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I Have been long in viewing their account of Venial sins; the pernicious use made of it to corrupt the whole body of practical Christianity, and to give liberty to the acting of all sorts of wickedness, with this modification; Will excuse me. They venture hard, ⟨p. 274⟩to leave in a manner no mortal sin; and so none needful to be avoided. This will be further manifest, by what they determine concerning those few sins, which they style mortal, or capital: they are reduced, in their ordinary reckoning, to seven. Some of these they conclude to be in their own nature, or regularly Venial; in others of them, they state the mortalness so high, that those who will be satisfied with wickedness, which is not rare, and prodigious, may live in the sins, and not reach the mortalness; and so wickedness which is deadly, in their speculative account, may be practised without mortal danger.
Covetousness is one of these capital crimes, which in general they heavily aggravate, and inveigh against, as most pernicious: yet when they come to direct conscience, and give particular rules for practice; it is shrunk into a harmless Venial. Covetousness says Cajetan (z)simply and absolutely, is not a mortal sin in its own nature, because it is not against, but besides charity. To deliver themselves more distinctly, they consider this sin, either, as it is opposed to liberality, or to justice: as it is opposite to the former virtue, they generally determine, it is but a Venial fault; so the same Cardinal,
So that by their Doctrine, if a rich man should be so sordidly so monstrously tenacious, as not to perform one act of liberality to himself or others, in all his life; yet would not this be a mortal sin, since the vice which is opposite to all liberality, and wholly exclusive of it, is but a Venial
⟨p. 275⟩
fault. Only when it is opposed to injustice, it may be a mortal sin, that is, when a man gets riches by unjust practices and methods; or detains what he has, unrighteously. Thus covetousness, however it comes into the account of mortal sins; yet it will stand there as a cypher, and signify no such thing, unless injustice be added to it. Let a man have the most extravagant passion for riches, let him be as greedy as Hell, or the Grave; and penurious, as the worst of misers can be: yet if he be not withal, a thief, or a cheat, and attempt not to get or keep an estate by fraud or violence, there's no guilt upon him, that he need regard:
In their sense only thieves and robbers, extortioners or cheats, are covetous, when covetousness is a crime. They speak of covetousness as little worse than an indifferent thing: injustice added to an act, otherwise lawful, will make it criminal; and this vice will be no crime, upon easier terms. But is covetousness a mortal sin, indeed, with them, when it is accompanied with injustice? they would seem to say so sometimes; but then they unsay it again in their other decisions. They allow men to gain unrighteously, and to keep what they have so gained. They declare them not obliged to restitution of what they have got by sinful practices, yea, and such as are most abominable.
Covetuousness is one of these capital crimes, which in general they heavily aggravate, and inveigh against, as most pernicious: yet when they come to direct conscience, and give particular rules for practice; it is shrunk into a harmless Venial. Covetousness says Cajetan (z)simply and absolutely, is not a mortal sin in its own nature, because it is not against, but besides chartty. To deliver themselves more distinctly, they consider this sin, either, as it is opposed to liberality, or to justice: as it is opposite to the former vertue, they generally determine, it is but a Venial fault; so the same Cardinal, (a)as it is contrary to liberality, and signifies an inordinate desire of money, so commonly it is a Venial sin: thus Navar (b)and Sotus (c)and all after Aquinas. (d)So that by their Doctrine, if a rich man should be so sordidly so monstrously tenacious, as not to perform one act of liberality to himself or others, in all his life; yet would not this be a mortal sin, since the vice which is opposite to all liberality, and wholly exclusive of it, is but a Venial ⟨p. 275⟩fault. Only when it is opposed to injustice, it may be a mortal sin, that is, when a man gets riches by unjust practices and methods; or detains what he has, unrighteously. Thus covetousness, however it comes into the account of mortal sins; yet it will stand there as a cypher, and signifie no such thing, unless injustice be added to it. Let a man have the most extravagant passion for riches, let him be as greedy as Hell, or the Grave; and penurious, as the worst of misers can be: yet if he be not withall, a thief, or a cheat, and attempt not to get or keep an estate by fraud or violence, there's no guilt upon him, that he need regard: (e)In their sense only thieves and robbers, extortioners or cheats, are covetous, when covetousness is a crime. They speak of covetousness as little worse than an indifferent thing: injustice added to an act, otherwise lawfull, will make it criminal; and this vice will be no crime, upon easier terms. But is covetousness a mortal sin, indeed, with them, when it is accompanied with injustice? they would seem to say so sometimes; but then they unsay it again in their other decisions. They allow men to gain unrighteously, and to keep what they have so gained. They declare them not obliged to restitution of what they have got by sinful practices, yea, and such as are most abominable.
(z)Simplititer & absolute non est peceatum mortale ex suo genera quiá non est contra, sed prater charitatem. Sum. v. Avaritia.
(a)Ut contrariatur liberalitati, & sic significat inordin•um oppetitum pecu•ia: & sic communiter est peccatum veniale. ibld.
(b)Cap. 23. n. 70.
