The practical divinity of the papists discovered to be destructive of Christianity and mens…

Further, ^(r)when so many persons in no necessity, take each of them a little fruit from a Vineyard or an Orchard, or a little corn from a field, that there is nothing at all left for the owner: yet if they did not conspire together to do this, it is a small fault. And thus any men of estates, (since it holds in other cases, no less than those specified) may be utterly impoverished; and yet those that ruin them, be guilty of nothing that they need regard. Moreover, when any one without any need, continues so long in the stealing matters of less worth, from one person or many, that in time they rise to a great value; and the thief thrives into a good estate thereby, without designing it: this altogether, is no more then a Venial fault; nor will it be worse, though he never make restitution, if there was any considerable interval betwixt the acts of theft ^(s)(say some); no, nor if there were no such intervals (say ^(t)others.) The consequences of which is, as Lopez observes, ^(u)that any Inn-keeper or Tradesman may grow rich, and raise a fair estate, without mortal sin, by defrauding all that buy of them, a little, in false measures, and so fleecing a whole Town. And why might not they as well conclude, that he who beats another, so it be but with little blows, though he beat him to death, offends but Venially? these of old were thought ^(x)alike. They conclude also, that such a quantity may be stolen, as is sufficient to make it a mortal sin, without sinning mortally, if it be for a good end. These are some of the instances they give. 1. A ^(y)man may steal to give Alms; We need not wonder at this, since they think not much to rob Christ of his honour in all their ⟨p. 242⟩good works: and so commit the worst kind of robbery (the highest Sacrilege) in their best acts; arrogating that to them, which is Christs peculiar; satisfaction and merit. And then, that the Charitable thief, if he become rich, is not bound to restore what is stolen, is the ^(z)common opinion. Also one may steal ^(a)money from another, rather then he shall venture it in gaming; for it it is good divinity with them (whatsoever it was with the Apostle) that one evil may be done to hinder another, ^(b)and that not only in other sins (as Fryer Joseph would limit it) but such as are intrinsically evil: for example; If one be about to commit adultery, it will be a lawful (a holy act) to beseech, and persuade him to commit fornication.

Further, ^(r)when so many persons in no necessity, take each of them a little fruit from a Vineyard or an Orchard, or a little corn from a field, that there is nothing at all left for the owner: yet if they did not conspire together to do this, it is a small fault. And thus any men of estates, (since it holds in other cases, no less than those specified) may be utterly impoverished; and yet those that ruine them, be guilty of nothing that they need regard. Moreover, when any one without any need, continues so long in the stealing matters of less worth, from one person or many, that in time they rise to a great value; and the thief thrives into a good estate thereby, without designing it: this altogether, is no more then a Venial fault; nor will it be worse, though he never make restitution, if there was any considerable interval betwixt the acts of theft ^(s)(say some); no, nor if there were no such intervals (say ^(t)others.) The consequences of which is, as Lopez observes, ^(u)that any Inn-keeper or Tradesman may grow rich, and raise a fair estate, without mortal sin, by defrauding all that buy of them, a little, in false measures, and so fleecing a whole Town. And why might not they as well conclude, that he who beats another, so it be but with little blows, though he beat him to death, offends but Venially? these of old were thought ^(x)alike. They conclude also, that such a quantity may be stoln, as is sufficient to make it a mortal sin, without sinning mortally, if it be for a good end. These are some of the instances they give. 1. A ^(y)man may steal to give Alms; We need not wonder at this, since they think not much to rob Christ of his honour in all their ⟨p. 242⟩good works: and so commit the worst kind of robbery (the highest Sacriledg) in their best acts; arrogating that to them, which is Christs peculiar; satisfaction and merit. And then, that the Charitable thief, if he become rich, is not bound to restore what is stoln, is the ^(z)common opinion. Also one may steal ^(a)money from another, rather then he shall venture it in gaming; for it it is good divinity with them (whatsoever it was with the Apostle) that one evil may be done to hinder another, ^(b)and that not only in other sins (as Fryer Joseph would limit it) but such as are intrinsecally evil: for example; If one be about to commit adultery, it will be a lawful (a holy act) to beseech, and perswade him to commit fornication.

1. (r)Corduba. Navarre. Lopez. pars. 2: Cap. 93. p. 414.Corduba. Navar. Lopez. pars. 2: Cap. 93. p. 414.
2. (s)Navarre. c. 17. n. 139. Graft. l. 2. c. 92. n. 18.Navar. c. 17. n. 139. Graff. l. 2. c. 92. n. 18.
3. (t)Angestus in Lopez. ibid. p. 416.
4. (u)Tabernarius seu quilibet negotiator posset ditescere sine mortall, et statum decentem fundare, et singulos emptores in modico mensuras curtando defraudare, totam civitatem sic depilando. ibid. p. 14.
5. (x)Nihil resert, an paulatim, an simul aliquem interimas, vel spolies. Jerom. ibid.
6. (y)Communis sententia ampliatur, ut non tantum pro se, sed etiam pro alio existent in extrema necessitate quis occulte subtrahere possit. Graff. c. 93. n. 12. Navarre. c. 17. n. 118. If a man be in mortal sin, his Wife may take of his goods privily, and give them away in Alms, for his conversion. Bonacin. de restit. disp. 2. q. 10. punct 2. n. 9.Communis sententia ampliatur, ut non tantum pro se, sed etiam pro alio existente in extrema necessitate quis occulte subtrahere possit. Graff. c. 93. n. 12. Navar. c. 17. n. 118. If a man be in mortal sin, his Wife may take of his goods privily, and give them away in Alms, for his conversion. Bonacin. de restit. disp. 2. q. 10. punct 2. n. 9.
7. (z)in Navarre. ibid.in Navar. ibid.
8. (a)Antoninus quem sequitur. Nav. ibid. n. 5. p. 282.
9. (b)Licet inducere ad minus malum, paratum jam ad majus malum: ut si quis proponit interficere, aut adulterari quis, licet ei persuader percutere aut fornicari, contra fratrem Josephum, qui limitat hanc sententiam ad peccata quae non sunt intrinseca mala sed cense• sententiam hanc generaliter esse tenendam, prout eam tenet Navarrus, et Cajetanus, Lopez. pars. 1. cap. 58. p. 297. Adrianus, Cajetan. Sotus. quos sequitur Navarre. cap. 14. n. 40. Luxurioso sancte consulitur ut non adulteretur, sed fornicetur. Cajetan. sum. v. Tyrannis. Medina, Sotus, Adrian existimant—non tantum licere suadere minus furtum latroni, sed etiam ipsum comitari, imo etiam adjuvare. in Vasq. opusc. Moral. p. 24. dub. 2. Bonacin. de rest disp. 1. q. 2. punct. 7. n. 9.Licet inducere ad minus malum, paratum jam ad majus malum: ut si quis proponit interficere, aut adulterari quis, licet ei persuadere percutere aut fornicari, contra fratrem Josephum, qui limitat hanc sententiam ad peccata quae non sunt intrinseca mala sed cense• sententiam hanc generaliter esse tenendam, prout eam tenet Navarrus, et Cajetanus, Lopez. pars. 1. cap. 58. p. 297. Adrianus, Cajetan. Sotus. quos sequitur Navar. cap. 14. n. 40. Luxurioso sancte consulitur ut non adulteretur, sed fornicetur. Cajetan. sum. v. Tyrannis. Medina, Sotus, Adrian existimant—non tantum licere suadere minus furtum latroni, sed etiam ipsum comitari, imo etiam adjuvare. in Vasq. opusc. Moral. p. 24. dub. 2. Bonacin. de rest disp. 1. q. 2. punct. 7. n. 9.

Or nearer the matter in hand; if one be ready to steal an hundred pounds, I may advise him to steal fifty; and so persuade to a mortal sin with some moderation. They think it not only lawful to persuade a thief to a smaller robbery, but also to accompany and assist him therein. Further, a ^(c)woman if her Husband be profuse, may against his command take away his goods, and conceal them, to provide for the future. If a man be distracted, or if he be absent, his Wife may spend more of his estate than he would do, if he were sober or present. Bonacin ibio. Finally, they all agree, that to steal any thing of what value soever inconsiderately, that is, without full and perfect deliberation, is but a Venial Trespass. And how he can be obliged to restore, it by their Principles, I understand not: since they hold that ^(d)no man is bound to ⟨p. 243⟩make restitution, but for a mortal offence. If in a matter that is weighty, the cult be Venial, for want of full consideration, it will not be so much as ^(*)a small fault, not to make restitution, how much soever be stolen inconsiderately. By these and such like rules, they have opened a way, to make thievery small or great, practicable; without any sin or danger, but what is small and inconsiderable in their account. Scholars and those who count good Books their treasure, are by their Doctrine exposed more particularly, for they teach, that to take away heretical Books, from such as have not Licence to read them, is no theft; Bonacin. de restit disp. 2. q. 8. punct. 1. n. 1. So that it will be no fault at all, to rob one of the best part of his Library, how valuable soever.

