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Disgracing and defaming others to their face by contumelies, or behind their backs by detraction; reproaching them with charges true or false, to the impairing or ruining of their esteem or credit (though some of them say this is worse than theft or robbery, and others make it worse than adultery; and in the Canon Law, such are called murderers; yet) is allowed under the notion of a Venial, in so many cases, that he who is addicted thereto, may satisfy his humour fully in the practice of it without scruple. 'Tis a Maxim with them, that the (s)quality of sins in words, is regulated ⟨p. 267⟩by the intention. 'Tis this that gives this sin, and others besides, their formality, (which Cajetan often inculcates) and without that, they are no sins, or but Venial. Hence he tells us, that the contempt (t)of our Neighbour is a mortal sin, speaking formally, that is, with an intention of contemning him: for no man formally contemns another, but he that despises him, that he may despise him; so no man is a detractor formally, but he that back-bites, that he may back-bite; and no man is formally contumelious, but he that speaks reproachfully, that he may reproach. So that if he intend not thus to sin, let him say what he will against his Neighbour, he is not guilty of the sin formally, and in deed. Accordingly he tells us, that (u)materially, (i. e. without intention of dishonouring another) contumelious words may be spoken, either without any sin, or any but what is Venial. 'Tis true, some of them say, words may be a crime, if they grievously defame a person, though they be uttered without a design to do it; but then withal they allow of such reproaches as Venial, which are of no better consequence, but tend to disgrace him effectually. To reproach him with natural defects of mind, or body, or birth, is regularly but Venial; all agree in this says
Sairus: To charge him with ignorance, to say he has little wit, and small judgment, to call him a fool, or an Hermaphrodite, or a Bastard, though the charge be false. To report one to be infected with the French-disease is but Venial, because that is no great disgrace. Pet. Navarre. Sairus, & alii communiter in Bonacin.
Also to charge him falsely with any wickedness, which they count Venial.
DIsgracing and defaming others to their face by contumelies, or behind their backs by detraction; reproaching them with charges true or false, to the impairing or ruining of their esteem or credit (though some of them say this is worse than theft or robbery, and others make it worse than adultery; and in the Canon Law, such are called murderers; yet) is allowed under the notion of a Venial, in so many cases, that he who is addicted thereto, may satisfie his humour fully in the practice of it without scruple. 'Tis a Maxime with them, that the (s)quality of sins in words, is regulated ⟨p. 267⟩by the intention. 'Tis this that gives this sin, and others besides, their formality, (which Cajetan often inculcates) and without that, they are no sins, or but Venial. Hence he tells us, that the contempt (t)of our Neighbour is a mortal sin, speaking formally, that is, with an intention of contemning him: for no man formally contemns another, but he that despises him, that he may despise him; so no man is a detractor formally, but he that back-bites, that he may back-bite; and no man is formally contumelious, but he that speaks reproachfully, that he may reproach. So that if he intend not thus to sin, let him say what he will against his Neighbour, he is not guilty of the sin formally, and in deed. Accordingly he tells us, that (u)materially, (i. e. without intention of dishonouring another) contumelious words may be spoken, either without any sin, or any but what is Venial. 'Tis true, some of them say, words may be a crime, if they grievously defame a person, though they be uttered without a design to do it; but then withall they allow of such reproaches as Venial, which are of no better consequence, but tend to disgrace him effectually. To reproach him with natural defects of mind, or body, or birth, is regularly but Venial; all agree in this saies (x)Sairus: To charge him with ignorance, to say he has little wit, and small jugment, to call him a fool, or an Hermaphrodite, or a Bastard, though the charge be false. To report one to be infected with the French-disease is but Venial, because that is no great disgrace. Pet. Navar. Sairus, & alii communiter in Bonacin. ⟨p. 268⟩ibid. n. 9. 5Also to charge him falsly with any wickedness, which they count Venial.
(s)Aquinas, & Alexander, Alensis, in Sylv, sum. v. contumel. n. 2.
(t)Hinc patet quod contemptus proximi est peccatum mortale formaliter loquendo, hoc est ex intentione contemnendi. Nullus enim formaliter contemnit proximum, nisi qui speruit proximum ut spermat proximum: sicut nullus detrahit formaliter, nisi qui detrahit ut detrahat. &c. Cajetan. sum. v. contemptus.
(u)Materialiter (hoc est non ex intentione dehonorandi) possunt verba contumeliosà etiam absque ullo peccato dici. Ibid. v. contumelia, Soto de Just. l. 5. q. 10. art. 2.
(x)Lib. 11, c. 6. n. 4. Detegere falsos defectus naturales, puta quod▪ est Luscus, Claudus, Mancus, Gibbosus, Ignarus, & alia hujusmodi, que non pertinent ad bonam famam morum, non est suo genere, nec regulariter mortale. Navarre. cap. 18. n. 23. Vid. Bonacin. de restit. disp. 2. q. 4. punct. 2.Lib. 11, c. 6. n. 4. Detegere falsos defectus naturales, puta quod▪ est Luscus, Claudus, Mancus, Gibbosus, Ignarus, & alia hujusmodi, que non pertinent ad bonam famam morum, non est suo genere, nec regulariter mortale. Navar. cap. 18. n. 23. Vid. Bonacin. de restit. disp. 2. q. 4. punct. 2.
5(y) Imponere vel detegire veniale, non est de se mortale. Idem Navarre. ibid. n. 24: Sylvest. sum. v. detractio n. 2. non esse mortale in his quae sunt modicae importantiae, ut venialia quae communiter non infamant secundum Antoninum, & Angelus sum. v. detract. n. 2. Pet. Navarre. Aragon. in Bonacin. ibid. n. 6. alii communiter.(y) Imponere vel detegire veniale, non est de se mortale. Idem Navar. ibid. n. 24: Sylvest. sum. v. detractio n. 2. non esse mortale in his quae sunt modicae importantiae, ut venialia quae communiter non infamant secundum Antoninum, & Angelus sum. v. detract. n. 2. Pet. Navar. Arragon. in Bonacin. ibid. n. 6. alii communiter.