(c)De Just. l. 4. q. 5. art. 2. p. 11 •
(d)2• q. 118. art. 4.
(e)Ut opponitur justitiae & sic significat injustam voluntatem accipiend• sen retinendi alienum, & est manifeste mortale peccatum, et juxta hunc sensum, usurarios, sures, latrones, negotiators fraudulentos, &c. avaros dicimus. Cajetan. ibid.Ut opponitur justitiae & sic significat injustam voluntatem accipiend• sen retinendi alienum, & est manifeste mortale peccatum, et juxta hunc sensum, usurarios, sures, latrones, negotiatores fraudulentos, &c. avaros dicimus. Cajetan. ibid.
I have showed before what unjust and fraudulent methods of gaming they encourage under the favour of Venial faults; let me here instance in gaming only. This with them is (f)Venial, though it be not only out of an ordinate, but an excessive desire of gaining, if there be no other mortal ingredient; yea, though not only the subservient, but the principal end, be lucre; and so ⟨p. 276⟩that which is only for recreation, be turned into a trade. And this is not only the opinion of some particular Doctors, but seems to be the persuasion of them all: for says Navarre, (g)we see in all parts of the world, all sorts of people play for great sums of money, and the greatest part of them principally for gain; and yet the confessors absolve them, though they signify no intention to give over the practice, which they could not do, if there were any mortal sin in it. And (h)such gaming is allowed, even that which they call Diabolical, in any place, though in their account (i)sacred; at any time, for whole days, even the holiest, that little time excepted with will suffice the people to hear the chief parts of the Mass, or in any person, even their cloistered pretenders to perfection, so they omit not divine service. Their mode of devotion needs be no hindrance, for with them it is lawful to make a game of their Prayers. Lopez enquires (an licitum fit ludere preces sacras) if it be lawful to play at Prayers. He says it is the practice of devout persons, and that Navarre seems to approve it, part 2. c. 32. so does Bonacina after Navarre. Rebellus and others, de restit. disp. 2. q. 3. punct. 1. n. 8. and not only at Ave Mari's but other prayers also; and that it will be no irreverence against God to play with their prayers, if they do it reverently, ibid. To say nothing that (k)their Clergy and Monks may be spectators of games and shows that are mortally wicked, if they continue not a long time at it; and yet offend but Venially. They teach further, that it is not needful ⟨p. 277⟩to (l)restore what is wickedly gained. Sylvester after others, says (m)that filthy lucre (that is, dishonest or shameful gain,) is not necessarily to be restored, 'tis but matter of counsel. But he that hath lost much at unlawful games, may take another course for his satisfaction; for Pope Adrian and others, allow him to steal it from him that has won it, Vid. Lopez. ibid.
I have shew'd before what unjust and fraudulent methods of gaming they incourage under the favour of Venial faults; let me here instance in gaming only. This with them is (f)Venial, though it be not only out of an ordinate, but an excessive desire of gaining, if there be no other mortal ingredient; yea, though not only the subservient, but the principal end, be lucre; and so ⟨p. 276⟩that which is only for recreation, be turned into a trade. And this is not only the opinion of some particular Doctors, but seems to be the perswasion of them all: for says Navar, (g)we see in all parts of the world, all sorts of people play for great sums of money, and the greatest part of them principally for gain; and yet the confessors absolve them, though they sign•fie no intention to give over the practice, which they could not do, if there were any mortal sin in it. And (h)such gaming is allowed, even that which they call Diabolical, in any place, though in their account (i)sacred; at any time, for whole days, even the holiest, that little time excepted wich will suffice the people to hear the chief parts of the Mass, or in any person, even their cloyster'd pretenders to perfection, so they omit not divine service. Their mode of devotion needs be no hindrance, for with them it is lawful to make a game of their Prayers. Lopez enquires (an licitum fit ludere preces sacras) if it be lawful to play at Prayers. He says it is the practice of devout persons, and that Navar seems to approve it, part 2. c. 32. so does Bonacina after Navar. Rebellus and others, de restit. disp. 2. q. 3. punct. 1. n. 8. and not only at Ave Mari's but other prayers also; and that it will be no irreverence against God to play with their prayers, if they do it reverently, ibid. To say nothing that (k)their Clergy and Monks may be spectators of games and shews that are mortally wicked, if they continue not a long time at it; and yet offend but Venially. They teach further, that it is not needful ⟨p. 277⟩to (l)
(f)Multi ludo qui recreationis causa licitus & Sanctus est abutuntur, ut negotiatione ad lucrum—ludunt principaliter propter lucrum. Et hoc semper est peccatum: quoniam est dare operam turpi lucro, si tamen nulla alia deformitas immisceatur, non est peccatum mortale. Cajetan. sum. v. Ludere. p. 410. Navarre. cap. 20. n. 3. Lopez. pars 2. c. 31. p. 183.Multi ludo qui recreationis causa licitus & Sanctus est abutuntur, ut negotiatione ad lucrum—ludunt principaliter propter lucrum. Et hoc semper est peccatum: quoniam est dare operam turpi lucro, si tamen nulla alia deformitas immisceatur, non est peccatum mortale. Cajetan. sum. v. Ludere. p. 410. Na•ar. cap. 20. n. 3. Lopez. pars 2. c. 31. p. 183.