Or nearer the matter in hand; if one be ready to steal an hundred pounds, I may advise him to steal fifty; and so perswade to a mortal sin with some moderation. They think it not only lawful to perswade a thief to a smaller robbery, but also to accompany and assist him therein. Further, a ^(c)woman if her Husband be profuse, may against his command take away his goods, and conceal them, to provide for the future. If a man be distracted, or if he be absent, his Wife may spend more of his estate than he would do, if he were sober or present. Bonacin ibio. Finally, they all agree, that to steal any thing of what value soever inconsiderately, that is, without full and perfect deliberation, is but a Venial Trespass. And how he can be obliged to restore, it by their Principles, I understand not: since they hold that ^(d)no man is bound to ⟨p. 243⟩make restitution, but for a mortal offence. If in a matter that is weighty, the •ult be Venial, for want of full consideration, it will not be so much as ^(*)a small fault, not tomake restitution, how much soever be stoln inconsiderately. By these and such like rules, they have opened a way, to make thievery small or great, practicable; without any sin or danger, but what is small and inconsiderable in their account. Scholars and those who count good Books their treasure, are by their Doctrine exposed more particularly, for they teach, that to take away haeretical Books, from such as have not Licence to read them, is no theft; Bonacin. de restit disp. 2. q. 8. punct. 1. n. 1. So that it will be no fault at all, to rob one of the best part of his Library, how valuable soever.

1. (c)Sylvest. v. furtum. n. 15. Navarre. cap. 17. n. 154. Graft. l. 2. c. 92. n. 26:Sylvest. v. furtum. n. 15. Navar. cap. 17. n. 154. Graff. l. 2. c. 92. n. 26:
2. (d)Adrian. 4. de restit. fam. ad 8. Sylvest. v. culpa. q. 4. in Fill. tr. 32. n. 32.
3. (*)Sylvest. & alii ibid.

They open as wide a gap, and give as much encouragement to •eating, and like unconscionable practices. They teach there is no necessity to be regulated in bargaining, by the just value of things: but they may sell for as much as they can extort, and buy answerably; and this they take for a general Rule; ^(e)a thing is worth so much as it can be sold for. Hence Sylvester concludes it lawful, ^(f)for any one to sell as dear, and buy as cheap as he can, which unlimited, gives liberty to all to prey upon one another, without equity or conscience. So one may buy a thing of great value ^(g)though he knows it and the owner understands it not, for a small matter, nor ^(h)needs be declare it, when he apprehends that it is much more worth; since that may be enquired of others. They conclude, that false measures and weights may be used, though the buyer be hereby deceived and damnified, and the custom it self to be a corruption: yet they are excused who use them, ⁽ⁱ⁾if they do it for their own security, or for moderate ⟨p. 244⟩gain; as if in case, they should give full measure, the price would be greater, and consequently they would have few or no Customers. So, by their Rules, they may further deceive those that deal with them, by selling one thing for another, or adulterating what they sell; and so cheat them not only in the measure, but in the quality, yea or the substance of the Commodity. Instances hereof we have in Soto: Corn or Wine, when it is more worth than the set rate, the Merchant may fell it ^(k)by false measure, thereby to get his price. If a ^(l)man have very good Wine, but people, if they did not take it for Rhenish, would not give so good a price for it; he may sell it at the rate they would g•ve for Rhenish, though it be not. So he may ^(m)mix his Wine with water, and sell it for pure, taking but a just price; as for example; ⁽ⁿ⁾In case Wine were so dear, that scarce any would buy it at the price it is worth; he may mix it with water, and sell it at the rate they will give. So ^(o)Cloth or Silks may be sold for that of such a Country which is most esteemed, though it be of another.

They open as wide a gap, and give as much encouragement to •eating, and like unconscionable practices. They teach there is no necessity to be regulated in bargaining, by the just value of things: but they may sell for as much as they can extort, and buy answerably; and this they take for a general Rule; ^(e)a thing is worth so much as it can be sold for. Hence Sylvester concludes it lawful, ^(f)for any one to sell as dear, and buy as cheap as he can, which unlimited, gives liberty to all to prey upon one another, without equity or conscience. So one may buy a thing of great value ^(g)though he knows it and the owner understands it not, for a small matter, nor ^(h)needs be declare it, when he apprehends that it is much more worth; since that may be enquired of others. They conclude, that false measures and weights may be used, though the buyer be hereby deceived and damnified, and the custom it self to be a corruption: yet they are excused who use them, ⁽ⁱ⁾if they do it for their own security, or for moderate ⟨p. 244⟩gain; as if in case, they should give full measure, the price would be greater, and consequently they would have few or no Customers. So, by their Rules, they may further deceive those that deal with them, by selling one thing for another, or adulterating what they sell; and so cheat them not only in the measure, but in the quality, yea or the substance of the Commodity. Instances hereof we have in Soto: Corn or Wine, when it is more worth than the set rate, the Merchant may fell it ^(k)by false measure, thereby to get his price. If a ^(l)man have very good Wine, but people, if they did not take it for Rhenish, would not give so good a price for it; he may sell it at the rate they would g•ve for Rhenish, though it be not. So he may ^(m)mix his Wine with water, and sell it for pure, taking but a just price; as for example; ⁽ⁿ⁾In case Wine were so dear, that scarce any would buy it at the price it is worth; he may mix it with water, and sell it at the rate they will give. So ^(o)Cloth or Silks may be sold for that of such a Countrey which is most esteemed, though it be of another.

1. (e)Justum praetium reputatur quod absque fraude extorqueri potest. Ità, Bannes, Medina, Aragon, Villalobos, Bonacina, & alii in Dian. 1. p. tr. 8. res. 55.Justum praetium reputatur quod absque fraude extorqueri potest. Ità, Bannes, Medina, Arragon, Villalobos, Bonacina, & alii in Dian. 1. p. tr. 8. res. 55.
2. (f)Res tantum valet quantum vendi potest—Et secundum hoc licet cuilibe• carius vendere, aut vilius emere quantum potest. Sumv. Emptio. n. 10.
3. (g)Vid. Cajetan. Sum. v. Emptio, p. 138.
4. (h)Emptor non tenetur ei explicit affirmare quantum valet: quam habeat alios, unde possit inquirere et scire. ibid.Emptor non tenetur ei explicite affirmare quantum valet: quam habeat alios, unde possit inquirere et scire. ibid.
5. (i)Tabernarii dantes vini mensuram diminutam secundum Arc. non excusantur: quia decipiunt & damnifiant emptores, non obstant• contra• consuetudine, quae est corruptela: nisi hoc faciunt ad suam indemnitatem, vel lucrum moderatum: puta, quia si darent plenas, oporteret pretium augere, ut consequenter n•llos aut paucos invenirent emptores. Sylv. Sum. ibid. n. 20. Vid. Soto, de just. & jur. lib. 6. q. 3. art. 2.
6. (k)Soto, ibid. p. 198.
7. (l)Ibid.
8. (m)Eadem ratione, & aqua possit vinum diluere. Idem ibid.
9. (n)Ibid.
10. (o)Idem ibid.

1. (p)Forsan venditoris mendacium in talibus casibus, si alioqui praedicto modo servetur justitia, non est pernitiosum. Idem •bid. p. 199. quem sequitur in his omnibus, Tol. instr. l. 8. c. 49.
2. (q)Sum. Ibid. n. 22.
3. (r)Si accipit certo pretio ven dendum, retinere potest id quo pluris illud vendiderit, nisi excesserit pretium rigorosum. Navarre. c. 23. n. 97.Si accipit certo pretio ven dendum, retinere potest id quo pluris illud vendiderit, nisi excesserit pretium rigorosum. Navar. c. 23. n. 97.
4. (s)Angel. Sum. in Sylv. ibid. n. 25.

Further, Panormitan ^(t)takes notice, that their Canon-law allows of deceit, if it be not extended beyond half the worth of the thing bargained or, (that is, if a man be not cozened of above fifty per Cent. in a bargain) But then to salve the reputation of the Law (which he like a true Canonist, says, was formed by the instinct of the holy Ghost), he will have it understood of deceit in the thing, not of fraud in the persons, and others after him; but Sylvester who sees no ground for that, uses another shift; ^(u)he says it may be understood, either of deceit in the thing, or fraud in the persons, which their Law tolerates, but approves not. Cajetan grants so great deceit ^(x)is lawful, by humane constitution: but says, it is condemned by the law of God; and so we leave this shameful Deceit, lawful by the Popes Decrees, but damnable by Gods Word.

1. (t)Dicit etiam Panormitan quod jura Canonica permittentia deceptionem usque ad dimidium, intelligi debent quando venit deceptio reipsa, in Silv. ibid. n. 9.
2. (u)Ego dico quod loquitur in foro contentioso, sive deceptio sit ex re, sive ex dolo: non quia illum approbat, sed quia tolerat. Ibid.
3. (x)Jure humano dicitur licitum decipere citra dimidium justi pretii: sed lex domini immaculata est, &c. Sum. v. emptore.

SECT. IX.

LET us see, in the next place, what truth may be expected in Popery, or those that profess it: and whether their Rules, tend not to leave, neither truth in the world, nor amongst themselves, by giving liberty to all falseness, and lying in words and deeds: A lye, as they define it, ^(y)is an asserting of what is false, with an intent to speak falsely, and to deceive others. Now they teach that to deliver ⟨p. 246⟩^(a)what is false, if not on purpose, though it he without any care whether it be true or false; if it be a fault, is such, as needs not be regarded; unless, where it is in testimony, or upon Oath (and there they will excuse it too, by and by): because this is but a material lie, and not in its formal perfection. But then, a perfect lye with a design to speak what is false, and to deceive the hearers, is as innocent if it be for pleasure or in sport, ridentem dicere falsum quis •etat? to make a sport of violating truth, or in offering it such injury, to please himself, or others; any one may do it out of habit, and make a practice of it, and tell ^(b)lies when he list, out of mere pleasure to be telling lies: yea ^(c)or out of malice (though that be the highest aggravation of sin). An officious lie is with them as harmless, they have warrant enough for the most complete and perfect lies, ^(d)when they are of any advantage to some, and no hurt to others; how much soever truth be injured, or others deceived thereby. So that their true Catholics, need leave no place for truth, either in their heart or words; when the excluding of it from both, will, without hurt, serve either their pleasure or profit. However, herein they use true and plain dealing, in letting the world know, that in these cases, they are never to be trusted, either in matters of Conversation, or Religion. This being their Principle, ^(e)received by all Catholics, and universally acknowledged; we need not wonder, that it hath been their common practice in several ages, and that they make no conscience of it still, to counterfeit false miracles, to forge false stories, to ⟨p. 247⟩show false Relics, to divulge false Visions, and Revelations, to obtrude on the world supposititious Writings; to corrupt the Monuments of former times, and expunge out of them all the truth that makes against them; to make even the dead speak lies, or disguise the truth.

