The worst perfidiousness in the world, may be excused from mortal guilt, according to Cajetan, (d)through ignorance of the fact; or through forgetfulness (if one forget to be honest, he may be innocently a knave); or out of confidence in him, to whom he is engaged (the good nature of one party concerned, may be a warrant to the other to break faith with him); or for any cause, which he thinks reasonable. He need have said no more than this, any one may violate all truth, and ⟨p. 262⟩faith; not only, when there is some reasonable cause; but when there there is any that seems but so to him: when any thing will seem so to him, who is disposed to play the knave. This is enough to Licence a world of perfidiousness; but this is not all. Sylvester after others tells us, a (e)man is not obliged to perform, promise or compact, if he had not a mind to oblige himself thereby; yea or if he had a mind to dissemble, (to feign that he is engaged, when he did not mean it): for, says he, though he offend, yet he is not obliged, unless there was a cause from some command, which, of it self, would oblige him: as for Example, if he had promised Cloths to his Father, and he is now starving for cold, in such a case (would ye think it?) one may be bound to keep his promise, to wit, when he would have been a monster, if he had not done the thing, though he had never promised it. He tells us else-where, (f)that a promise does oblige, when it is made to a City, or an University, the Clergy, the Church, or the poor of a certain place, in case it be for some cause, to wit, for the honour of God, or the like: but if there be no cause, it does not bind, though it be made to those forementioned; and it does not bind, when it is made to any other besides those, though there be cause for it. Others maintain (g)that a promise or compact does not oblige in conscience to performance, if the cause why it is made be not expressed; so Panormitan, Angelus and Rosella, with others: so that if a man forbear but to mention the cause (which is most commonly ⟨p. 263⟩done, and may be always), though he bind himself with ten thousand promises or covenants, he may with a safe conscience break them all, by their rules. They hold that the firmest promise does but bind under Venial guilt. Cajetan, Armilla, Rebellus, Garzias, in Bonacin. ibid. n. 12.
The worst perfidiousness in the world, may be excused from mortal guilt, according to Cajetan, (d)through ignorance of the fact; or through forgetfulness (if one forget to be honest, he may be innocently a knave); or out of confidence in him, to whom he is ingaged (the good nature of one party concern'd, may be a warrant to the other to break faith with him); or for any cause, which he thinks reasonable. He need have said no more than this, any one may violate all truth, and ⟨p. 262⟩faith; not only, when there is some reasonable cause; but when there there is any that seems but so to him: when any thing will seem so to him, who is disposed to play the knave. This is enough to Licence a world of perfidiousness; but this is not all. Sylvester after others tells us, a (e)man is not obliged to perform, promise or compact, if he had not a mind to oblige himself thereby; yea or if he had a mind to dissemble, (to feign that he is ingaged, when he did not mean it): for, saies he, though he offend, yet he is not obliged, unless there was a cause from some command, which, of it self, would oblige him: as for Example, if he had promised Cloths to his Father, and he is now starving for cold, in such a case (would ye think it?) one may be bound to keep his promise, to wit, when he would have been a monster, if he had not done the thing, though he had never promised it. He tells us else-where, (f)that a promise does oblige, when it is made to a City, or an Ʋniversity, the Clergy, the Church, or the poor of a certain place, in case it be for some cause, to wit, for the honour of God, or the like: but if there be no cause, it does not bind, though it be made to those foremenrioned; and it does not bind, when it is made to any other besides tbose, though there be cause for it. Others maintain (g)that a promise or compact does not oblige in conscience to performance, if the cause why it is made be not expressed; so Panormitan, Angelus and Rosella, with others: so that if a man forbear but to mention the cause (which is most commonly ⟨p. 263⟩done, and may be always), though he bind himself with ten thousand promises or covenants, he may with a safe conscience break them all, by their rules. They hold that the firmest promise does but bind under Venial guilt. Cajetan, Armilla, Rebellus, Garzias, in Bonacin. ibid. n. 12.
- (d)Excusatur à mortali—ex parte formae, hoc est quia non per se, seu ex intentione peccatum illud fit—sed ex oblivione, aut ignorantia fucti, aut ex fiducia quam accipit de eo cui promisit, aut ex causa quae sibi videtur rationabilis. Sum. v. perfidia.
- (e)Est Theologorum doctrina (quod obligatur) si habuit animum see obligandi see•s si habuit animum essendi liber usque ad redditionem: vel si habuit animam fing• di: quia licet peccet non obligatur tamen, nisi subesset causa de se ex praecepto obligans: puta, si promissa est patri vestis, & frigoribus alget. Ibid. n. 4. Alias si non habuit animum obligandi, non tenetur subpoena mortalis peccati ad pactum nudum servandam: nisi subesset causa quae ad hoc obligaret de necessitate precepti, puta, promisi patri meo vestem, qui moritur ex frigore, quoniam tenetur quamvis non habuerit animum obligendi see. Angel sum. v. pactum n. 4.Est Theologorum doctrina (quod obligatur) si habuit animum se obligandi see•s si habuit animum essendi liber usque ad redditionem: vel si habuit animam fing• di: quia licet peccet non obligatur tamen, nisi subesset causa de se ex praecepto obligans: puta, si promissa est patri vestis, & frigoribus alget. Ibid. n. 4. Alias si non habuit animum obligandi, non tenetur subpoena mortalis peccati ad pactum nudum servandam: nisi subesset causa quae ad hoc obligaret de necessitate precepti, puta, promisi patri meo vestem, qui moritur ex frigore, quoniam tenetur quamvis non habuerit animum obligendi se. Angel sum. v. pactum n. 4.
- (f)Utrum autem quis obligatur ex pollicitatione? & dico quod sic quando pollicetur civitati, universitati, clero Ecclesiae, vel pauperibus alicujus loci, & ex causa: puta, ad honorem Dei & hujusmodi: secus si fiat praedictis sine causa: vel aliis à praedictis etiam cum causa: quia non obligatur, nisi praetextu promissionis aliquid caeperit. Ibid v. pollicitatio. Ità & eisdem verbis. Angelus sum. v pollicitatio.
- (g)In Sylvest. ibid. v. pactum n. 4. promissio sive pactum obligat in conscientia—hoc antem sum. Aug. & Rosell. & est limitatio Coll. quem sequitur Panor. quando exprimitur causa promittendi.