(g)In omnibus mundi partibus cujusque ordinis laicos videamus magnam pecuniarum summam, & maximam eorum partem principaliter propter lucrum ludere, & à confessariis, sine proposito nunquam ita ludendi absolvi quod sacere nequirent, si in eo mortaliter peccar•nt. Navarre. ibid. n. 11.In omnibus mundi partibus cujusque ordinis laicos videamus magnam pecuniarum summam, & maximam eorum partem principaliter propter lucrum ludere, & à confessariis, sine proposito nunquam ita ludendi absolvi quod sacere nequirent, si in eo mortaliter peccar•nt. Navar. ibid. n. 11.
(h)Q•eritur utrum & quomodo ludus diabolicus alearis sit peccatum? & dico quod hic l•dus non •st pecca•um, vel est veniale quum luditur aliquid modicum, &c. Sylvest. sum. v. ludus. n. 4.
(i)Navarre. ibid. n. 3.Navar. ibid. n. 3.
(k)Peccat clericus vel monachus quiludum mortaliter malum spectat, si multo tempore spectat, saecus si parvo. Navarre. ibid. n. 14.Peccat clericus vel monachus quiludum mortaliter malum spectat, si multo tempore spectat, saecus si parvo. Navar. ibid. n. 14.
(l)Nullus tenetur cum famae periculo rem alterius restituere. Est communis sententia. Cajetan. v. restit. Navarre. c. 19. n. 90. (Toll. l. 5. c. 27.) This will go near to excuse most, if not all: dicitur non posse—qui commode non potest. Cap. 17. n. 56.
Or to save himself the trouble of stealing, he may refuse to pay, what he loses; or if he have bound himself by Oath to pay it (not only the Pope, but) any Bishop may release him from the obligation of his Oath, and that without the citation of the party. So Navarre. Corduba. Sotus. Penna. & alii in Bonacin. ibid, punct. 3. n. 2. Yea, they will not have those obliged to make restitution who have received any thing for acting enormous wickedness, for example, a Judg for passing an unjust Sentence, or a witness for false testimony and perjury, or a man for satisfying the lust of a lewd woman, or any sort of women for prostituting themselves, or an assassinate for murdering, or a rogue for firing Houses or Towns: all are comprised in this conclusion, (n)that which is unjustly received, freely of the giver, where there is wickedness on both parts (as in giving, so in receiving), is not, by virtue of any command, to be restored to any. Only (for the encouragement of covetousness, and injustice together) where money is given for the perpetrating of such crimes, if they be not acted, it is to be restored: but if the wickedness be done, the villainous actor may conscientiously detain it. As the Judg that receives a bribe for a false Sentence, (o)if he pass a just one, he is ⟨p. 278⟩obliged to restore; but not if he make an unjust award. And (p)a witness if he receive money for a true testimony, is bound to restore it; but not for a false deposition. He that is promised a reward for murdering a man, may not receive or keep it before he kill him: but after the murder is done, he may take it (and need not restore it) upon the account of his labour and hazard in killing him, and because therein he has done a fact profitable and delightful to him that hired him, Idem ibid. n. 5. Pet. Navarre. & ally. So an Astrologer who takes money for telling things, which he cannot know but by the help of the Devil, is not bound to restore it, after diligence and pains to get the Devils assistance therein; because that diligence and pains (with the Devil) is valuable, though it prove ineffectual. But he that pretends but to this skill, and makes no use of the Devil, is bound to restore; Pet. Navar. & alli cum Bonacin. ibid. n. 10. And that the poor may be cut off every way by covetousness, whether it be with injustice, or without it;
Or to save himself the trouble of stealing, he may refuse to pay, what he loses; or if he have bound himself by Oath to pay it (not only the Pope, but) any Bishop may release him from the obligation of his Oath, and that without the citation of the party. So Navar. Corduba. Sotus. Penna. & alii in Bonacin. ibid, punct. 3. n. 2. Yea, they will not have those obliged to make restitution who have received any thing for acting enormous wickedness, for example, a Judg for passing an unjust Sentence, or a witness for false testimony and perjury, or a man for satisfying the lust of a lewd woman, or any sort of women for prostituting themselves, or an assassinate for murdering, or a rogue for firing Houses or Towns: all are comprised in this conclusion, (n)that which is unjustly received, freely of the giver, where there is wickedness on both parts (as in giving, so in receiving), is not, by vertue of any command, to be restored to any. Only (for the incouragement of covetousness, and injustice together) where money is given for the perpetrating of such crimes, if they be not acted, it is to be restored: but if the wickedness be done, the villanous actor may conscientiously detain it. As the Judg that receives a bribe for