LET us see, in the next place, what truth may be expected in Popery, or those that profess it: and whether their Rules, tend not to leave, neither truth in the world, nor amongst themselves, by giving liberty to all falseness, and lying in words and deeds: A lye, as they define it, ^(y)is an asserting of what is false, with an intent to speak falsely, and to deceive others. Now they teach that to deliver ⟨p. 246⟩^(a)what is false, if not on purpose, though it he without any care whether it be true or false; if it be a fault, is such, as needs not be regarded; unless, where it is in testimony, or upon Oath (and there they will excuse it too, by and by): because this is but a material lie, and not in its formal perfection. But then, a perfect lye with a design to speak what is false, and to deceive the hearers, is as innocent if it be for pleasure or in sport, ridentem dicere falsum quis •etat? to make a sport of violating truth, or in offering it such injury, to please himself, or others; any one may do it out of habit, and make a practice of it, and tell ^(b)lies when he list, out of meer pleasure to be telling lies: yea ^(c)or out of malice (though that be the highest aggravation of sin). An officious lie is with them as harmless, they have warrant enough for the most compleat and perfect lies, ^(d)when they are of any advantage to some, and no hurt to others; how much soever truth be injur'd, or others deceived thereby. So that their true Catholicks, need leave no place for truth, either in their heart or words; when the excluding of it from both, will, without hurt, serve either their pleasure or profit. However, herein they use true and plain dealing, in letting the world know, that in these cases, they are never to be trusted, either in matters of Conversation, or Religion. This being their Principle, ^(e)received by all Catholicks, and universally acknowledged; we need not wonder, that it hath been their common practice in several ages, and that they make no conscience of it still, to counterfeit false miracles, to forge false stories, to ⟨p. 247⟩shew false Reliques, to divulge false Visions, and Revelations, to obtrude on the world supposititious Writings; to corrupt the Monuments of former times, and expunge out of them all the truth that makes against them; to make even the dead speak lies, or disguise the truth.

1. (y)Aquinas, 2. 2. q. 110. art. 1.
2. (a)Si dicatur falsum sed defit voluntas dicendi falsum—non est mendacium proprit aut perfect, & si diligentia esset adhibita, non esset peccatum, & si non sit adh•bita, est veniale, 2. 2. q. 2. C. homines in Sylv. Sum. v. mendacinm. n. 1.Si dicatur falsum sed defit voluntas dicendi falsum—non est mendacium proprit aut perfecte, & si diligentia esset adhibita, non esset peccatum, & si non sit adh•bita, est veniale, 2. 2. q. 2. C. homines in Sylv. Sum. v. mendacinm. n. 1.
3. (b)Quod fit sola mentiendi libidine quod procedit ex habitu: nam mendax ex to quod talis est secundum habitum ipso mendacio gaudet, 4 Ethic.—reducitur ad jocosum, cum sit delectabile mentienti. Idem ibid. nec mendacium erat mortale ut in jocoso & officios•, ibid. n. 3.
4. (c)Contingit tamen propter imperfectionem actus esse veniale peccatum ex malitia: • si quis vana mendacia eligit dicere ex intentione hujus mali, quod est vane mentiri, & non propter aliud. Cajetan. Sum. v. malitia.
5. (d)Officiosum (mendacium) quod fine alicujus injuria dicitur, ut alicui prosit, & hoc etiam est veniale. Cajet. ibid. v. Mendac.
6. (e)Lex de non mentiendo jocose aut officiose sine dumno alterius—(ejus) transgressio est solum venialis, secundum omnes Catholicos. Navar. c. 23. n. 5.

For, all this falseness is officious, it serves the interest of the Church, it is to commend her Doctrine, and to maintain her authority over mens Consciences; and it does the world no hurt; For it is (they say) the duty of all men, and would be their advantage, to entertain her Doctrine, and subject themselves to her Authority. Now if the rest of mankind, Jews, Turks, Heathens, had retained no more conscience nor reverence for truth, than these Catholics: if upon their supposition (that their way was the best), they had proceeded by their rules and methods to broach any lies for them, or falsify any Records against them: who sees not, that this had been a direct course to have left no truth at all in the world, nor means to come to the knowledge of it? yet this practice with the Romanists (so great friends are they to Truth), is but a Venial fault. Did I say they count it so bad? I do them wrong; it is a great piece of piety, to make lies for their Religion, as some ^(f)of themselves do acknowledge it has been accounted. To proceed, ^(g)there are five or six several sorts of lies, (that they may have room enough still to avoid truth), which they may make their practice without danger. It is the pernicious Lye only that need be avoided, that which wrongs others, and is against justice; and thus no violation of truth, no injury to it, how great soever (so tender they are of it) will be a crime, unless withal, it be against Justice: and a Lie, (be it as gross as can be) will not of itself, ^(h)and in its own nature, be more than Venial, but only by accident; when it so falls out that it does mischief: And it may be as innocent to tell lies as truth, and as criminal to speak truth as lies; there will be no difference as to mortal guilt in their own nature: and by accident they ⟨p. 248⟩may do hurt alike. However, considering that Truth and their Religion are so much at odds, the world is obliged to them for being so indifferent as to truth and lies, and that these have no more the preference. But then, though none but pernicious Lies need be shunned, yet not all of this sort neither: they give liberty to tell mischievous lies, as many and as oft as you please, so the mischief they do be not great, though it prejudice others in spirituals or temporals: or though ye do the ⁽ⁱ⁾greatest mischief that can be done, yet if you did not intend it to be great;

For, all this falsness is officious, it serves the interest of the Church, it is to commend her Doctrine, and to maintain her authority over mens Consciences; and it does the world no hurt; For it is (they say) the duty of all men, and would be their advantage, to entertain her Doctrine, and subject themselves to her Authority. Now if the rest of mankind, Jews, Turks, Heathens, had retained no more conscience nor reverence for truth, than these Catholicks: if upon their supposition (that their way was the best), they had proceeded by their rules and methods to broach any lies for them, or falsifie any Records against them: who sees not, that this had been a direct course to have left no truth at all in the world, nor means to come to the knowledg of it? yet this practice with the Romanists (so great friends are they to Truth), is but a Venial fault. Did I say they count it so bad? I do them wrong; it is a great piece of piety, to make lies for their Religion, as some ^(f)of themselves do acknowledg it has been accounted. To proceed, ^(g)there are five or six several sorts of lyes, (that they may have room enough still to avoid truth), which they may make their practice without danger. It is the pernicions Lye only that need be avoided, that which wrongs others, and is against justice; and thus no violation of truth, no injury to it, how great soever (so tender they are of it) will be a crime, unless withall, it be against Justice: and a Lie, (be it as gross as can be) will not of itself, ^(h)and in its own nature, be more than Venial, but only by accident; when it so falls out that it does mischief: And it may be as innocent to tell lies as truth, and as criminal to speak truth as lies; there will be no difference as to mortal guilt in their own nature: and by accident they ⟨p. 248⟩may do hurt alike. However, considering that Truth and their Religion are so much at odds, the world is obliged to them for being so indifferent as to truth and lies, and that these have no more the preference. But then, though none but pernicious Lyes need be shun'd, yet not all of this sort neither: they give liberty to tell mischievous lyes, as many and as oft as you please, so the mischief they do be not great, though it prejudice others in spirituals or temporals: or though ye do the ⁽ⁱ⁾greatest mischief that can be done, yet if you did not intend it to be great;

1. (f)Fuerunt qui magnae pietatis loco ducerent mendaciola pro religione confingere. Ludovicus Vives, & Espensaeus, Come. in Tim. l. 1. c. 11. p. 156.Fuerunt qui magnae pietatis loco ducerent mendaciola pro religione confingere. Ludovicus Vives, & Espensaeus, Com. in Tim. l. 1. c. 11. p. 156.
2. (g)Sylvest. ibid. n. 5.
3. (h)Mendacium si aliam non habet maculam quam falsitatis, non est genere suo mortale, patet, quia neque est contra religionem (Romanam) neque contra justitiam. Soto, ibid. l. 5, q. 7. art. 4. p. 168.
4. (i)Mortalis autem est omnis, & sola illa, quae fit animo notabiliter nocendi in bonis spiritualibus aut temporariis, quamvis non noceat, et illa quae fit nocendo notabiliter, aut dando causam ita nocendi sine tali animo, advertendo tamen, aut advertere debendo per illam notabiliter nocere, aut causam notabilis nocumenti dando, alias non, quamvis injuria gravissima sit juxta mentem. S. Thom. declaratam utrobique per Cajetan. Navarre. c. 18. n. 1.Mortalis autem est omnis, & sola illa, quae fit animo notabiliter nocendi in bonis spiritualibus aut temporariis, quamvis non noceat, et illa quae fit nocendo notabiliter, aut dando causam ita nocendi sine tali animo, advertendo tamen, aut advertere debendo per illam notabiliter nocere, aut causam notabilis nocumenti dando, alias non, quamvis injuria gravissima sit juxta mentem. S. Thom. declaratam utrobique per Cajetan. Navar. c. 18. n. 1.