Thus they may calumniate any man, and without crime charge him falsely, as a Blasphemer, a Thief, a Liar, a Perjured Person, a Cheat, &c, since they count these, in many degrees, Venial: and if they be consistent with the Honour and reputation of Roman Catholics, yet others, either Christian or Heathen, will think their credit blasted with such imputations. Likewise to (z)revile one in such terms as may signify either great or lesser crimes, to accuse him as one greatly proud, covetous, wrathful: or any thing whatsoever, which may denote either the natural inclination, and first motions, or the outward acts; this is not mortal; because the hearers are to put the better construction on it. And here is liberty enough, to calumniate in such terms as may ruin any persons reputation; upon a presumption, that all who hear the slander will be always so wise, and good, as any rarely are. Or, (a)if a man be noted for wickedness already, you may charge him with crimes that are not known, and yet offend but Venially: because you cannot hurt his reputation, which is hurt already. As if when a man has dangerously wounded himself, you might give him more wounds, and dispatch him; when life and same are of like account. Or you (b)may charge those falsely ⟨p. 269⟩for committing a crime, when they did it not; if it hath been their practice before. Or you (c)may charge them with any crimes that are secret, if they be less than those that are known; as if one had been guilty of murder, you may accuse him of theft, and if he hath stolen, you may accuse him of fornication, and if he be a Heretic, you may charge him with any thing, since with them nothing is worse than what they count Heresy. Or you may accuse others of any (d)wickedness, which such sort of persons seem to make nothing of: as some young men, of fornication, and others of adulteries. Further, any terms tending to defame others may be used in passion, such as hinders full deliberation: for these will excuse blasphemy against God, much more the worst reproaches of men. Or you may do it in jest (e)with moderate facetiousness, when the reproach is set off neatly, then it is a virtue with those, who learn their Divinity of Aristotle rather then the Apostle: and think if a man have wit, he needs herein have no conscience. Or you may do (f)it out of levity, or pleasure in tattling;
Thus they may calumniate any man, and without crime charge him falsly, as a Blasphemer, a Thief, a Lyar, a Perjur'd Person, a Cheat, &c, since they count these, in many degrees, Venial: and if they be consistent with the Honour and reputation of Roman Catholicks, yet others, either Christian or Heathen, will think their credit blasted with such imputations. Likewise to (z)revile one in such terms as may signifie either great or lesser crimes, to accuse him as one greatly proud, covetous, wrathful: or any thing whatsoever, which may denote either the natural inclination, and first motions, or the outward acts; this is not mortal; because the hearers are to put the better construction on it. And here is liberty enough, to calumniate in such terms as may ruine any persons reputation; upon a presumption, that all who hear the slander will be always so wise, and good, as any rarely are. Or, (a)if a man be noted for wickedness already, you may charge him with crimes that are not known, and yet offend but Venially: because you cannot hurt his reputation, which is hurt already. As if when a man has dangerously wounded himself, you might give him more wounds, and dispatch him; when life and same are of like account. Or you (b)may charge those falsly ⟨p. 269⟩for committing a crime, when they did it not; if it hath been their practice before. Or you (c)may charge them with any crimes that are secret, if they be less than those that are known; as if one had been guilty of murder, you may accuse him of theft, and if he hath stollen, you may accuse him of fornication, and if he be a Heretick, you may charge him with any thing, since with them nothing is worse than what they count Heresie. Or you may accuse others of any (d)wickedness, which such sort of persons seem to make nothing of: as some young men, of fornication, and others of adulteries. Further, any terms tending to defame others may be used in passion, such as hinders full deliberation: for these will excuse blasphemy against God, much more the worst reproaches of men. Or you may do it in jest (e)with moderate facetiousness, when the reproach is set off neatly, then it is a vertue with those, who learn their Divinity of Aristotle rather then the Apostle: and think if a man have wit, he needs herein have no conscience. Or you may do
(z)Qui ex loquacitate profert ea, quae & pro mortali & pro veniali possunt accipi, ut dicendo talis est magnus superbus avarus iracundus, vel hususmodi quae sumi possunt & pro naturali inclination & motu primo, non peccet mortaliter quia audientes debent in meliorem partem interpraetari. Sylvest. secundum Antoninum ibid. Angelus, ibid. Graft. l. 2. cap. 137. n. 26. Pet. Navarre. Sayrus, Aragon, & alii communiter in Bonacin. ibid.Qui ex loquacitate profert ea, quae & pro mortali & pro veniali possunt accipi, ut dicendo talis est magnus superbus avarus iracundus, vel hususmodi quae sumi possunt & pro naturali inclinatione & motu primo, non peccet mortaliter quia audientes debent in meliorem partem interpraetari. Sylvest. secundum Antoninum ibid. Angelus, ibid. Graff. l. 2. cap. 137. n. 26. Pet. Navar. Sayrus, Arragon, & alii communiter in Bonacin. ibid.
(a)Si ille cui dicit habebat eum pro scelerato: quia jam infamatus erat apud eum de alîis, & si non de isto. Angelus, ibid. Idem est in mortalibus notoriis secundum Archiepiscopum quia non laeditur fama jam laesa. Sylvest. ibid.
(b)Mentitus es meretricem tali nocte admisisse lenonem, eo casu non restituere famam, non est peccatum mortale. Graft. ibid. n. 22. secundum Cajetanum. Excusatur à peccato mortali, qui aliquem infamavit cum secundum suum existimationem illa non esset infamia. ibid.Mentitus es meretricem tali nocte admisisse lenonem, eo casu non restituere famam, non est peccatum mortale. Graff. ibid. n. 22. secundum Cajetanum. Excusatur à peccato mortali, qui aliquem infamavit cum secundum suum existimationem illa non esset infamia. ibid.
(c)Idem esset in criminibus mortalibus etiam occultis, si sunt minora notoriis, sicut non est infamia notorio homicidae & furi, quod sit fornicatus. Sylvest. ibid.
(d)Si sunt personae quarum famam simplex fornicatio in nullo laedit, ut juvenes saeculares—quod simile est de adulterio apud multos. Graff. ibid. (juxta Cajetanum) n. 28.
(e)Respondetur quod convitiari, secundum Arist. 4. Ethic. c. 8. eatenus est vertutis Eatrapeliae, quatenus intra limits moderatae facetiae continetur: quando scil urbanitatis venustas in convitio adest. Soto de Just. l. 5. q. 9. art. 2. p. 172.Respondetur quod convitiari, secundum Arist. 4. Ethic. c. 8. eatenus est vertutis Eatrapeliae, quatenus intra limites moderatae facetiae continetur: quando scil urbanitatis venustas in convitio adest. Soto de Just. l. 5. q. 9. art. 2. p. 172.