a false Sentence, (o)if he pass a just one, he is ⟨p. 278⟩obliged to restore; but not if he make an unjust award. And (p)a witness if he receive money for a true testimony, is bound to restore it; but not for a false deposition. He that is promised a reward for murdering a man, may not receive or keep it before he kill him: but after the murder is done, he may take it (and need not restore it) upon the account of his labour and hazard in killing him, and because therein he has done a sact profitable and delightful to him that hired him, Idem ibid. n. 5. Pet. Navar. & ali•. So an Astrologer who takes money for telling things, which he cannot know but by the help of the Devil, is not bound to restore it, after diligence and pains to get the Devils assistance therein; because that diligence and pains (with the Devil) is valuable, though it prove ineffectual. But he that pretends but to this skill, and makes no use of the Devil, is bound to restore; Pet. Navar. & alli cum Bonacin. ibid. n. 10. And that the poor may be cut off every way by covetousness, whether it be with injustice, or without it;
(n)Acceptum voluntarie ab alio, ità ut ab utraque parte admittittur turpitudo, nulli est de precepto restituendum, S. Antoninus Monaldus, Angel•s, Sylvester, (in) Navarre. c. 17. n. 36. & n. 30. Sensit Thom. & Cajetan. quod quicquid turpiter accipit contra legis prohibitionem—ut in Simonia—lucro meretricis, (& idem diceret de datis & acceptis ob alia quaecunque crimina) quod non sit restituendum, nec pauperibus, vid. Vasq. opusc. moral. p. 134. dub. 9. n. 84.Acceptum voluntarie ab alio, ità ut ab utraque parte admittittur turpitudo, nulli est de precepto restituendum, S. Antoninus Monaldus, Angel•s, Sylvester, (in) Navar. c. 17. n. 36. & n. 30. Sensit Thom. & Cajetan. quod quicquid turpiter accipit contra legis prohibitionem—ut in Simonia—lucro meretricis, (& idem diceret de datis & acceptis ob alia quaecunque crimina) quod non sit restituendum, nec pauperibus, vid. Vasq. opusc. moral. p. 134. dub. 9. n. 84.
(o)Quando malum ob quod datum fuit, non consequitur, ut si datum est judici quo inique judicaret, & recte judicavit, &c. datori, & non pauperibus restituendum est ut doctiffimus Medina, efficaciter probat. Navarre. ibid. n. 30. p. 295. &c. 25. n. 45.Quando malum ob quod datum fuit, non consequitur, ut si datum est judici quo inique judicaret, & recte judicavit, &c. datori, & non pauperibus restituendum est ut doctiffimus Medina, efficaciter probat. Navar. ibid. n. 30. p. 295. &c. 25. n. 45.
(p)Peccat qui mercedem accipit, ut verum testetur, cum obligatione restituendi ei qui dedit; & qui accipit, ut falsum testetur, sine tamen necessitate restituendi, vid. Bonacin. de restit. disp. 1. q. 3. punct. 2. n. 6. & punct. 3. n. 8.
though they say, what is received for the perpetrating of wicked acts, may be restored to the poor: yet it is a rule with them, (q)that restitution to the poor in this, and other casts, is only a counsel, not a command; so that he who is hired to de villany, may restore what he received to the poor, if he will; but if he will not, he needs not; he may conscientiously enjoy the fruits of his villainy, and the poor have nothing. In short, not only disquietment of mind (r)through the tumult of worldly distracting cares, and the restless agitation of a covetous humour; but also hardness of heart (s)against the poor, and unmercifulness to them in ⟨p. 279⟩their distress, (the natural effect of extreme covetousness) is as innocent •s its cause, no worse than Venial, unless, when one is obliged •der pain of mortal guilt to afford relief, And when is that? only (t)in extreme necessity, when the starving man may (u)sell his own child to get bread; or when it will be lawful (x)to steal from him who would otherwise part with nothing; or when he may be compelled by Law (y)to part with something; then his heart must relent so far, as to let go what he cannot keep: but it is like he may never meet with such a case while he lives, and then the miser is excused; no moment of his life, need be embittered with one act of charity; he may enjoy the felicity of a petrified heart all his days, and not suffer by one dint in it. Or if he should unhappily meet with one in such extremity, yet may he escape without giving a farthing; it will be enough to exchange, or to lend: (x)yea he may be excused from either giving or lending, (a)if it be but likely that any other may do it. In fine, this unmercifulness, which admits no compassion from the distress of others, (b)is scarce ever mortal; unless it become so (accidentally) by some other mortal acts, and so there is no need to confes• it as a sin. How well does this indulgence to such monstrous covetousness as quite swallows up at once Christian charity, mercy, and morality, become those, who cry up themselves as the sole Assertors of the necessity of good works?