or if you should not, or did not observe and consider that it would be so; in such cases even pernicious lies will be harmless Venials. They may by their Rules, lye to the prejudice of others in Soul, Body, or Estate, and that deliberately, and with design to do it, provided the damage be not great; but when it will be great, their Casuists cannot well determine; this is not confined to a point, there's a fair latitude, and liberty enough given for less or more, it is much left to discretion: and if he do much mischief instead of little, the Liar cannot be charged with mortal guilt; for who can condemn any for transgressing bounds that are not set? and how can they think, that any injury done by lying, can be great, who count it better than innocent (as we saw before) to abuse the world with lies in point of Religion? Sure if the injury be not great there, any will be small. And in other matters, they have fair leave to do great hurt by lying, so they do it but by degrees, and be not so hasty as to do it all at once. Take but an instance of it in commerce. ^(k)To ⟨p. 249⟩use lies, says de Graffiis, in bargaining, to get a good price, or the using of them to deceive others in a little, is but a Venial fault, though it were a daily practice. Hostiensis thought that this lying to cheat others, if it were their continual practice, might prove mortal: but he is confuted by the common judgment of their Doctors, who hold, that a Venial▪ how much soever multiplied or continued, can never become mortal. We see they may lie, and deceive those that deal with them, if they wrong them but a little at once, this they may do daily and continually; and so in time, that little will be much, yet the sin will be no more; the pernicious Lye which does great injury, will be as innocent as any.

or if you should not, or did not observe and consider that it would be so; in such cases even pernicious lies will be harmless Venials. They may by their Rules, lye to the prejudice of others in Soul, Body, or Estate, and that deliberately, and with design to do it, provided the damage be not great; but when it will be great, their Casuists cannot well determine; this is not confined to a point, there's a fair latitude, and liberty enough given for less or more, it is much left to discretion: and if he do much mischief instead of little, the Lyar caunot be charged with mortal guilt; for who can condemn any for transgressing bounds that are not set? and how can they think, that any injury done by lying, can be great, who count it better than innocent (as we saw before) to abuse the world with lyes in point of Religion? Sure if the injury be not great there, any will be small. And in other matters, they have fair leave to do great hurt by lying, so they do it but by degrees, and be not so hasty as to do it all at once. Take but an instance of it in commerce. ^(k)To ⟨p. 249⟩use lies, says de Graffiis, in bargaining, to get a good price, or the using of them to deceive others in a little, is but a Venial fault, though it were a daily practice. Hostiensis thought that this lying to cheat others, if it were their continual practice, might prove mortal: but he is confuted by the common judgment of their Doctors, who hold, that a Veni•l▪ how much soever multiplied or continued, can never become mortal. We see they may lie, and deceive those that deal with them, if they wrong them but a little at once, this they may do daily and continually; and so in time, that little will be much, yet the sin will be no more; the pernitious Lye which does great injury, will be as innocent as any.

1. (k)Mendaciis uti eo fine in venditione, ut pervenire possit ad justum pretium, vel ipsis uti tantum ad decipiendum in modico, peccatum veniale est, quamvis illis assidue utatur: licet Hostiensis dicat esse mortale, si assidue fiat, quod falsum est, quia veniale de se, quantumcunque multiplicatur & continuetur, nunquam fit mortale, ut Doctores notant, &c. Graft. l. 2. c. 118. n. 10. Excusari tamen à mortali eum qui utitur amphibólogia in contractu cum juramento, &c. Idem. Tom. 2. disp. 4. q. 1. punct. 12. n. 7. ubi Sayrus & alii.Mendaciis uti eo fine in venditione, ut pervenire possit ad justum pretium, vel ipsis uti tantum ad decipiendum in modico, peccatum veniale est, quamvis illis assidue utatur: licet Hostiensis dicat esse mortale, si assidue fiat, quod falsum est, quia veniale de se, quantumcunque multiplicatur & continuetur, nunquam fit mortale, ut Doctores notant, &c. Graff. l. 2. c. 118. n. 10. Excusari tamen à mortali eum qui utitur amphibólogia in contractu cum juramento, &c. Idem. Tom. 2. disp. 4. q. 1. punct. 12. n. 7. ubi Sayrus & alii.

Others teach, that lying is Venial in Trading; for Example, if one affirm falsely, that his Wine is so many years old, or of such a Country, which if the Buyer know to be a lie, he would not buy it at all, or would not give so much for it, this seems no mortal sin, provided all circumstances considered it be as good, and as much worth, or not much less. Bonacin. de contract. disp, 3. q. 1, punct. 2. sect. 2. n. 7. Or if the Sellers affirm with a lie, that the thing cost so much, or was sold to others at such a rate, that they may draw the Buyer to a rigorous price: by thus lying for the most part they sin but Venially, and regularly they are not bound to restitution: because such lies are customary, and men commonly know that these are the tricks of Sellers, to which those who deal with them give no credit; and for the same reason the same must be said of Buyers, who affirm (falsely) that they bought the thing cheaper, or had it offered them for less; that they may get it at the lowest rate. Idem ibid. disp. 3. q. 2. punct. 4. n. 3 1▪ after others; yea, if they not only lye but swear false too with some equivocation, they may be probably excused from mortal sin, if no great damage be done thereby to another. But though they have no more regard of truth in common conversation, or in commerce; yet it may be expected that they will be more tender of it in Judgment, and Courts of Judicature; since they cannot but acknowledge that the perverting of truth in Judgment is destructive of humane Society, and tends to throw the World into confusion. Notwithstanding they maintain lying there also, and that in many cases, I shall but mention some of them. 1. To lye in Court, if the end of it be but delight, ^(l)is harmless. Also, Witnesses may lye there seriously, if they do it ⟨p. 250⟩not as Witnesses, and in ^(m)matters judicial: and ⁽ⁿ⁾the Judg too, if he lye not as a Judg. Further, ^(o)they may bear false witness in favour of another; a false testimony for my Neighbour, is not mortal with them; and the reason is, because the Precept forbids false Witness against another, not for him. And upon the same account, Soto says, a false testimony may be excused, when it is to hinder one from doing injury. Likewise, when the matter in Judicial process, is not of great consequence, a lye is Venial, whether it be for, or against another.

Others teach, that lying is Venial in Trading; for Example, if one affirm falsly, that his Wine is so many years old, or of such a Countrey, which if the Buyer know to be a lie, he would not buy it at all, or would not give so much for it, this seems no mortal sin, provided all circumstances considered it be as good, and as much worth, or not much less. Bonacin. de contract. disp, 3. q. 1, punct. 2. sect. 2. n. 7. Or if the Sellers affirm with a lie, that the thing cost so much, or was sold to others at such a rate, that they may draw the Buyer to a rigorous price: by thus lying for the most part they sin but Venially, and regularly they are not bound to restitution: because such lyes are customary, and men commonly know that these are the tricks of Sellers, to which those who deal with them give no credit; and for the same reason the same must be said of Buyers, who affirm (falsly) that they bought the thing cheaper, or had it offer'd them for less; that they may get it at the lowest rate. Idem ibid. disp. 3. q. 2. punct. 4. n. 3 1▪ after others; yea, if they not only lye but swear false too with some equivocation, they may be probably excused from mortal sin, if no great dammage be done thereby to another. But though they have no more regard of truth in common conversation, or in commerce; yet it may be expected that they will be more tender of it in Judgment, and Courts of Judicature; since they cannot but acknowledge that the perverting of truth in Judgment is destructive of humane Society, and tends to throw the World into confusion. Notwithstanding they maintain lying there also, and that in many cases, I shall but mention some of them. 1. To lye in Court, if the end of it be but delight, ^(l)is harmless. Also, Witnesses may lye there seriously, if they do it ⟨p. 250⟩not as Witnesses, and in ^(m)matters judicial: and ⁽ⁿ⁾the Judg too, if he lye not as a Judg. Further, ^(o)they may bear false witness in favour of another; a false testimony for my Neighbour, is not mortal with them; and the reason is, because the Precept forbids false Witness against another, not for him. And upon the same account, Soto says, a false testimony may be excused, when it is to hinder one from doing injury. Likewise, when the matter in Judicial process, is not of great consequence, a lye is Venial, whether it be for, or against another.

1. (l)Durandus & Sylvester. ibid. n. 5.
2. (m)Navar. secundum Cajetanum. cap. 18. n. 3.
3. (n)Mortalia sunt judicis ut •c mendacia, reliqua sunt per accidens & ideo venialia. Cajetan. Sum. v. Mendac.
4. (o)Testimonium falsum in favorem proximi, non est mortal•: neque adeo quando dicitur, ut idem impediatur injuriam facere: quoniam neque hoc est contra ipsum. Praeceptum Ex. 20. sub illa forma constituitur. Non loqueris contra proximum tuum falsum testionium. Soto, ibid. l. 5. q. 7. art. 4. Victoriae visum est non esse damnondum de mortali falsitate—qui ut suum tueatur innocentiam, utitur testibus see ultra offerentibus ad testificandum salsum—jurando. Vid. Lopez. pars 2. c. 44. p. 264.Testimonium falsum in favorem proximi, non est mortal•: neque adeo quando dicitur, ut idem impediatur injuriam facere: quoniam neque hoc est contra ipsum. Praeceptum Ex. 20. sub illa forma constituitur. Non loqueris contra proximum tuum falsum testionium. Soto, ibid. l. 5. q. 7. art. 4. Victoriae visum est non esse damnondum de mortali falsitate—qui ut suum tueatur innocentiam, utitur testibus se ultra offerentibus ad testificandum salsum—jurando. Vid. Lopez. pars 2. c. 44. p. 264.