unless the words be so exasperating, as to occasion some other deadly evil. Or it may be done (g)by way of recital, suggesting what tends to blast them, as reported by others. Or when the defamer (h)is not believed ⟨p. 270⟩or gives no just cause of belief. Or (i)for correction; for they may defame others to amend them; and reform them, by making them worse than they are. Or (k)through some want of cautiousness, as amongst women and persons of inferiors rank, who vent what reproachful language comes next, how injurious soever. Or when their reputation does hurt, and may seduce others; to defame them, is absolutely lawful eos defamare esse licitum, absolute respondet. Adrianus. in Soto. ibid. q. 10. art. 2. Or (to add no more) if one accuse others, whom they think he ought not, though he impute nothing to them but what is true; they may charge him with false crimes, this will be no worse then a Venial fault. Bannes 22. q. 70. art. 3. p. 2. Thus as in other cases, so when any thing is said or writ, to the disparagement of their Church or themselves, how justly and truly soever: if they fix upon the Authors the most odious imputations that can be invente• (such as Bolsec and Cochleus would have fastened upon Luther and Calvin) and divulge them with a design to delude the world into a belief thereof, though their own consciences tell them there is not a syllable of truth therein; yet they incur no fault thereby, that a good Catholic need fear, or make conscience of. This is not only the opinion of the Jesuits, but the common Doctrine of Aquinas his Disciples, as Ledesma a Dominican assures us; and so we may spare those more then 20 Doctors, which Caramuel says, assert it. Hereby they give warning to mankind, that they are no more to be trusted in their charges against their opposers, to vindicate the reputation of themselves or their Church, than such persons will be trusted in a Court, which openly sentenced them to the pillory for false testimony; yea, in this maxim they have as good as set themselves upon a Pillory, and done that justice to the world, as to fix this Inscription upon their own Foreheads: We are they who declare it no crime to calumniate ⟨p. 271⟩most odiously and falsely, who ever speak ill (how truly soever) of us and our Church. These are some of their methods for destroying, the honour and reputation of others without any fault which they regard;
unless the words be so exasperating, as to occasion some other deadly evil. Or it may be done (g)by way of recital, suggesting what tends to blast them, as reported by others. Or when the defamer (h)is not believed ⟨p. 270⟩or gives no just cause of belief. Or (i)for correction; for they may defame others to amend them; and reform them, by making them worse than they are. Or (k)through some want of cautiousness, as amongst women and persons of inferious rank, who vent what reproachful language comes next, how injurious soever. Or when their reputation does hurt, and may seduce others; to defame them, is absolutely lawful eos defamare esse licitum, absolute respondet. Adrianus. in Soto. ibid. q. 10. art. 2. Or (to add no more) if one accuse others, whom they think he ought not, though he impute nothing to them but what is true; they may charge him with false crimes, this will be no worse then a Venial fault. Bannes 22. q. 70. art. 3. p. 2. Thus as in other cases, so when any thing is said or writ, to the disparagement of their Church or themselves, how justly and truly soever: if they fix upon the Authors the most odious imputations that can be invente• (such as Bolsec and Cochleus would have fastned upon Luther and Calvin) and divulge them with a design to delude the world into a belief thereof, though their own consciences tell them there is not a syllable of truth therein; yet they incur no fault thereby, that a good Catholick need fear, or make conscience of. This is not only the opinion of the Jesuites, but the common Doctrine of Aquinas his Disciples, as Ledesma a Dominican assures us; and so we may spare those more then 20 Doctors, which Caramuel says, assert it. Hereby they give warning to mankind, that they are no more to be trusted in their charges against their opposers, to vindicate the reputation of themselves or their Church, than such persons will be trusted in a Court, which openly sentenced them to the pillory for false testimony; yea, in this maxime they have as good as set themselves upon a Pillory, and done that justice to the world, as to fix this Inscription upon their own Foreheads: We are they who declare it no crime to caluminate ⟨p. 271⟩most odiously and falsly, who ever speak ill (how truly soever) of us and our Church. These are some of their methods for destroying, the honour and reputation of others without any fault which they regard;
(g)Idem esse (veniale) secundum Scotum, quum ex loquacitate dicuntur infamatoria recitative. Sylvest. ibid. Cajetan. in 22. q. 73. art. 2.
(h)Quoties non dedit justam causam credendi, vel non fuit ei adhibita sides. Graft. ibid. n. 23.Quoties non dedit justam causam credendi, vel non fuit ei adhibita sides. Graff. ibid. n. 23.
(i)Nec qui per fraternam correctionem aliquem infamavit, & ad majorem emendam, &c. Idem ibid. n. 24. Soto, ibid. q. 9. art. 2.
(k)Ubi vero nonnullus est cautelae defectus, plurimum consuevit esse veniale, ut saepe inter mulierculas contingit, & homines infimae Classis, qui invicem se convitiis conspergunt, ut in buccam veniunt. Soto, ibid. Graft. ibid. n. 9.Ubi vero nonnullus est cautelae defectus, plurimum consuevit esse veniale, ut saepe inter mulierculas contingit, & homines infimae Classis, qui invicem se convitiis conspergunt, ut in buccam veniunt. Soto, ibid. Graff. ibid. n. 9.
they deliver them in great variety, so that every one so disposed, may serve himself of such as suit his humour. And as a man may defame others, so he may do the same good office for himself; (l)not only by blazoning his secret wickedness, but by charging himself falsely with crimes he never acted: thus to impair, or utterly ruin his own credit, is but regularly a Venial fault according to Adrian, and Sotus, and others; for prodigality is but a Venial, and this is but to be prodigal of ones credit.
they deliver them in great variety, so that every one so disposed, may serve himself of such as suit his humour. And as a man may defame others, so he may do the same good office for himself; (l)not only by blazoning his secret wickedness, but by charging himself falsly with crimes he never acted: thus to impair, or utterly ruine his own credit, is but regularly a Venial fault according to Adrian, and Sotus, and others; for prodigality is but a Venial, and this is but to be prodigal of ones credit.
(l)Detegere propria peccata vera & secreta, & imponere sibi falsa suo genere & regulariter non est nisi veniale quamvis per illud notabiliter fama laedatur, aut omnino amittetur, ut Magister Sotus explicuit, & multo ante Adrianus sensit Navarre. cap. 18. n. 27. & 24. & 28. prodigalitas regulariter non est peccatum mortale, ut S. Thom. & detectio proprii peccati non est injustitia, sed prodigalitas samae. ibid.Detegere propria peccata vera & secreta, & imponere sibi falsa suo genere & regulariter non est nisi veniale quamvis per illud notabiliter fama laedatur, aut omnino amittetur, ut Magister Sotus explicuit, & multo ante Adrianus sensit Navar. cap. 18. n. 27. & 24. & 28. prodigalitas regulariter non est peccatum mortale, ut S. Thom. & detectio proprii peccati non est injustitia, sed prodigalitas samae. ibid.
