his understanding? Can he with a word make this great Ball, and can he not with as much ease order all to conform to the law of his own righteous will? Can a continual