So Navarre ^(p)and in him Ledesma, (whom he calls the Glory of the Dominican Order) with Soto, (of the same Order and no less renown) maintain, that no lye is mortal in any Court exterior (that of the Judge) or interior (that of the Confessor); which is but Venial, out of Court. So that if the lye be not signally injurious, it is not mortal, however or wherever it be delivered, though by a Witness in a Trial before a Judge▪ in the face of the Country. Moreover, it is as innocent in all those cases, wherein the Liar is not obliged to speak truth, which are not few. A Lye, says Sylvester ^(q)in judicial matters, is pernicious and mortal; because it subverts the truth of Judgment, which tends to the ruin of the Universe. But then he adds, this is to be limited to things, in which the Liar is bound to speak the truth, and not extended to ⟨p. 251⟩any other. Now they hold, there are very many cases in which they are not obliged to speak the truth, no not in Courts: and in all these by their common Doctrine (not that of the Jesuits only) either they may lye plainly; or (which is all one as to the justice of the practice, and as to the subverting of Judgment), secretly, by equivocation or mental reservation. Antonius Corduba determines, that a person other wise virtuous, being unduly interrogated, whether such a thing was done, which, confessed, might endanger him; he and the Witnesses too, if they cannot otherwise evade, (by saying ^(r)I know not, or I remember not); may say, though it be false, that it was not done, with this reserve, To discover it unto thee; and says, such Interrogatories may be answered or evaded, by any, with equivocal words, in usual ^(*)form. So that he is not bound to tell the truth, though he be sworn to declare it. Navarre holds that not only virtuous, but any person whatever, may so answer in like case; denying that to be done, which was done, secretly meaning, In such a Month; and this he asserts after Gabriel, Paludanus, Adrian, Vincentius Justinianus, and ^(s)Lopez after him. Sylvester ^(t)concludes, when the process is not judicial, or the accused not subject to the Judge; in this case mentioned, or any other cause whatsoever, though a lye he not lawful, yet it is not mortal, yea it will not be so much as Venial, if answering cautiously, and, as they say, sophistically, he speak that which is false in the Judges sense, ^(u)and true ⟨p. 252⟩in his own;

So Navar ^(p)and in him Ledesma, (whom he calls the Glory of the Dominican Order) with Soto, (of the same Order and no less renown) maintain, that no lye is mortal in any Court exterior (that of the Judge) or interior (that of the Confessor); which is but Venial, out of Court. So that if the lye be not signally injurious, it is not mortal, however or wherever it be delivered, though by a Witness in a Trial before a Judge▪ in the face of the Countrey. Moreover, it is as innocent in all those cases, wherein the Lyar is not obliged to speak truth, which are not few. A Lye, saies Sylvester ^(q)in judicial matters, is pernicious and mortal; because it subverts the truth of Judgment, which tends to the ruine of the Ʋniverse. But then he adds, this is to be limited to things, in which the Lyar is bound to speak the truth, and not extended to ⟨p. 251⟩any other. Now they hold, there are very many cases in which they are not obliged to speak the truth, no not in Courts: and in all these by their common Doctrine (not that of the Jesuits only) either they may lye plainly; or (which is all one as to the justice of the practice, and as to the subverting of Judgment), secretly, by equivocation or mental reservation. Antonius Corduba determines, that a person other wise virtuous, being unduly interrogated, whether such a thing was done, which, confessed, might endanger him; he and the Witnesses too, if they cannot otherwise evade, (by saying ^(r)I know not, or I remember not); may say, though it be false, that it was not done, with this reserve, To discover it unto thee; and says, such Interrogatories may be answered or evaded, by any, with equivocal words, in usual ^(*)form. So that he is not bound to tell the truth, though he be sworn to declare it. Navar holds that not only virtuous, but any person whatever, may so answer in like case; denying that to be done, which was done, secretly meaning, In such a Month; and this he asserts after Gabriel, Paludanus, Adrian, Vincentius Justinianus, and ^(s)Lopez after him. Sylvester ^(t)concludes, when the process is not judicial, or the aceused not subject to the Judge; in this case mentioned, or any other cause whatsoever, though a lye he not lawful, yet it is not mortal, yea it will not be so much as Venial, if answering cautiously, and, as they say, sophistically, he speak that which is false in the Judges sense, ^(u)and true ⟨p. 252⟩in his own;

1. (p)Concludendo nullum mendacium esse mortale, to solo, quod, in judicio exteriori, vel interiori dicatur, quod extra illud dictum tale non esset. Navar. cap. 18. n. 3. Censeo in judicio mendacium circa rem ad id pertinentem levissimam tamen contingens, non esse mortale crimen quod—ostendunt. Domin. a Soto, Covarruvius, Navarre. Graft. l. 1. c. 14. n. 6. & l. 2. c. 143. n. 7.Concludendo nullum mendacium esse mortale, to solo, quod, in judicio exteriori, vel interiori dicatur, quod extra illud dictum tale non esset. Navar. cap. 18. n. 3. Censeo in judicio mendacium circa rem ad id pertinentem levissimam tamen contingens, non esse mortale crimen quod—ostendunt. Domin. a Soto, Covarruvius, Navar. Graff. l. 1. c. 14. n. 6. & l. 2. c. 143. n. 7.
2. (q)Mendacium de his quae ad judicium pertinent est perniciosum & mortale: quia subvertit veritatem judicii, quod tendit, in perniciem universitatis, quod limita quantum ad ea, in quibus qui mentitur, tenetur dicere veritatem, non aliter. Ibid. n. 3.
3. (r)Liceret sibi & testibus injustè interrogatis sic respondere: (quando tunc respondere nescio, non recordor non prodasstt) non furatus sum, intelligendo, ad jure revelandum tibi.—alias tenemur per verba, & modos assuetos, licèt aequivocos injuste, interroganti, respondere. Lopez. cap. 51. p. 264.
4. (*)Angel. Sum. v. Confess. n. 1.
5. (s)Intelligendo intra se quod isto vel illo mense non fuerit id res furatus—Navarre opinio testimoniis Gabriel Adriani, Paludens & Vincent. Justiniani, rata habetur. Ibid.
6. (t)Quum juridice non procedet, vel quia accusatus non est ei subjectus simpliciter vel in hoc casu, aut quacunque alia causa, tune licèt mendacium sic illicitum, non est tamen mortale—Immò non erit etiam veniale, si respondendo cautelose, &, ut aiunt Sophistice, dicat aliquid salsum, apud sensum judicis, & apud suum verum; quia eo casu cum non sit ejus subditus, non tenetur dicere veritatem ad ejus intentionem. Rationem dictorum assignat. Hen. de Gan. Sylv. Sum. v. accusatio. n. 10.
7. (u)Licèt ei uti aequivocatione, Soto de just. l. 5. q. 6. art. 2. Adrian dicit, talem reum posse dicere non seci, & Cajetan. Opusc. 16. q. 5. Dicit posse respondere se non habuisse complices, quamvis habuerit, in Toll. Instr. l. 5. c. 58.Licèt ei uti aequivocatione, Soto de just. l. 5. q. 6. art. 2. Adrian dicit, talem reum posse dicere non seci, & Cajetan. Opusc. 16. q. 5. Dicit posse respondere se non habuisse complices, quamvis habuerit, in Tol. Instr. l. 5. c. 58.

^(w)since not being under him, he is not obliged to speak truth in his sense, and alledges Henricus de Gandavo, with his reason for it. Soto allows him to use Equivocation. Cajetan permits him to deny his Complices, though he had them. If the Judge demand of a Priest upon Oath, whether he knew such a thing by confession? ^(y)AQUINAS, and all the Doctors conclude, that he may swear he knows it not, though it hath been confessed to him, Because he knows it not as a man. And according to V•r•cellus, if he cannot otherwise decline the Judge, he may answer be knows nothing, with this inward reserve, AS A MAN; and in this Richard. de Sancto Victore, Bonaventure, Scotus and Panormitan agree; yet Angelus thinks when he swears, he knows it not, it had better be with this reserve, TO DISCOVER IT, because it cannot be denied, but that he knows it AS A MAN: ^(z)but this, says Sylvester, is said against the judgment of all his Doctors, and against the Canon Law, understood according to their common Doctrine, because the Priest is there said, to know it AS GOD. This needs no aggravation; a Priest rather than speak the truth (though ^(a)the discovery of it may be necessary to secure a Prince or a Nation from ruin), may with mental reservation delude Authority, and blaspheme God, and lye, and swear falsely in open Court; and be justified in all, by the authority ⟨p. 253⟩of the chief Saints and Doctors that Church has had, and such as she gloried in, before Ignatius had any disciples.

^(w)since not being under him, he is not obliged to speak truth in his sense, and alledges Henricus de Gandavo, with his reason for it. Soto allows him to use Equivication. Cajetan permits him to deny his Complices, though he had them. If the Judge demand of a Priest upon Oath, whether he knew such a thing by confession? ^(y)AQƲINAS, and all the Doctors conclude, that he may swear he knows it not, though it hath been confessed to him, Because he knows it not as a man. And according to V•r•cellus, if he cannot otherwise decline the Judge, he may answer be knows nothing, with this inward reserve, AS A MAN; and in this Richard. de Sancto Victore, Bonaventure, Scotus and Panormitan agree; yet Angelus thinks when he swears, he knows it not, it had better be with this reserve, TO DISCOVER IT, because it cannot be deny'd, but that he knows it AS A MAN: ^(z)but this, saies Sylvester, is said against the judgment of all his Doctors, and against the Canon Law, understood according to their common Doctrine, because the Priest is there said, to know it AS GOD. This needs no aggravation; a Priest rather than speak the truth (though ^(a)the discovery of it may be nenessary to secure a Prince or a Nation from ruine), may with mental reservation delude Authority, and blaspheme God, and lye, and swear falsly in open Court; and be justified in all, by the authority ⟨p. 253⟩of the chief Saints and Doctors that Church has had, and such as she gloried in, before Ignatius had any disciples.