Flattery also (that falseness of every sort, even the vilest, may not miss of their favour and encouragement) is reconciled to common practice under the notion of a Venial. To (m)praise one for the virtue which he has not, or the good that he does not; is little or no fault. To extol the good he does above measure and desert, is as innocent, yea (n)when a man is to to be praised for a good work, though you ⟨p. 272⟩know he will thereby be transported with deadly pride, such as will destroy his Soul; yet you should not desist, hut may and ought to lay aside the sense of his future ruin: because (says Cardinal Cajetan) there are twelve hours in the day, and a man may in an instant be illuminated and changed by Divine mercy. To (o)applaud one for his sins, if they be not mortal, is as harmless; when it is out of a design to please the sinner, without ruining him; or to gain some advantage by such flattery. So that when it is both wicked and sordid at once, yet will they scarce count it a fault. There's no more hurt in giving flatterers reward, and encouragement. Sylvester inquires if this be (p)a mortal sin? and in him Aquinas answers, no, unless a man affect, as Herod, to be extolled as a God; or design and desire to be magnified for mortal crimes. But (q)it is a virtue to give consent to false flattery, as when a woman who is secretly an adulteress, is praised for faithfulness to her Husband, that scandal may be avoided, and others deluded, by a good opinion of her. And so we may understand how the praises of the Church of Rome for her faithfulness to Christ, come to be a virtue. Or if one be not in so complacent a humour as to flatter others; he may curse them at as easy a rate, for, for it is but a Venial fault (r)to curse in words (if ⟨p. 273⟩not from the heart) any thing, any person (ones own Father not excepted); to imprecate any mischief or misery to them; to (s)wish Gods curse on them, or an ill end might befall them, or the Devil might have them. And when he is at it, he may curse the Devil too. (t)'Tis no sin at all, if it be for his fault, and gives the Devil but his due. Cursing (u)may be ones usual practice as innocently. It is scarce so bad as a Venial, (x)when cursing is used for honest recreation. And he may (y)curse the irrational creatures, or the Elements, and if he do it with his mouth only, or with both mouth and heart, without respect either to God or man:
FLattery also (that falsness of every sort, even the vilest, may not miss of their favour and incouragement) is reconciled to common practice under the notion of a Venial. To (m)praise one for the vertue which he has not, or the good that he does not; is little or no fault. To extoll the good he does above measure and desert, is as innocent, yea (n)when a man is to to be praised for a good work, though you ⟨p. 272⟩know he will thereby be transported with deadly pride, such as will destroy his Soul; yet you should not desist, hut may and ought to lay aside the sense of his future ruine: because (saies Cardinal Cajetan) there are twelve hours in the day, and a man may in an instant be illuminated and changed by Divine mercy. To (o)applaud one for his sins, if they be not mortal, is as harmless; when it is out of a design to please the sinner, without ruining him; or to gain some advantage by such flattery. So that when it is both wicked and sordid at once, yet will they scarce count it a fault. There's no more hurt in giving flatterers reward, and incouragement. Sylvester inquires if this be (p)a mortal sin? and in him Aquinas answers, no, unless a man affect, as Herod, to be extolled as a God; or design and desire to be magnified for mortal crimes. But (q)it is a virtue to give consent to false flattery, as when a woman who is secretly an adulteress, is praised for faithfulness to her Husband, that scandal may be avoided, and others deluded, by a good opinion of her. And so we may understand how the praises of the Church of Rome for her faithfulness to Christ, come to be a virtue. Or if one be not in so complacent a humour as to flatter others; he may curse them at as easie a rate, for, for it is but a Venial fault (r)to curse in words (if ⟨p. 273⟩not from the heart) any thing, any person (ones own Father not excepted); to imprecate any mischief or misery to them; to (s)wish Gods curse on them, or an ill end might befall them, or the Devil might have them. And when he is at it, he may curse the Devil too.
(m)Est adul•tio prima, quando quis adulatur, vel attribuit alicui bonum virtutis, quod ille non habet. Secunda quando nimium vel ultra debitum extollit bonum, quod habet, & utrumque istorum est veniale. Graff. decis, pars 2. l. 3. c. 3. n. 5.
(n)Quam aliquis debet ex officio aliquem de bono aliquo opere laudare etiamsi si stiat laudatum in superbiam mortalem se elaturum, non tenetur propterea desistere à debito officio: potest tamen & debet deponere hujusmodi scientiam de futura ruina illius, quia 12 horae su•t diei, & potest in instanti homo illuminari, & mutari à divina miserecordia. Cajet. Sum. v. adulatio.
(o)Est autem peccatum veniale quando vel laudatur aliquis de malis venialibus, vel de bonis, sola complacendi intentione absque ruina, vel etiam ob aliquem utilitatem consequundam, vel non impediendam, ut de se patet. Cajetan. ibid. Graft. p. 1. l. 2. cap. 138. n. 1. 161. Aquinas 2. 2. q. 115. art. 2. Sylv. v. adulat. n. 4.Est autem peccatum veniale quando vel laudatur aliquis de malis venialibus, vel de bonis, sola complacendi intentione absque ruina, vel etiam ob aliquem utilitatem consequundam, vel non impediendam, ut de se patet. Cajetan. ibid. Graff. p. 1. l. 2. cap. 138. n. 1. 161. Aquinas 2. 2. q. 115. art. 2. Sylv. v. adulat. n. 4.
(p)Utrum dare adulatoribus sit peccatum mortal? & dicit S. Thom. 2. 2. q. 168: quod non: nisi nimius appetitus vanae gloriae—sicut delectabatur Herodes, quum ei Dei & non hominis, laudes dabantur: vel nisi intendat quis & cupiat laudationem de peccatis—Et hoc est quod dicit Alexand. de Alis, quod tale peccatum est ista datio, quaele adulatio propter quam dat, id est si venialis venial, &c. Sum. v. adulatio. n. 6.Utrum dare adulatoribus sit peccatum mortale? & dicit S. Thom. 2. 2. q. 168: quod non: nisi nimius appetitus vanae gloriae—sicut delectabatur Herodes, quum ei Dei & non hominis, laudes dabantur: vel nisi intendat quis & cupiat laudationem de peccatis—Et hoc est quod dicit Alexand. de Alis, quod tale peccatum est ista datio, quaele adulatio propter quam dat, id est si venialis veniale, &c. Sum. v. adulatio. n. 6.
(q)Imo virtus est consentire laudi, sive se false laudanti, de virtute tamen suo statui necessaria, exemplum de uxore occulte adultera, quae de fidelitate laudatur, non eo intuitu ut laudetur, sed ut per bonam opinionem, quam alii habent scandalum evitetur. Graft. l. 2. cap. 138. n. 2. Navarre. cap. 23. n. 13.
I Have been long in viewing their account of Venial sins; the pernicious use made of it to corrupt the whole body of practical Christianity, and to give liberty to the acting of all sorts of wickedness, with this modification; Will excuse me. They venture hard, ⟨p. 274⟩to leave in a manner no mortal sin; and so none needful to be avoided. This will be further manifest, by what they determine concerning those few sins, which they style mortal, or capital: they are reduced, in their ordinary reckoning, to seven. Some of these they conclude to be in their own nature, or regularly Venial; in others of them, they state the mortalness so high, that those who will be satisfied with wickedness, which is not rare, and prodigious, may live in the sins, and not reach the mortalness; and so wickedness which is deadly, in their speculative account, may be practised without mortal danger.
