(2.) A Power to refuse any Object, however it be offered, with what advantage soever it be propounded by the Spirit of God, or the Ministry of man. For the Liberty, ⟨p. 36⟩they make essential to the Will, consists, they say, in an indifferency, either to choose or refuse, either to act or not to act. And it must be left indifferent in all cases; so that nothing in Heaven or Earth can determine it, but it self. God himself they say cannot without fail determine it to the choice of this or the other without destroying it. Voluntas hominis ad actus suos motion irresistibili determinari non potest ne ab ipso Deo quidem. (Syn. Dor. 212.) He cannot1 incline the will irresistibly, he cannot by any Divine Motion of unwilling make it willing. Whatever Power he does or can put forth for this purpose, the Will may and can resist it and render it of no effect. If the Lord do desire and intend to Convert a Sinner, and do what can be done by the Power of his Grace in order thereto; yet the Will may hinder him. Take it in their own words, A man may hinder his own regeneration, when God has a mind to have him regenerated, and it is his will to regenerate him, Coll. Hag. 282. Corvinus (the most subtle and cautious of their writers) says expresly, Positis omnibus ad agendum 2requisitis, &c. when all ⟨p. 37⟩the Operations of Grace in order to Conversion are past upon the Will; yet it is still in the free power of the Will to convert or not to convert it self. So that, when God has done his utmost to bring a Sinner into a saving State; yet it is in the power of the Will to defeat and hinder him. In plain terms, when God has done what he can, the Will may do what it list. They will have the Will to be so free, as that it can be under no necessity of any sort, not only such as is natural, or compulsive, or absolute, which is granted; but such as is only respective▪ and that in reference to God himself. So that •f it be needful in respect of the Decree and Purpose of God, or in respect of his Will and Desire, or in respect of his Word and Engagement, or in respect of his Design and Intention, that the Will should move this way and not the other; yet it may incline and determine it self the other way; and so may act counter to God in •hese his Concerns, defeat him in them •ll, and carry it against him.
(2.) A Power to refuse any Object, however it be offered, with what advantage soever it be propounded by the Spirit of God, or the Ministry of man. For the Liberty, ⟨p. 36⟩they make essential to the Will, consists, they say, in an indifferency, either to choose or refuse, either to act or not to act. And it must be left indifferent in all cases; so that nothing in Heaven or Earth can determine it, but it self. God himself they say cannot without fail determine it to the choice of this or the other without destroying it. Voluntas hominis ad actus suos motione irresistibili determinari non potest ne ab ipso Deo quidem. (Syn. Dor. 212.) He cannot1 incline the will irresistably, he cannot by any Divine Motion of unwilling make it willing. Whatever Power he does or can put forth for this purpose, the Will may and can resist it and render it of no effect. If the Lord do desire and intend to Convert a Sinner, and do what can be done by the Power of his Grace in order thereto; yet the Will may hinder him. Take it in their own words, A man may hinder his own regeneration, when God has a mind to have him regenerated, and it is his will to regenerate him, Coll. Hag. 282. Corvinus (the most subtile and cautious of their writers) says expresly, Positis omnibus ad agendum 2requisitis, &c. when all ⟨p. 37⟩the Operations of Grace in order to Conversion are past upon the Will; yet it is still in the free power of the Will to convert or not to convert it self. So that, when God has done his utmost to bring a Sinner into a saving State; yet it is in the power of the Will to defeat and hinder him. In plain terms, when God has done what he can, the Will may do what it list. They will have the Will to be so free, as that it can be under no necessity of any sort, not only such as is natural, or compulsive, or absolute, which is granted; but such as is only respective▪ and that in reference to God himself. So that •f it be needfull in respect of the Decree and Purpose of God, or in respect of his Will and Desire, or in respect of his Word and Ingagement, or in respect of his Design and Intention, that the Will should move this way and not the other; yet it may incline and determin it self the other way; and so may act counter to God in •hese his Concerns, defeat him in them •ll, and carry it against him.
- 1Vid. Ames rescript. p. 129.
- 2Vid. Hickm. p. 33.