1. (w)Non tenetur respondere etiamsi jurasset dicere veritatem secundum, Henr. de Gand.—sed dicetne mendacium? Resp. quod non sed utetur aliis verbis duplicibus & silatis. Angel. Surn. v. Confess. n. 1.
2. (y)Quid. si judex instat, vel exigit juramentum à sacerdote an per confessionem sciat aliquid de tali facto? Et dico quod secundum, S. Tho. & omnes doctores, sacerdos si ab eo quaeretur, de aliquo absente, an aliquid sciat quod audivit in confessione jurare potest, se nescire illud: quia non scit illud in quantum homo—Secundùm Vervec, si alio modo iniquum judicem declinare non potest: respondere potest se nihil scire quia subintelligiter ut homo—& consentit Rich. Bonav. Scot. & Pan. Sylvest. v. confessio 3. n. 6.
3. (z)Quod ejus dictum est contra omnem doctrinam suorum Doctorum et contra C. si sacerd. intellectum juxta communem doctrinam: quia ibi dicitur sacerdos hoc scire ut Deus.
4. (a)Certum est obligationem hujus precepti tantum esse, ut in nullo casu, & propter nullum finem, etiam pro tuenda tota republice ab ingenti malo temporally aut spirituali, violare illud liceat. Ita docent theologi omnes contra unum Altisiod tenet. D. Tho. S. Bonav. Richard, Scotus, Durand. Palud. Major. Capreol. Gabriel. Alensis. Adrian. Medina. Viguer. Sylv. & alii summistae, omnes Pet. Soto. Domin. Soto. Navarre. Covarruv. Simanca. Cajetan. Ledesma in Suar. Tom. 34. disp. 33. sect. 1. n. 2.Certum est obligationem hujus precepti tantum esse, ut in nullo casu, & propter nullum finem, etiam pro tuenda tota republice ab ingenti malo temporali aut spirituali, violare illud liceat. Ita docent theologi omnes contra unum Altisiod tenet. D. Tho. S. Bonav. Richard, Scotus, Durand. Palud. Major. Capreol. Gabriel. Alensis. Adrian. Medina. Viguer. Sylv. & alii summistae, omnes Pet. Soto. Domin. Soto. Navar. Covarruv. Simanca. Cajetan. Ledesma in Suar. Tom. 34. disp. 33. sect. 1. n. 2.

But though truth suffer so much by them in civil things; it may be she may find sanctuary in their divine Offices, and be secured there from such shameful violations: no, even there she is prostituted before their Altars, in their Pulpits, and their penitential Tribunals. Their Liturgies have been stuffed with Fables, and Lies made both the ground and part of their public devotion. Their own ⁽¹⁾Writers take notice of ⁽²⁾plain lies recited in their daily Prayers. And what store of them there were in the whole, we may guess by a part. ⁽³⁾Peter Abbot of Cluny declares, that in a Church hymn in praise of Saint Benet, though reading it cursorily, and not marking all; yet he found 24 lies at least. Some reformation hereof was thought requisite, for shame of the World. But though the old sore smelt noisomely even to the sense of those amongst themselves who had any; yet it must be touched tenderly, and not all the corruption let out, least nothing at all of the old Service should be lest. Melchior Canus, (a Bishop from whom better things might be expected than most in the Council of Trent where he sate), acknowledged some years after, that there are things read in their Church-Service that are uncertain, counterfeit, frivolous and false too; but yet he thought it not advisable, to have this throughly purged. Those that attempt it, in his account want prudence. They cure a sore nail, but mischief the head; They bring in grave stories ⟨p. 254⟩instead of what were false, but they change the Church-Service so far from what it was, that scarce any show of the old Religion seems less in the daily Prayers: whereby he lets us understand what their old Religion or religious Service is, since so little or nothing of it would be left, if no lies or forgeries were left therein. Another learned Bishop of their Church, who survived the Trent-Council, and all the Orders there made for Reformation, not only complains still of false and foolish things there; but of something worse too, in these words: ^(b)if the Bishop of Lyons, says he, who declared that he had corrected superfluous, and ridiculous, and blasphemous things, in their Missals and Antiphonaries; were now alive, and did behold them: Oh with what terms would be set them out? for our prayert are defiled with most filthy corruptions; but the rest will admit of no reformation, through the fault of the Bishops.

But though truth suffer so much by them in civil things; it may be she may find sanctuary in their divine Offices, and be secured there from such shameful violations: no, even there she is prostituted before their Astars, in their Pulpits, and their penitential Tribunals. Their Lyturgies have been stuffed with Fables, and Lyes made both the ground and part of their publick devotion. Their own ⁽¹⁾Writers take notice of ⁽²⁾plain lyes recited in their daily Prayers. And what store of them there were in the whole, we may guess by a part. ⁽³⁾Peter Abbat of Cluny declares, that in a Church hymn in praise of Saint Benet, though reading it cursorily, and not marking all; yet he found 24 lyes at least. Some reformation hereof was thought repuisite, for shame of the World. But though the old sore smelt noisomly even to the sense of those amongst themselves who had any; yet it must be touched tenderly, and not all the corruption let out, least nothing at all of the old Service should be lest. Melchior Canus, (a Bishop from whom better things might be expected than most in the Council of Trent where he sate), acknowledged some years after, that there are things read in their Church-Service that are uncertain, counterfeit, frivolous and false too; but yet he thought it not adviseable, to have this throughly purged. Those that attempt it, in his account want prudence. They cure a sore nail, but mischief the head; They bring in grave stories ⟨p. 254⟩instead of what were false, but they change the Church-Service so far from what it was, that scarce any shew of the old Religion seems less in the daily Prayers: whereby he lets us understand what their old Religion or religious Service is, since so little or nothing of it would be left, if no lyes or forgeries were left therein. Another learned Bishop of their Church, who survived the Trent-Council, and all the Orders there made for Reformation, not only complains still of false and foolish things there; but of something worse too, in these words: ^(b)if the Bishop of Lyons, says he, who declared that he had corrected superfluous, and ridiculous, and blasphemous things, in their Missalls and Antiphonaries; were now alive, and did behold them: Oh with what terms would be set them out? for our prayert are defiled with most filthy corruptions; but the rest will admit of no reformation, through the fault of the Bishops.

1. (1)Vid. Espenc. come. in 2 Tom. c. 4. digr. 21.Vid. Espenc. com. in 2 Tom. c. 4. digr. 21.
2. (2)Nuper Raphael. Volateranus ausus est scribere dolendum, aperta in horis Canonicis legi mendacia. Ibid. p. 424.
3. (3)Nosti quantum me pigeant falsa in Ecclesia Dei cantica, quantum nugae canorae mihi odibiles, inter quas, nam plurimae sunt—mendacia ad minus 24 canticum id, citato percurrens animo, reperi. Ibid. p. 433. In res sacras hanc quoque mentiendi licentiam irrepsisse, seu potius aperte invectam esse. Ludovic. Vives, l. 2. de corruptis artibus, Espens. in 1 Tim. digr. l. 1. c. 11. p. 156. Quae in Ecclesia legi solent—quanquam nonnulla ex his incerta sunt, apocrypha levia, falsa. Loc. Theol. l. 11. c. 5. p. 911. In his prudentia desideratur. Quidam namque dumb reduviam currant, capiti incommodant, videlicet historias graves pro apocryphis reddunt quidem, sed divinum Ecclesiae officium usque eo praeter solitam immutant, ut vi• ulla antique religionis forma in quotidianis precibus relicta esse videatur. Ibid. p. 910.Nosti quantum me pigeant falsa in Ecclesia Dei cantica, quantum nugae canorae mihi odibiles, inter quas, nam plurimae sunt—mendacia ad minus 24 canticum id, citato percurrens animo, reperi. Ibid. p. 433. In res sacras hanc quoque mentiendi licentiam irrepsisse, seu potius aperte invectam esse. Ludovic. Vives, l. 2. de corruptis artibus, Espens. in 1 Tim. digr. l. 1. c. 11. p. 156. Quae in Ecclesia legi solent—quanquam nonnulla ex his incerta sunt, apocrypha levia, falsa. Loc. Theol. l. 11. c. 5. p. 911. In his prudentia desideratur. Quidam namque dum reduviam curant, capiti incommodant, videlicet historias graves pro apocryphis reddunt quidem, sed divinum Ecclesiae officium usque eo praeter solitam immutant, ut vi• ulla antiqu• religionis forma in quotidianis precibus relicta esse videatur. Ibid. p. 910.
4. (b)Episcopus ille Lugdunensis qui dixit se in missaltbus & antiphonariis superflu•, levia falsa ridicula; blaspheme phantastica multa correxisse; si nunc viveret & ea con•iceret Deum immortalem! quo ea nomine depingeret? sunt (enim) preces (nostrae) turpissimis mendis conspurcatae: come. in Tim. 1. l. 1. 157. Espencaeus, in the words of Lindanus.Episcopus ille Lugdunensis qui dixit se in missaltbus & antiphonariis superflu•, levia falsa ridicula; blaspheme phantastica multa correxisse; si nunc viveret & ea con•iceret Deum immortalem! quo ea nomine depingeret? sunt (enim) preces (nostrae) turpissimis mendis conspurcatae: com. in Tim. 1. l. 1. 157. Espencaeus, in the words of Lindanus.