Covetousness is one of these capital crimes, which in general they heavily aggravate, and inveigh against, as most pernicious: yet when they come to direct conscience, and give particular rules for practice; it is shrunk into a harmless Venial. Covetousness says Cajetan (z)simply and absolutely, is not a mortal sin in its own nature, because it is not against, but besides charity. To deliver themselves more distinctly, they consider this sin, either, as it is opposed to liberality, or to justice: as it is opposite to the former virtue, they generally determine, it is but a Venial fault; so the same Cardinal, (a)as it is contrary to liberality, and signifies an inordinate desire of money, so commonly it is a Venial sin: thus Navarre (b)and Sotus (c)and all after Aquinas. (d)So that by their Doctrine, if a rich man should be so sordidly so monstrously tenacious, as not to perform one act of liberality to himself or others, in all his life; yet would not this be a mortal sin, since the vice which is opposite to all liberality, and wholly exclusive of it, is but a Venial ⟨p. 275⟩fault. Only when it is opposed to injustice, it may be a mortal sin, that is, when a man gets riches by unjust practices and methods; or detains what he has, unrighteously. Thus covetousness, however it comes into the account of mortal sins; yet it will stand there as a cypher, and signify no such thing, unless injustice be added to it. Let a man have the most extravagant passion for riches, let him be as greedy as Hell, or the Grave; and penurious, as the worst of misers can be: yet if he be not withal, a thief, or a cheat, and attempt not to get or keep an estate by fraud or violence, there's no guilt upon him, that he need regard: (e)In their sense only thieves and robbers, extortioners or cheats, are covetous, when covetousness is a crime. They speak of covetousness as little worse than an indifferent thing: injustice added to an act, otherwise lawful, will make it criminal; and this vice will be no crime, upon easier terms. But is covetousness a mortal sin, indeed, with them, when it is accompanied with injustice? they would seem to say so sometimes; but then they unsay it again in their other decisions. They allow men to gain unrighteously, and to keep what they have so gained. They declare them not obliged to restitution of what they have got by sinful practices, yea, and such as are most abominable.
Covetuousness is one of these capital crimes, which in general they heavily aggravate, and inveigh against, as most pernicious: yet when they come to direct conscience, and give particular rules for practice; it is shrunk into a harmless Venial. Covetousness says Cajetan (z)simply and absolutely, is not a mortal sin in its own nature, because it is not against, but besides chartty. To deliver themselves more distinctly, they consider this sin, either, as it is opposed to liberality, or to justice: as it is opposite to the former vertue, they generally determine, it is but a Venial fault; so the same Cardinal, (a)as it is contrary to liberality, and signifies an inordinate desire of money, so commonly it is a Venial sin: thus Navar (b)and Sotus (c)and all after Aquinas. (d)So that by their Doctrine, if a rich man should be so sordidly so monstrously tenacious, as not to perform one act of liberality to himself or others, in all his life; yet would not this be a mortal sin, since the vice which is opposite to all liberality, and wholly exclusive of it, is but a Venial ⟨p. 275⟩fault. Only when it is opposed to injustice, it may be a mortal sin, that is, when a man gets riches by unjust practices and methods; or detains what he has, unrighteously. Thus covetousness, however it comes into the account of mortal sins; yet it will stand there as a cypher, and signifie no such thing, unless injustice be added to it. Let a man have the most extravagant passion for riches, let him be as greedy as Hell, or the Grave; and penurious, as the worst of misers can be: yet if he be not withall, a thief, or a cheat, and attempt not to get or keep an estate by fraud or violence, there's no guilt upon him, that he need regard: (e)In their sense only thieves and robbers, extortioners or cheats, are covetous, when covetousness is a crime. They speak of covetousness as little worse than an indifferent thing: injustice added to an act, otherwise lawfull, will make it criminal; and this vice will be no crime, upon easier terms. But is covetousness a mortal sin, indeed, with them, when it is accompanied with injustice? they would seem to say so sometimes; but then they unsay it again in their other decisions. They allow men to gain unrighteously, and to keep what they have so gained. They declare them not obliged to restitution of what they have got by sinful practices, yea, and such as are most abominable.
(z)Simplititer & absolute non est peceatum mortale ex suo genera quiá non est contra, sed prater charitatem. Sum. v. Avaritia.
(a)Ut contrariatur liberalitati, & sic significat inordin•um oppetitum pecu•ia: & sic communiter est peccatum veniale. ibld.
(b)Cap. 23. n. 70.
(c)De Just. l. 4. q. 5. art. 2. p. 11 •
(d)2• q. 118. art. 4.
(e)Ut opponitur justitiae & sic significat injustam voluntatem accipiend• sen retinendi alienum, & est manifeste mortale peccatum, et juxta hunc sensum, usurarios, sures, latrones, negotiators fraudulentos, &c. avaros dicimus. Cajetan. ibid.Ut opponitur justitiae & sic significat injustam voluntatem accipiend• sen retinendi alienum, & est manifeste mortale peccatum, et juxta hunc sensum, usurarios, sures, latrones, negotiatores fraudulentos, &c. avaros dicimus. Cajetan. ibid.
I have showed before what unjust and fraudulent methods of gaming they encourage under the favour of Venial faults; let me here instance in gaming only. This with them is (f)Venial, though it be not only out of an ordinate, but an excessive desire of gaining, if there be no other mortal ingredient; yea, though not only the subservient, but the principal end, be lucre; and so ⟨p. 276⟩that which is only for recreation, be turned into a trade. And this is not only the opinion of some particular Doctors, but seems to be the persuasion of them all: for says Navarre, (g)we see in all parts of the world, all sorts of people play for great sums of money, and the greatest part of them principally for gain; and yet the confessors absolve them, though they signify no intention to give over the practice, which they could not do, if there were any mortal sin in it. And (h)such gaming is allowed, even that which they call Diabolical, in any place, though in their account (i)sacred; at any time, for whole days, even the holiest, that little time excepted with will suffice the people to hear the chief parts of the Mass, or in any person, even their cloistered pretenders to perfection, so they omit not divine service. Their mode of devotion needs be no hindrance, for with them it is lawful to make a game of their Prayers. Lopez enquires (an licitum fit ludere preces sacras) if it be lawful to play at Prayers. He says it is the practice of devout persons, and that Navarre seems to approve it, part 2. c. 32. so does Bonacina after Navarre. Rebellus and others, de restit. disp. 2. q. 3. punct. 1. n. 8. and not only at Ave Mari's but other prayers also; and that it will be no irreverence against God to play with their prayers, if they do it reverently, ibid. To say nothing that (k)their Clergy and Monks may be spectators of games and shows that are mortally wicked, if they continue not a long time at it; and yet offend but Venially. They teach further, that it is not needful ⟨p. 277⟩to (l)restore what is wickedly gained. Sylvester after others, says (m)that filthy lucre (that is, dishonest or shameful gain,) is not necessarily to be restored, 'tis but matter of counsel. But he that hath lost much at unlawful games, may take another course for his satisfaction; for Pope Adrian and others, allow him to steal it from him that has won it, Vid. Lopez. ibid.