though they say, what is received for the perpetrating of wicked acts, may be restored to the poor: yet it is a rule with them, (q)that restitution to the poor in this, and other casts, is only a counsel, not a command; so that he who is hired to de villany, may restore what he received to the poor, if he will; but if he will not, he needs not; he may conscientiously injoy the fruits of his villany, and the poor have nothing. In short, not only disquietment of mind (r)through the tumult of worldly distracting cares, and the restless agitation of a covetous humour; but also hardness of heart (s)against the poor, and unmercifulness to them in ⟨p. 279⟩their distress, (the natural effect of extream covetousness) is as innocent •s its cause, no worse than Venial, unless, when one is obliged •der pain of mortal guilt to afford relief, And when is that? only (t)in extream necessity, when the starving man may (u)sell his own child to get bread; or when it will be lawful (x)to steal from him who would otherwise part with nothing; or when he may be compelled by Law (y)to part with something; then his heart must relent so far, as to let go what he cannot keep: but it is like he may never meet with such a case while he lives, and then the miser is excused; no moment of his life, need be imbittered with one act of charity; he may injoy the felicity of a petrified heart all his days, and not suffer by one dint in it. Or if he should unhappily meet with one in such extremity, yet may he escape without giving a farthing; it will be enough to exchange, or to lend: (x)yea he may be excused from either giving or lending, (a)if it be but likely that any other may do it. In fine, this unmercifulness, which admits no compassion from the distress of others,
(q)Est regula Vervecelli, recepta à. S. Antonino, Angel. Sylvest. & ab aliis complurimis, quod restitutis, quae non est facienda alicui certae personae, sed pauperibus non debetur ex praecepto, sed solum ex consilio. Navar. ibid. c. 17. n. 30.
(r)Cajetan. sum. v. inquietudo.
(s)Per duritiam cordis, & inquietudinem mentis peccant qui non subveniunt pauperi, quoties t•nentur de precepto obligante ad mortale—alias enim hac venialia tantum sunt. Navar. c. 23. n. 76.
(t)Idem. Cap. 24. n. 5.
(u)Idem C. 23. n. 95.
(x)Vict. supra.
(y)Glossa communiter recepta. Ibid. n. 74.
(x)(z) Idem ibid. n. 95.
(a)Idem c. 24. n. 5.
(b)Quia haec fere nunquam sunt mortalia nisi conjungantur aliis actibus mortalibus, • sunt necessario confitenda, quia satis est confiteri illa mortalia, quae per predictam duritiam & inquietudinem admittuntur. Idem c. 2•. n. 76.
But that they may not be partial, they show themselves as favourable to the crime in the other extreme; (c)pure prodigality is no mortal ⟨p. 280⟩sin, because i• is a less fault than covetousness, contrary: to liberality; which is manifestly of it self no mortal sin, and the reason of both i•▪ neither of them is against charity to God or others, but only besides it. So Cajetan and others. So (d)Navarre, prodigality (including both th• of a mans credit and his estate) is regularly no mortal sin; and this after (e)Aquinas.
But that they may not be partial, they shew themselves as favourable to the crime in the other extream; (c)pure prodigality is no mortal ⟨p. 280⟩sin, becaus• i• is a less fault than covetousness, contrary: to liberality; which is manifestly of it self no mortal sin, and the reason of both i•▪ neither of them is against charity to God or others, but only besides it. So Cajetan and others. So (d)Navar, prodigality (including both th• of a mans credit and his estate) is regularly no mortal sin; and this after (e)Aquinas.
(c)Prodigalitas non est mortale peccatum si pura est • quiae minus peccatum est, quam avaritia liberalitati contraria; quum sipura est, constat non esse mortalem. Et utriusque ratio est quia neutra, agit contra charitatem Dei aut proximi, sed pr•er. illam. Cajetan. sum. v. Prodigal.
Pride is another capital crime, they style it (f)the Queen of mo• tal sins; but then they will have it advanced so high, before it be mortal, that the proudest person amongst Christians can seldom reach it; and so all pride which is not of an extraordinary size, and such as is rarely found, must pass for Venial. In Aquinas (g)it is an aversion to God, in that he will not be subject to him •d his will; not upon other accounts (to wit desire of pleasure or profit, &c.) but out of contempt. So (h)Cajetan also, • others after him. Navarre says (i)they make it an actual conte• of being subject to God, and adds, thanks be to God, this is but […] in few Christians, though all are truly proud; so that mortal pride, by that account which the Oracle of their School, and his followers give of it; is rarely to be found in the Christian world, ⟨p. 281⟩'Tis questionable whether Scotus did count that pride mortal, which Aquinas judged to be so, he says (k)few learned men know in what degree it is deadly, and others are not bound to know it. However (l)Cajetan ventures to tell us what pride is Venial; and his account is worth our view. It is thus at large: He that shows himself so irreligious and ungrateful, as if he had not received all from God, is proud (says he) in the first kind; for of a like effect the Apostle says, what hast thou which thou hast not received? why dost thou glory, as if thou hadst not received? where by glorying, as the effect, the inward pride is manifested, as though he had not received it. Likewise when one is so affected, as to be s•cure concerning the good he hath, or querulous for the good which is lost; or wonders that he is not heard of God, this is the second kind of pride: because such a one makes account that such things are due to him. But he that prefers himself before others, and is prone to spy in his mind or fancy, the defects of others or to excuse his own naughtiness, and to aggravate that of others, has a third sort of pride; when he will have himself to be great, as if he alone were great. Further, he who caring little for the Heavenly country; for the members of Christ, for the expiation of his sins, passing his days as one dreaming, or scarce •ake, has a fourth kind of pride: for he presumes he is a Heavenly Citi•h, a friend of God, a Son, a Member; when such negligence and carelessness are no evidence of his favours:
PRide is another capital crime, they style it (f)the Queen of mo• tal sins; but then they will have it advanced so high, before it be mortal, that the proudest person amongst Christians can seldom reach it; and so all pride which is not of an extraordinary size, and such as is rarely found, must pass for Venial. In Aquinas (g)it is an aversion to God, in that he will not be subject to him •d his will; not upon other accounts (to wit desire of pleasure or profit, &c.) but out of contempt. So (h)Cajetan also, • others after him. Navar says (i)they make it an actual conte• of being subject to God, and adds, thanks be to God, this is but 〈…〉 in few Christians, though all are truly proud; so that mortal pride, by that account which the Oracle of their School, and his followers give of it; is rarely to be found in the Christian world, ⟨p. 281⟩'Tis questionable whether Scotus did count that pride mortal, which Aquinas judg'd to be so, he says (k)few learned men know in what degree it is deadly, and others are not bound to know it. However (l)Cajetan ventures to tell us what pride is Venial; and his account is worth our view. It is thus at large: He that shews himself so irreligious and ungrateful, as if he had not received all from God, is proud (says he) in the first kind; for of a like effect the Apostle says, what hast thou which thou hast not received? why dost thou glory, as if thou hadst not received? where by glorying, as the effect, the inward pride is manifested, as though he had not received it. Likewise when one is so affected, as to be s•cure concerning the good he hath, or querulous for the good which is lost; or wonders that he is not heard of God, this is the second kind of pride: because such a one makes account that such things are due to him. But he that prefers himself before others, and is prone to spie in his mind or fancie, the defects of others or to excuse his own naughtiness, and to aggravate that of others, has a third sort of pride; when he will have himself to be great, as if he alone were great. Further, he who caring little for the Hvaeenly countrey; for the members of Christ, for the expiation of his sins, passing his days as one dreaming, or scarce ake, has a fourth kind of pride: for he presumes he is a Heavenly Citih, a friend of God, a Son, a Member; when such negligence and carelesness are no evidence of his favours:
(g)Exparte aversionis superbia habet maximam gravitatem, quia in aliis peccatis homo à Deo avertitur vel propter ignorantiam vel propter infirmitatem, sive propter disiderium cujuscunque alterius boni. Sed superbia habet aversionem à Deo ex hoc ipso qui non vult Deo & ejus regulae subject—cujus natus est Dei contemptus. Aquin. 22. q. 162. n. 6.
(h)Sum. v. superbia, vid. Sylvest. v. superbia.
(i)Requirunt uterque Thomas communiter recepti ad ejus essentiam actualem contemptum subjiciendi se Deo & legi ejus—cum id (Gratia Deo) pauci Christiani faci• & v•r• omnes aliquo modo superbiamus, c. 23. n. 5. certe paucissimi Christiani, &c. 2. 6.
(k)Quilibet tenetur vitare omne peccatum mortale, tamen non tenetur scire in quo grade, superbia est peccatum mortale, quia nec multi experti sciunt. Scotus, in St. Cl•r. Probl. 15. p. 94.
the love of God where it is producing (those) great things. And likewise in reference to his Neighbours crudeness of mind, and incompassionateness to others, counting injuries intolerable, impatience, not enduring to be slighted, indignation, and the like, do show, that the man thinks better of himself than he is, &c. So great a littler of this monster he exposes to our view, telling us its issue is much more numerous; and then strokes all gently over, calling them Venials. (m)These, says he, and many others are a sort of imperfect pride, and are ⟨p. 282⟩commonly Venial sins for the imperfectness of them, since they occur in the manner of passions, without injury to God or others. Yet (that we may be the more amazed, to see all this pass for a little fault) such sins (he adds) hinder spiritual life exceedingly; being of the stock of pride; when it is written, that God resists the proud. As for that pride which they count mortal, and grown to its full height; (n)Aquinas out of Gregory, and (o)others after both, give an account of it in some particulars; the prime are these, (p)When o• thinks that good he has, is from himself. When he thinks that what he has from God, is for his merits. And when he boasts that he hath what he has not. If their great Azpilcue•a could see none of this most deadly crime amongst Christians, having the merit of congruity and condignity before him; either his sight failed him, or his Church was not visible. Others, with his eyes, can see not only mortal pride, but (as deadly a sin) infidelity, (q)where this is part of a Creed: To make up one article, of two deadly sins, must be a sure mark of the only Church. Seriously, finding so many of their Authors on this head, charging the opinion of merit, with mortal pride; and therein following not only the greatest of their Doctors, but the most infallible of their Bishops; I have wondered why they did not either make that none of their faith, or this no such sin. What sal• they will find against deadly sin, when it is in their faith, I know not: but if part of their belief had proved arrogance (though that founds like the worst of pride) they might have come off well enough, for arrogance is a Venial sin, except in some rare cases. It is ⟨p. 283⟩says Cajetan, 6frequently Venial, when without prejudice of others, a man values himself as having more knowledge, or goodness, or authority than he hath;