He signifies, that there was something worse in their Service-Books, than that idle, false, ridiculous, and blasphemous stuff, which that ancient Bishop Agohardus corrected, in the old Missals and Antiphonaries: declaring expressly, that their prayers now were polluted with most filthy Corruptions, and that without hope of amendment. Nor is truth more secure amongst them, in the Pulpit, though that (where is bears any sway at all) is its Throne. A Preacher may lye, by Cajetans ^(c)leave, if he does it not as a Preacher, or in things which belong to him as such. In other matters, it seems, he may take his liberty; and lying when he is Preaching, will be but Venial, unless it be scandalous. He may lye in the Pulpit, if he can do it wittily; ^(d)he may mix his Sermons with false stories, (if they ⟨p. 255⟩be facetious) to please his auditory, ^(e)that's commonly a Venial- He may ^(f)tell a tale in his Sermon, or any thing ridiculous, if he do it with some wit this is commonly no worse than Venial; no nor so bad, if it be done succinctly, to make the people merry, so the mirth be honest. He may lye too, as a serious Divine; and instill false Doctrine into the people without any fault but what is Venial, if it be done without contempt or scandal, so Summa Angelica, and Rosella, with others, conclude. ^(g)They limit it indeed, to matters under Counsel; but this does not much straiten them; for practical Divinity being the most proper Subject for Sermons, and virtues, with Christian duties, (and the opposite sins,) being, by their common Doctrine, in a manner all reduced to Counsels, some way or other (as we have showed before): they have liberty enough left them, to do nothing else but lye instead of Preaching. But in any matters of Divinity whatsoever, speculative, or practical; enjoined, or but advised; they may lye at as easy a rate, if ^(h)it be but done out of a fluent faculty, or without danger, and design of doing signal mischief. Their practice publicly allowed, has outdone their rules; for these, though licentious enough, must have now and then some show of modesty, and caution. Sylvester takes notice of those, who held it was no mortal sin to lye in the Pulpit, and acted accordingly; ⁷and thought themselves concerned, only to avoid such monstrous lies as ⟨p. 256⟩the people would smell out. But this cautiousness, was not always thought needful;

He signifies, that there was something worse in their Service-Books, than that idle, false, ridiculous, and blasphemous stuff, which that antient Bishop Agohardus corrected, in the old Missals and Antiphonaries: declaring expresly, that their prayers now were poluted with most filthy Corruptions, and that without hope of amendment. Nor is truth more secure amongst them, in the Pulpit, though that (where is bears any sway at all) is its Throne. A Preacher may lye, by Cajetans ^(c)leave, if he does it not as a Preacher, or in things which belong to him as such. In other matters, it seems, he may take his liberty; and lying when he is Preaching, will be but Venial, unless it be scandalous. He may lye in the Pulpit, if he can do it wittily; ^(d)he may min his Sermons with false stories, (if they ⟨p. 255⟩be facetious) to please his auditory, ^(e)that's commonly a Venial- He may ^(f)tell a tale in his Sermon, or any thing ridiculous, if he do it with some wit this is commonly no worse than Venial; no nor so bad, if it be done succinctly, to make the people merry, so the mirth be honest. He may lye too, as a serious Divine; and instill false Doctrine into the people without any fault but what is Venial, if it be done without contempt or scandal, so Summa Angelica, and Rosella, with others, conclude. ^(g)They limit it indeed, to matters under Counsel; but this does not much straiten them; for practical Divinity being the most proper Subject for Sermons, and vertues, with Christian duties, (and the opposite sins,) being, by their common Doctrine, in a manner all reduced to Counsels, some way or other (as we have shew'd before): they have liberty enough left them, to do nothing else but lye instead of Preaching. But in any matters of Divinity whatsoever, speculative, or practical; injoyned, or but advised; they may lye at as easie a rate, if ^(h)it be but done out of a fluent faculty, or without danger, and design of doing signal mischief. Their practice publickly allowed, has outdone their rules; for these, though licentious enough, must have now and then some shew of modesty, and caution. Sylvester takes notice of those, who held it was no mortal sin to lye in the Pulpit, and acted accordingly; ⁷and thought themselves concerned, only to avoid such monstrous lyes as ⟨p. 256⟩the people would smell out. But this cautiousness, was not always thought needful;

1. (c)Sam. v. mendicium, p. 437. omne mendacium predicatoris contra veritatem spectantem ad predicatoris officium (est mortale)—quoniam haec tantum sunt predicatores ut sic—mendacia: reliqua sunt per accidens, & ideo venialia: nisi rationes scandali aliud occurrat censendum.
2. (d)Quaeritur utrum fit peccatum mortal predicatori mentiri in ambone? & dico quod non, in eis quae non spectant ad doctrinam puta, • dicat aliqua jocosa. Sylv. v. Mendac. n. 4. Graft. l. 2. cap. 143. n. 5. S. Thom. in opusc. 4. precept. 8.Quaeritur utrum fit peccatum mortale predicatori mentiri in ambone? & dico quod non, in eis quae non spectant ad doctrinam puta, • dicat aliqua jocosa. Sylv. v. Mendac. n. 4. Graff. l. 2. cap. 143. n. 5. S. Thom. in opusc. 4. precept. 8.
3. (e)Immiscere predicationi facetas fabellus delictaudi gratia quod B. Ambrosius reprehendit quia non debent, in tam gravi actione de rebus tam arduis qualia sunt divina verba, immisceri jocosa & ridicula. Communiter tamen est hoc veniale. Cajetan. sum. v. predicat: p. 481.
4. (f)Qui concioni fabulam & facetias, aut aliquid ridiculum miscet, peccat quidem juxta S. Antoninum & Cajetanum, sed commaniter non plusquam venialiter, juxta •undem, imo non semper venialiter, ut cum ad hilaritatem honestam breviter dicuntur, ut tradit, Augustin. Triumphus Navarre. c. 25. n. 142-Qui concioni fabulam & facetias, aut aliquid ridiculum miscet, peccat quidem juxta S. Antoninum & Cajetanum, sed commaniter non plusquam venialiter, juxta •undem, imo non semper venialiter, ut cum ad hilaritatem honestam breviter dicuntur, ut tradit, Augustin. Triumphus Navar. c. 25. n. 142-
5. (g)In pertinentibus ad doctrinam tenent. Sum. Angel. & Rosell. quod non sit mortale, nisi ratione scandali vel contemptus doctrine annexi: vel nisi in his que sunt de necessitate facienda, intellige etiam omittenda, secus si ex consilio, Sylvest. v. mendac. n. 4.
6. (h)Peccat qui mentitur in materia fidei, sacrae scripturae vel morum—quod limitat Cajetanus, non procedere quando id fit per solum multiloquium, vel alias sine animo & periculo nocendi notabiliter. Navarre. c. 18. n. 4.Peccat qui mentitur in materia fidei, sacrae scripturae vel morum—quod limitat Cajetanus, non procedere quando id fit per solum multiloquium, vel alias sine animo & periculo nocendi notabiliter. Navar. c. 18. n. 4.
7. 7(i) Credunt non esse mortale mentiri in ambone, nisi ut illi dicunt, predicant maximas falsitates, quae deinde à saecularibus deprehenduntur. Ibid.

he that reads the Legends, which served the people heretofore for Sermons: will find there multitudes of such stories, so absurdly, ridiculously, horridly false; as may fully convince him, that the Spirit which acted them, was seven times worse, than that which inspired Ahab's Prophets. And where they are now disused: its not with any acknowledgement, that such notorious lies, were not fit to be Preached; but for shame of that part of the world, which they could no longer delude, and abuse. And even after their reformation, they could not quite leave their old habit; their Priests since, have this testimony from one of their own Doctors: ^(k)The law says he, is perished from Priests; for History, they recite fables; for serious things, jests; for truth, lies; for the power of God, feigned miracles, not to say the prodigies of Devils. That such Doctrine, should have some confirmation, is no more than needs: they provided such as was answerable to it, such are their false miracles, which their (now mentioned) Espenceous calls, Devilish prodigies. And ^(l)false relics, or miracles, they allow to be showed, or published; it is not a mortal sin with them, unless it be done for filthy lucre; and it is not filthy lucre, ^(m)if it be done principally for a good end, and less principally for gain.

he that reads the Legends, which served the people heretofore for Sermons: will find there multitudes of such stories, so absurdly, ridiculously, horridly false; as may fully convince him, that the Spirit which acted them, was seven times worse, than that which inspired Ahabs Prophets. And where they are now disused: its not with any acknowledgment, that such notorious lyes, were not fit to be Preached; but for shame of that part of the world, which they could no longer delude, and abuse. And even after their reformation, they could not quite leave their old habit; their Priests since, have this testimony from one of their own Doctors: ^(k)The law saies he, is perished from Priests; for History, they recite fables; for serious things, jests; for truth, lyes; for the power of God, feigned miracles, not to say the prodigies of Devils. That such Doctrine, should have some confirmation, is no more than needs: they provided such as was answerable to it, such are their false miracles, which their (now mentioned) Espenceous calls, Divilish prodigies. And ^(l)false reliques, or miracles, they allow to be shew'd, or published; it is not a mortal sin with them, unless it be done for filthy lucre; and it is not filthy lucre, ^(m)if it be done principally for a good end, and less principally for gain.