I have shew'd before what unjust and fraudulent methods of gaming they incourage under the favour of Venial faults; let me here instance in gaming only. This with them is (f)Venial, though it be not only out of an ordinate, but an excessive desire of gaining, if there be no other mortal ingredient; yea, though not only the subservient, but the principal end, be lucre; and so ⟨p. 276⟩that which is only for recreation, be turned into a trade. And this is not only the opinion of some particular Doctors, but seems to be the perswasion of them all: for says Navar, (g)we see in all parts of the world, all sorts of people play for great sums of money, and the greatest part of them principally for gain; and yet the confessors absolve them, though they sign•fie no intention to give over the practice, which they could not do, if there were any mortal sin in it. And (h)such gaming is allowed, even that which they call Diabolical, in any place, though in their account (i)sacred; at any time, for whole days, even the holiest, that little time excepted wich will suffice the people to hear the chief parts of the Mass, or in any person, even their cloyster'd pretenders to perfection, so they omit not divine service. Their mode of devotion needs be no hindrance, for with them it is lawful to make a game of their Prayers. Lopez enquires (an licitum fit ludere preces sacras) if it be lawful to play at Prayers. He says it is the practice of devout persons, and that Navar seems to approve it, part 2. c. 32. so does Bonacina after Navar. Rebellus and others, de restit. disp. 2. q. 3. punct. 1. n. 8. and not only at Ave Mari's but other prayers also; and that it will be no irreverence against God to play with their prayers, if they do it reverently, ibid. To say nothing that (k)their Clergy and Monks may be spectators of games and shews that are mortally wicked, if they continue not a long time at it; and yet offend but Venially. They teach further, that it is not needful ⟨p. 277⟩to (l)
(f)Multi ludo qui recreationis causa licitus & Sanctus est abutuntur, ut negotiatione ad lucrum—ludunt principaliter propter lucrum. Et hoc semper est peccatum: quoniam est dare operam turpi lucro, si tamen nulla alia deformitas immisceatur, non est peccatum mortale. Cajetan. sum. v. Ludere. p. 410. Navarre. cap. 20. n. 3. Lopez. pars 2. c. 31. p. 183.Multi ludo qui recreationis causa licitus & Sanctus est abutuntur, ut negotiatione ad lucrum—ludunt principaliter propter lucrum. Et hoc semper est peccatum: quoniam est dare operam turpi lucro, si tamen nulla alia deformitas immisceatur, non est peccatum mortale. Cajetan. sum. v. Ludere. p. 410. Na•ar. cap. 20. n. 3. Lopez. pars 2. c. 31. p. 183.
(g)In omnibus mundi partibus cujusque ordinis laicos videamus magnam pecuniarum summam, & maximam eorum partem principaliter propter lucrum ludere, & à confessariis, sine proposito nunquam ita ludendi absolvi quod sacere nequirent, si in eo mortaliter peccar•nt. Navarre. ibid. n. 11.In omnibus mundi partibus cujusque ordinis laicos videamus magnam pecuniarum summam, & maximam eorum partem principaliter propter lucrum ludere, & à confessariis, sine proposito nunquam ita ludendi absolvi quod sacere nequirent, si in eo mortaliter peccar•nt. Navar. ibid. n. 11.
(h)Q•eritur utrum & quomodo ludus diabolicus alearis sit peccatum? & dico quod hic l•dus non •st pecca•um, vel est veniale quum luditur aliquid modicum, &c. Sylvest. sum. v. ludus. n. 4.
(i)Navarre. ibid. n. 3.Navar. ibid. n. 3.
(k)Peccat clericus vel monachus quiludum mortaliter malum spectat, si multo tempore spectat, saecus si parvo. Navarre. ibid. n. 14.Peccat clericus vel monachus quiludum mortaliter malum spectat, si multo tempore spectat, saecus si parvo. Navar. ibid. n. 14.
(l)Nullus tenetur cum famae periculo rem alterius restituere. Est communis sententia. Cajetan. v. restit. Navarre. c. 19. n. 90. (Toll. l. 5. c. 27.) This will go near to excuse most, if not all: dicitur non posse—qui commode non potest. Cap. 17. n. 56.
Or to save himself the trouble of stealing, he may refuse to pay, what he loses; or if he have bound himself by Oath to pay it (not only the Pope, but) any Bishop may release him from the obligation of his Oath, and that without the citation of the party. So Navarre. Corduba. Sotus. Penna. & alii in Bonacin. ibid, punct. 3. n. 2. Yea, they will not have those obliged to make restitution who have received any thing for acting enormous wickedness, for example, a Judg for passing an unjust Sentence, or a witness for false testimony and perjury, or a man for satisfying the lust of a lewd woman, or any sort of women for prostituting themselves, or an assassinate for murdering, or a rogue for firing Houses or Towns: all are comprised in this conclusion, (n)that which is unjustly received, freely of the giver, where there is wickedness on both parts (as in giving, so in receiving), is not, by virtue of any command, to be restored to any. Only (for the encouragement of covetousness, and injustice together) where money is given for the perpetrating of such crimes, if they be not acted, it is to be restored: but if the wickedness be done, the villainous actor may conscientiously detain it. As the Judg that receives a bribe for a false Sentence, (o)if he pass a just one, he is ⟨p. 278⟩obliged to restore; but not if he make an unjust award. And (p)a witness if he receive money for a true testimony, is bound to restore it; but not for a false deposition. He that is promised a reward for murdering a man, may not receive or keep it before he kill him: but after the murder is done, he may take it (and need not restore it) upon the account of his labour and hazard in killing him, and because therein he has done a fact profitable and delightful to him that hired him, Idem ibid. n. 5. Pet. Navarre. & ally. So an Astrologer who takes money for telling things, which he cannot know but by the help of the Devil, is not bound to restore it, after diligence and pains to get the Devils assistance therein; because that diligence and pains (with the Devil) is valuable, though it prove ineffectual. But he that pretends but to this skill, and makes no use of the Devil, is bound to restore; Pet. Navar. & alli cum Bonacin. ibid. n. 10. And that the poor may be cut off every way by covetousness, whether it be with injustice, or without it;