the love of God where it is produeing (those) great things. And likewise in reference to his Neighbours crudeness of mind, and incompassionateness to others, counting injuries intolerable, impatience, not induring to be slighted, indignation, and the like, do shew, that the man thinks better of himself than he is, &c. So great a littler of this monster he exposes to our view, telling us its issue is much more numerous; and then stroaks all gently over, calling them Venials. (m)These, says he, and many others are a sort of imperfect pride, and are ⟨p. 282⟩commonly Venial sins for the imperfectness of them, since they occur in the manner of passions, without injury to God or others. Yet (that we may be the more amazed, to see all this pass for a little fault) such sins (he adds) hinder spiritual life exceedingly; being of the stock of pride; when it is written, that God resists the proud. As for that pride which they count mortal, and grown to its full heighth; (n)Aquinas out of Gregory, and (o)others after both, give an account of it in some particulars; the prime are these, (p)When o• thinks that good he has, is from himself. When he thinks that what he has from God, is for his merits. And when he boasts that he hath what he has not. If their great Azpilcue•a could see none of this most deadly crime amongst Christians, having the merit of congruity and condignity before him; either his sight fail'd him, or his Church was not visible. Others, with his eyes, can see not only mortal pride, but (as deadly a sin) infidelity, (q)where this is part of a Creed: To make up one article, of two deadly sins, must be a sure mark of the only Church. Seriously, finding so many of their Authors on this head, charging the opinion of merit, with mortal pride; and therein following not only the greatest of their Doctors, but the most infallible of their Bishops; I have wondred why they did not either make that none of their faith, or this no such sin. What sal• they will find against deadly sin, when it is in their faith, I know not: but if part of their belief had proved arrogance (though that founds like the worst of pride) they might have come off well enough, for arrogance is a Venial sin, except in some rare cases. It is
(m)Sunt autem haec & multa alia, quae imperfectae sunt superbiae, communiter venialia peccata propter imperfectionem actus, dumb per modum passionum occurrunt absque injuria Dei & proximorum. Impediunt autem hujusmo li peccata valde vitam spiritualem: utpote ex genere superbiae existentia: quum scriptum sit superbis Deus resistit. Ibid. p. 548.Sunt autem haec & multa alia, quae imperfectae sunt superbiae, communiter venialia peccata propter imperfectionem actus, dum per modum passionum occurrunt absque injuria Dei & proximorum. Impediunt autem hujusmo li peccata valde vitam spiritualem: utpote ex genere superbiae existentia: quum scriptum sit superbis Deus resistit. Ibid. p. 548.
(n)22 q. 142. art. 4.
(o)Angelus, v. superb. Sylvest. v. superb. Navarre. c. 23. n. 7. alii communiter.Angelus, v. superb. Sylvest. v. superb. Navar. c. 23. n. 7. alii communiter.
(p)Secundum hoc sumuntur duae primae superbiae species, scilicet cum quis à semet ipso habere aestimat quod à Deo habet, vel oum propriis meritis sibi datum desuper credit.—Sic est tertia species superbiae cum scilicet aliquis jactat se habere quod non babet. Aquinas, ibid.
(q)Credere id (viz. predicta) in genere est actus—infidelitatis. Navarre. ibid. n. 8. In universally dicere—bonum aliquod habere à se & non à Deo, vel suis meritis, hoc p•rtinet ad infidelitatem & est mortale peccatum infidelitatis. Angel. sum. v. super•i•.Credere id (viz. predicta) in genere est actus—infidelitatis. Navar. ibid. n. 8. In universali dicere—bonum aliquod habere à se & non à Deo, vel suis meritis, hoc p•rtinet ad infidelitatem & est mortale peccatum infidelitatis. Angel. sum. v. super•i•.
6(r) Est autem frequenter venialis arrogantia dumb absque prejudicio proximi astimat quis▪ se plus scientiae, aut bonitatis aut authoritatis habere, quam habet Sum. v. arrogantia peccatum est quia contra rectam rationem est. Sed mortale non est nisi vel id quod sibi usurpat, sit contra divinam reverentiam: ut Rex Tyri, Ego Deus Sum. aut contra proximum: ut tyrannis, vel finis ultimus in bujusmodi elation ponatur. Ibid.)
and again, it is a sin, but it is not mortal, unless when it usurps against God, as the King of Tyre, when he said, I am God (now none are observed to do this, except the Pope, who has the Law in his own hand); or against others by Tyranny (which is so odious as all disclaim it: and affecting it, is no worse than affecting to kill men without consent; which, with him is (s)not deadly): or unless it be made ones ultimate end (which none will own). Accordingly, Angelus determines, that (t)arrogancy is commonly a Venial fault, unless upon the account of something else that is mortal, as when it arises from mortal pride; but that (as he and others define it, we heard before) is scarce to be found amongst Christians.