1. (k)Verum lex periit à sacerdotibus; recitant pro Historia fabulas, pro seriis joca, pro veritate mendacium,—pro virtute Dei fictitia miracula ne dicam portenta Dae• niorum. Espencaeus, Serm. 1. De officio pastorum. After he hath premised something of the preaching and writing of false Miracles, he adds: At facilius Augia stabulum, quam talibus fabellis multorum tam libros, tam concio nes repurges, in 2 Tim. c. 4. digr. 21. p. 424.
2. (l)Peccat qui utitur falsis reliquiis aut veris, causa turpis quaestus. Navarre. cap. 17: n. 169. Graft. l. 2. c. 134. n. 30. Idem dic de illo, qui utitur falsis reliquiis, Si causa turpis quaestus fiat, id est, eo fine aliquid accipiendi pro ostensione earum.Peccat qui utitur falsis reliquiis aut veris, causa turpis quaestus. Navar. cap. 17: n. 169. Graff. l. 2. c. 134. n. 30. Idem dic de illo, qui utitur falsis reliquiis, Si causa turpis quaestus fiat, id est, eo fine aliquid accipiendi pro ostensione earum.
3. (m)Navarre. Ibid.Navar. Ibid.

And now I cannot devise where there can be any expectation, that they will be restrained from lying; unless in their Sacrament of Penance: that is, in their account, the holiest Rite, wherein the partakers have liberty of speech: Here they confess sin, and profess to do it with a sincere abhorrence of it, as before God, in order to pardon, which they then expect; one would think, in this act at least they should count themselves obliged, to be far from such a ⟨p. 257⟩crime, as offering violence to truth; but hereby it appears, that truth can in no wise be fastened to any part of their Religion; they let us know that there is nothing so holy amongst them, where they will not find a place for lying and deceit: and that where-ever they have liberty of speech, they must have leave to lye. 'Tis the ⁽ⁿ⁾common Doctrine, that they may lye in confession, which yet they say, is directed principally to God; and they look upon the Confessors chair as the Divine Tribunal. The confient may deny ^(o)that ever he committed those Venial sins which he is guilty of, ^(p)or affirm he is guilty when he is not, or he may deny either Venial or mortal sin, to his Confessor, ^(q)if he be not sufficient. Or he may deny ^(r)that ever he acted those mortal sins which he has committed; if he has confessed them to another. And thus he may without mortal sin delude and cheat his Confessor, even when he is upon his knees before him and looks upon him as God, and not as man (for so they are taught to do, as we said before.) To this purpose, when their wickedness is too shameful to be made known to a sober Priest; a person may have ^(s)two Confessors, one a ⟨p. 258⟩lewd fellow like himself, to whom he may, without shame, confess the worst debauches; and the other more civil, to whom he may confess his lesser sins: denying, if he be asked, that he is guilty of any greater. And as they may abuse their Confessors with plain lies, so likewise with equivocations. Joh. Sanchez (no Jesuit) offers us several instances; Select. disp. 9. He that is not able to make restitution, may affirm he has done it; if he think his Confessor be ignorant, and would not absolve him without it. He that is accustomed to some wickedness, and thinks the Confessor would not absolve him if he confessed it; may with equivocation deny it is his custom; to this sense, I have no such custom, not absolutely, but which I will confess at present. n. 7.

And now I cannot devise where there can be any expectation, that they will be restrained from lying; unless in their Sacrament of Penance: that is, in their account, the holiest Rite, wherein the partakers have liberty of speech: Here they confess sin, and profess to do it with a sincere abhorrence of it, as before God, in order to pardon, which they then expect; one would think, in this act at least they should count themselves obliged, to be far from such a ⟨p. 257⟩crime, as offering violence to truth; but hereby it appears, that truth can in no wise be fastened to any part of their Religion; they let us know that there is nothing so holy amongst them, where they will not find a place for lying and deceit: and that where-ever they have liberty of speech, they must have leave to lye. 'Tis the ⁽ⁿ⁾common Doctrine, that they may lye in confession, which yet they say, is directed principally to God; and they look upon the Confessors chair as the Divine Tribunal. The confient may deny ^(o)that ever he committed those Venial sins which he is guilty of, ^(p)or affirm he is guilty when he is not, or he may deny either Venial or mortal sin, to his Confessor, ^(q)if he be not sufficient. Or he may deny ^(r)that ever he acted those mortal sins which he has committed; if he has confessed them to another. And thus he may without mortal sin delude and cheat his Confessor, even when he is upon his knees before him and looks upon him as God, and not as man (for so they are taught to do, as we said before.) To this purpose, when their wickedness is too shameful to be made known to a sober Priest; a person may have ^(s)two Confessors, one a ⟨p. 258⟩lewd fellow like himself, to whom he may, without shame, confess the worst debauches; and the other more civil, to whom he may confess his lesser sins: denying, if he be asked, that he is guilty of any greater. And as they may abuse their Confessors with plain lyes, so likewise with equivocations. Joh. Sanchez (no Jesuite) offers us several instances; Select. disp. 9. He that is not able to make restitution, may affirm he has done it; if he think his Confessor be ignorant, and would not absolve him without it. He that is accustomed to some wickedness, and thinks the Confessor would not absolve him if he confessed it; may with equivocation deny it is his custom; to this sense, I have no such custome, not absolutely, but which I will confess at present. n. 7.

1. (n)Angelus, v. Confess. Sylvest. v. Confess. 1. n. 9. Nav. c. 21. n. 37. Graft. l. 1. c. 14. n. 6. Covarruvius. Petr. Soto in Victorell. p. 530. Bannes, Salonius, &c. in •ll•r. 4. n. 44. alii in Suar. Tom. 4. disp. 22. sect. 10. Circa eas circumstantias, quae nullo modo pertinent ad materiam confessionis—non est peccatum mortale miscere aliquod mendaciam, sive affirmando sive negando; sed est veniale g•avias quam esset simile mendacium extra illum actum. In hoc conveniunt omnes doctores citandi, (viz. Richardus Paludan. Bonavent. Cajetan. Ledesma, Armilla, Angel•, Sylvest. Soto, Navarre. Pen Soto.) Idem ibid. n. 3▪ & 6.Angelus, v. Confess. Sylvest. v. Confess. 1. n. 9. Nav. c. 21. n. 37. Graff. l. 1. c. 14. n. 6. Covarruvius. Petr. Soto in Victorell. p. 530. Bannes, Salonius, &c. in •ll•r. 4. n. 44. alii in Suar. Tom. 4. disp. 22. sect. 10. Circa eas circumstantias, quae nullo modo pertinent ad materiam confessionis—non est peccatum mortale miscere aliquod mendaciam, sive affirmando sive negando; sed est veniale g•avias quam esset simile mendacium extra illum actum. In hoc conveniunt omnes doctores citandi, (viz. Richardus Paludan. Bonavent. Cajetan. Ledesma, Armilla, Angel•, Sylvest. Soto, Navar. Pen Soto.) Idem ibid. n. 3▪ & 6.
2. (o)Navarre. ibid. n. 37. Soto in opusc. d• secret memb. 2. q. 7. Sylvest. ibid. Est cert• mentiri in materia non necessaria negando factum, non esse peccatum mortale, in quo etiam omnes conveniunt quos statim referemus (viz. jam laudati). Suar. ibid. n. 4.Navar. ibid. n. 37. Soto in opusc. d• secret memb. 2. q. 7. Sylvest. ibid. Est cert• mentiri in materia non necessaria negando factum, non esse peccatum mortale, in quo etiam omnes conveniunt quos statim referemus (viz. jam laudati). Suar. ibid. n. 4.
3. (p)Mendacium affirmativum de peccato veniali—non esse peccatum mortale per se l•quendo, hoc est secluso scandalo & contemptu, tenet Angelus, Sylvester, Soto, Pe•, Soto, Navarre. Idem ibid. N. V.Mendacium affirmativum de peccato veniali—non esse peccatum mortale per se l•quendo, hoc est secluso scandalo & contemptu, tenet Angelus, Sylvester, Soto, Pe•, Soto, Navar. Idem ibid. N. V.
4. (q)Sylvest. ibid. vel affirmando. Idem in Suar. ibid. n. 10.
5. (r)Non peccare mortaliter, ut dirimus, confitentem negantem see admisisse peccatum mortal, alias ligitime confessum. Navarre. ibid. n. 38.Non peccare mortaliter, ut dirimus, confitentem negantem se admisisse peccatum mortale, alias ligitime confessum. Navar. ibid. n. 38.
6. (s)Unde sequitur non peccare mortaliter eos, qui ne suam existimationem honestam a•ittant, confessario cuidem familiari suo confitentur omnia peccata sua, etiam obscaema, & postea alteri probo & gravi solum leviora,, quod de se non est malum, & si sinis verialls fuerit, peccatum venial erit, & si mortalis, mortal, & si bonus qualis frequen•r est, sanctus & probus, immo interdum necessarius. Idem ibid. n. 40. Vid. Sylvest. ibid. n. 8. Bonacina, (& in eo Victoria cum aliis) Tom. 1. disp. 5. q. 6. sect. 2. punct. 2.Unde sequitur non peccare mortaliter eos, qui ne suam existimationem honestam a•ittant, confessario cuidem familiari suo confitentur omnia peccata sua, etiam obscaema, & postea alteri probo & gravi solum leviora,, quod de se non est malum, & si sinis verialls fuerit, peccatum veniale erit, & si mortalis, mortale, & si bonus qualis frequen•r est, sanctus & probus, immo interdum necessarius. Idem ibid. n. 40. Vid. Sylvest. ibid. n. 8. Bonacina, (& in eo Victoria cum aliis) Tom. 1. disp. 5. q. 6. sect. 2. punct. 2.