Or to save himself the trouble of stealing, he may refuse to pay, what he loses; or if he have bound himself by Oath to pay it (not only the Pope, but) any Bishop may release him from the obligation of his Oath, and that without the citation of the party. So Navar. Corduba. Sotus. Penna. & alii in Bonacin. ibid, punct. 3. n. 2. Yea, they will not have those obliged to make restitution who have received any thing for acting enormous wickedness, for example, a Judg for passing an unjust Sentence, or a witness for false testimony and perjury, or a man for satisfying the lust of a lewd woman, or any sort of women for prostituting themselves, or an assassinate for murdering, or a rogue for firing Houses or Towns: all are comprised in this conclusion, (n)that which is unjustly received, freely of the giver, where there is wickedness on both parts (as in giving, so in receiving), is not, by vertue of any command, to be restored to any. Only (for the incouragement of covetousness, and injustice together) where money is given for the perpetrating of such crimes, if they be not acted, it is to be restored: but if the wickedness be done, the villanous actor may conscientiously detain it. As the Judg that receives a bribe for a false Sentence, (o)if he pass a just one, he is ⟨p. 278⟩obliged to restore; but not if he make an unjust award. And (p)a witness if he receive money for a true testimony, is bound to restore it; but not for a false deposition. He that is promised a reward for murdering a man, may not receive or keep it before he kill him: but after the murder is done, he may take it (and need not restore it) upon the account of his labour and hazard in killing him, and because therein he has done a sact profitable and delightful to him that hired him, Idem ibid. n. 5. Pet. Navar. & ali•. So an Astrologer who takes money for telling things, which he cannot know but by the help of the Devil, is not bound to restore it, after diligence and pains to get the Devils assistance therein; because that diligence and pains (with the Devil) is valuable, though it prove ineffectual. But he that pretends but to this skill, and makes no use of the Devil, is bound to restore; Pet. Navar. & alli cum Bonacin. ibid. n. 10. And that the poor may be cut off every way by covetousness, whether it be with injustice, or without it;
(n)Acceptum voluntarie ab alio, ità ut ab utraque parte admittittur turpitudo, nulli est de precepto restituendum, S. Antoninus Monaldus, Angel•s, Sylvester, (in) Navarre. c. 17. n. 36. & n. 30. Sensit Thom. & Cajetan. quod quicquid turpiter accipit contra legis prohibitionem—ut in Simonia—lucro meretricis, (& idem diceret de datis & acceptis ob alia quaecunque crimina) quod non sit restituendum, nec pauperibus, vid. Vasq. opusc. moral. p. 134. dub. 9. n. 84.Acceptum voluntarie ab alio, ità ut ab utraque parte admittittur turpitudo, nulli est de precepto restituendum, S. Antoninus Monaldus, Angel•s, Sylvester, (in) Navar. c. 17. n. 36. & n. 30. Sensit Thom. & Cajetan. quod quicquid turpiter accipit contra legis prohibitionem—ut in Simonia—lucro meretricis, (& idem diceret de datis & acceptis ob alia quaecunque crimina) quod non sit restituendum, nec pauperibus, vid. Vasq. opusc. moral. p. 134. dub. 9. n. 84.
(o)Quando malum ob quod datum fuit, non consequitur, ut si datum est judici quo inique judicaret, & recte judicavit, &c. datori, & non pauperibus restituendum est ut doctiffimus Medina, efficaciter probat. Navarre. ibid. n. 30. p. 295. &c. 25. n. 45.Quando malum ob quod datum fuit, non consequitur, ut si datum est judici quo inique judicaret, & recte judicavit, &c. datori, & non pauperibus restituendum est ut doctiffimus Medina, efficaciter probat. Navar. ibid. n. 30. p. 295. &c. 25. n. 45.
(p)Peccat qui mercedem accipit, ut verum testetur, cum obligatione restituendi ei qui dedit; & qui accipit, ut falsum testetur, sine tamen necessitate restituendi, vid. Bonacin. de restit. disp. 1. q. 3. punct. 2. n. 6. & punct. 3. n. 8.
though they say, what is received for the perpetrating of wicked acts, may be restored to the poor: yet it is a rule with them, (q)that restitution to the poor in this, and other casts, is only a counsel, not a command; so that he who is hired to de villany, may restore what he received to the poor, if he will; but if he will not, he needs not; he may conscientiously enjoy the fruits of his villainy, and the poor have nothing. In short, not only disquietment of mind (r)through the tumult of worldly distracting cares, and the restless agitation of a covetous humour; but also hardness of heart (s)against the poor, and unmercifulness to them in ⟨p. 279⟩their distress, (the natural effect of extreme covetousness) is as innocent •s its cause, no worse than Venial, unless, when one is obliged •der pain of mortal guilt to afford relief, And when is that? only (t)in extreme necessity, when the starving man may (u)sell his own child to get bread; or when it will be lawful (x)to steal from him who would otherwise part with nothing; or when he may be compelled by Law (y)to part with something; then his heart must relent so far, as to let go what he cannot keep: but it is like he may never meet with such a case while he lives, and then the miser is excused; no moment of his life, need be embittered with one act of charity; he may enjoy the felicity of a petrified heart all his days, and not suffer by one dint in it. Or if he should unhappily meet with one in such extremity, yet may he escape without giving a farthing; it will be enough to exchange, or to lend: (x)yea he may be excused from either giving or lending, (a)if it be but likely that any other may do it. In fine, this unmercifulness, which admits no compassion from the distress of others, (b)is scarce ever mortal; unless it become so (accidentally) by some other mortal acts, and so there is no need to confes• it as a sin. How well does this indulgence to such monstrous covetousness as quite swallows up at once Christian charity, mercy, and morality, become those, who cry up themselves as the sole Assertors of the necessity of good works?
though they say, what is received for the perpetrating of wicked acts, may be restored to the poor: yet it is a rule with them, (q)that restitution to the poor in this, and other casts, is only a counsel, not a command; so that he who is hired to de villany, may restore what he received to the poor, if he will; but if he will not, he needs not; he may conscientiously injoy the fruits of his villany, and the poor have nothing. In short, not only disquietment of mind (r)through the tumult of worldly distracting cares, and the restless agitation of a covetous humour; but also hardness of heart (s)against the poor, and unmercifulness to them in ⟨p. 279⟩their distress, (the natural effect of extream covetousness) is as innocent •s its cause, no worse than Venial, unless, when one is obliged •der pain of mortal guilt to afford relief, And when is that? only (t)in extream necessity, when the starving man may (u)sell his own child to get bread; or when it will be lawful (x)to steal from him who would otherwise part with nothing; or when he may be compelled by Law (y)to part with something; then his heart must relent so far, as to let go what he cannot keep: but it is like he may never meet with such a case while he lives, and then the miser is excused; no moment of his life, need be imbittered with one act of charity; he may injoy the felicity of a petrified heart all his days, and not suffer by one dint in it. Or if he should unhappily meet with one in such extremity, yet may he escape without giving a farthing; it will be enough to exchange, or to lend: (x)yea he may be excused from either giving or lending, (a)if it be but likely that any other may do it. In fine, this unmercifulness, which admits no compassion from the distress of others,
(q)Est regula Vervecelli, recepta à. S. Antonino, Angel. Sylvest. & ab aliis complurimis, quod restitutis, quae non est facienda alicui certae personae, sed pauperibus non debetur ex praecepto, sed solum ex consilio. Navar. ibid. c. 17. n. 30.