(s)Ibid, v. vovendi condit.
(t)Utrum sit mortal peccatum? Resp. quod sic, quum ex tali superbia vel contentione fit quae sit mortalis—alias communiter peccatum venial erit. Sum. v. arrogantia.Utrum sit mortale peccatum? Resp. quod sic, quum ex tali superbia vel contentione fit quae sit mortalis—alias communiter peccatum veniale erit. Sum. v. arrogantia.
Ambition was wont to be counted a deadly crime; the world and the Church too, has reason to judg it so, since the most of their miseries and ruins, may be imputed to it; but the Church of Rome and her Champions are concerned not to think so ill of it; stilo curiae, in the sense of the Court, it may pass for Venial. Angelus inquires, (u)whether ambition be a mortal sin? he answers▪ negatively it is not ⟨p. 284⟩so simply, but may be so, in respect of its end (and so may any thing in it self lawful be, if its end be criminal); or it may be so, if the thing affected be▪ a crime; but that is accidental, and still ambitiousness; the inordinacy of the affection is excused, and may transgress all bounds, if the honour and power affected, be lawful. Thus Cajetan he will yield it more than (x)Venial, when one will be honoured for a crime, or would be counted a God; accordingly it is resolved by Sylvester, (y)with Navarre, (z)regularly an inordinate appetite (or greediness) of Honour, exceeds not the bounds of a Venial fault. Indeed if pride and ambition had been branded as damnable; two Cardinal virtues had been concerned; and, which is more, the Vatican Throne, both in its foundation and supports.
AMbition was wont to be counted a deadly crime; the world and the Church too, has reason to judg it so, since the most of their miseries and ruins, may be imputed to it; but the Church of Rome and her Champions are concerned not to think so ill of it; stilo curiae, in the sense of the Court, it may pass for Venial. Angelus inquires, (u)whether ambition be a mortal sin? he answers▪ negatively it is not ⟨p. 284⟩so simply, but may be so, in respect of its end (and so may any thing in it self lawful be, if its end be criminal); or it may be so, if the thing affected be▪ a crime; but that is accidental, and still ambitiousness; the inordinacy of the affection is excused, and may transgress all bounds, if the honour and power affected, be lawful. Thus Cajetan he will yield it more than (x)Venial, when one will be honoured for a crime, or would be counted a God; accordingly it is resolved by Sylvester, (y)with Navar, (z)regularly an inordinate appetite (or greediness) of Honour, exceeds not the bounds of a Venial fault. Indeed if pride and ambition had been branded as damnable; two Cardinal vertues had been concern'd; and, which is more, the Vatican Throne, both in its foundation and supports.
(u)Utrum ambitio sit peccatum mortale? Resp. quod non simpliciter sed pro ratione finis—vel secundo ratione rei quae appetitu. Sum. v. ambitio.
(x)Non est autem mortale peccatum, nisi vel ex parte rei in qua appetitur honor: puta, si quis vult honorari ob crimen aliquod; vel ex parte finis—quia vult haheri ut Deus. Cajetan. v. ambit.
(y)Sum. v. superbia. n. 7.
(z)Quamvis regulariter, appetitus inordinatus honoris, non excedat metas culpae venialis, Cap. 23. n. 15.
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restore what is wickedly gained. Sylvester after others, says
that filthy lucre (that is, dishonest or shameful gain,) is not necessarily to be restored, 'tis but matter of counsel. But he that hath lost much at unlawful games, may take another course for his satisfaction; for Pope Adrian and others, allow him to steal it from him that has won it, Vid. Lopez. ibid.
Nullus tenetur cum famae periculo rem alterius restituere. Est communis sententia. Cajetan. v. restit. Navar. c. 19. n. 90. (Tol. l. 5. c. 27.) This will go near to excuse most, if not all: dicitur non posse—qui commode non potest. Cap. 17. n. 56.
(m)Non tamen necessario tale turpe lucrum est restituendum secundum. Rodofred, s•d de consilio solum. Sum. v. Emptio, n. 10. Vid. Lopez. ibid.
is scarce ever mortal; unless it become so (accidentally) by some other mortal acts, and so there is no need to confes• it as a sin. How well does this indulgence to such monstrous covetousness as quite swallows up at once Christian charity, mercy, and morality, become those, who cry up themselves as the sole Assertors of the necessity of good works?
frequently Venial, when without prejudice of others, a man values himself as having more knowledg, or goodness, or authority than he hath;
(r) Est autem frequenter venialis arrogantia dum absque prejudicio proximi astimat quis▪ se plus scientiae, aut bonitatis aut authoritatis habere, quam habet Sum. v. arrogantia peccatum est quia contra rectam rationem est. Sed mortale non est nisi vel id quod sibi usurpat, sit contra divinam reverentiam: ut Rex Tyri, Ego Deus Sum. aut contra proximum: ut tyrannis, vel finis ultimus in bujusmodi elatione ponatur. Ibid.)