(r)Cajetan. sum. v. inquietudo.
(s)Per duritiam cordis, & inquietudinem mentis peccant qui non subveniunt pauperi, quoties t•nentur de precepto obligante ad mortale—alias enim hac venialia tantum sunt. Navar. c. 23. n. 76.
(t)Idem. Cap. 24. n. 5.
(u)Idem C. 23. n. 95.
(x)Vict. supra.
(y)Glossa communiter recepta. Ibid. n. 74.
(x)(z) Idem ibid. n. 95.
(a)Idem c. 24. n. 5.
(b)Quia haec fere nunquam sunt mortalia nisi conjungantur aliis actibus mortalibus, • sunt necessario confitenda, quia satis est confiteri illa mortalia, quae per predictam duritiam & inquietudinem admittuntur. Idem c. 2•. n. 76.
But that they may not be partial, they show themselves as favourable to the crime in the other extreme; (c)pure prodigality is no mortal ⟨p. 280⟩sin, because i• is a less fault than covetousness, contrary: to liberality; which is manifestly of it self no mortal sin, and the reason of both i•▪ neither of them is against charity to God or others, but only besides it. So Cajetan and others. So (d)Navarre, prodigality (including both th• of a mans credit and his estate) is regularly no mortal sin; and this after (e)Aquinas.
But that they may not be partial, they shew themselves as favourable to the crime in the other extream; (c)pure prodigality is no mortal ⟨p. 280⟩sin, becaus• i• is a less fault than covetousness, contrary: to liberality; which is manifestly of it self no mortal sin, and the reason of both i•▪ neither of them is against charity to God or others, but only besides it. So Cajetan and others. So (d)Navar, prodigality (including both th• of a mans credit and his estate) is regularly no mortal sin; and this after (e)Aquinas.
(c)Prodigalitas non est mortale peccatum si pura est • quiae minus peccatum est, quam avaritia liberalitati contraria; quum sipura est, constat non esse mortalem. Et utriusque ratio est quia neutra, agit contra charitatem Dei aut proximi, sed pr•er. illam. Cajetan. sum. v. Prodigal.
(f)Si autem ex animi levitate loquendive libidine ore labatur in summa propter aliquam causam non necessariam fiat: peccatum est plurimum ucniale. Idem ibid. q. 10. art. 2. Cajetan. sum. v. contumel.Si autem ex animi levitate loquendive libidine ore labatur in summa propter aliquam causam non necessariam fiat: peccatum est plurimum vcniale. Idem ibid. q. 10. art. 2. Cajetan. sum. v. contumel.
curse the irrational creatures, or the Elements, and if he do it with his mouth only, or with both mouth and heart, without respect either to God or man:
Imo virtus est consentire laudi, sive se false laudanti, de virtute tamen suo statui necessaria, exemplum de uxore occulte adultera, quae de fidelitate laudatur, non eo intuitu ut laudetur, sed ut per bonam opinionem, quam alii habent scandalum evitetur. Graff. l. 2. cap. 138. n. 2. Navar. cap. 23. n. 13.
(r)Ore tantum maledicere non est mortale, ut communiter maledicunt parents siliis, & colon•, & mullions bobus, & mulis. Idem ibid. n. 117.Ore tantum maledicere non est mortale, ut communiter maledicunt parentes siliis, & colon•, & muliones bobus, & mulis. Idem ibid. n. 117.
(s)Vid. Soto de Just. l. 5. 5. q. 12. art. 3. Navarre. ibid.Vid. Soto de Just. l. 5. 5. q. 12. art. 3. Navar. ibid.
(t)Peccat qui maledicit diabolo ratione suae naturae quia illa bona est & a Deo facta secus si ratione suae culpae, & tradit S. Thom. modo nec plus nec aliter quam meretur. Idem. ibid. Cajetan. sum. v. maledictio.
(u)(Quum) malo usu bujusmodi profert & est veniale peccatum. Cajetan. ibid.
(x)Contingit tamen inquit (S. Tho.) quod aliquando sit veniale—vel propter affectum proferentis, dum ex levi motu vel ludo—talia verba profert, quia peccata verborum ex affecta pensantur. Sylvest. v. maledict. n. 3. sit veniale—quod ex levi motu seu lusu. Soto, ibid. Aliquando etiam culpa veniali carere possit, ut si fiat joco & ludo, vel causa recreationis honestae.
(y)Si paenitens dicat see maledixisse creaturam irrationalem vel elementa interrogare debet confessarius maledixerit ne ore tantum, vel ore & animo, nulla ratione Dei vel proximi habita, quia in his casibus est tantum veniale peccatum. Graft. l. 2. c. 72. n. 3. Navarre. ibid. n. 117.Si paenitens dicat se maledixisse creaturam irrationalem vel elementa interrogare debet confessarius maledixerit ne ore tantum, vel ore & animo, nulla ratione Dei vel proximi habita, quia in his casibus est tantum veniale peccatum. Graff. l. 2. c. 72. n. 3. Navar. ibid. n. 117.
restore what is wickedly gained. Sylvester after others, says
that filthy lucre (that is, dishonest or shameful gain,) is not necessarily to be restored, 'tis but matter of counsel. But he that hath lost much at unlawful games, may take another course for his satisfaction; for Pope Adrian and others, allow him to steal it from him that has won it, Vid. Lopez. ibid.
Nullus tenetur cum famae periculo rem alterius restituere. Est communis sententia. Cajetan. v. restit. Navar. c. 19. n. 90. (Tol. l. 5. c. 27.) This will go near to excuse most, if not all: dicitur non posse—qui commode non potest. Cap. 17. n. 56.
(m)Non tamen necessario tale turpe lucrum est restituendum secundum. Rodofred, s•d de consilio solum. Sum. v. Emptio, n. 10. Vid. Lopez. ibid.
is scarce ever mortal; unless it become so (accidentally) by some other mortal acts, and so there is no need to confes• it as a sin. How well does this indulgence to such monstrous covetousness as quite swallows up at once Christian charity, mercy, and morality, become those, who cry up themselves as the sole Assertors of the necessity of good works?
