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Such a Supper these Fasters may eat in the Morning, if they please. This will be but a small fault, though they do it when there is no occasion for it(*): and they may the better fast after, upon a full Stomach, till noon at least; but they need not stay so long, for they may drink every hour, or oftener if they will, and when ever they drink, they may eat something too, that the drink may not hurt them; and thus may break their fast every hour of the day, or more, and yet keep it the whole day well enough.
Such a Supper these Fasters may eat in the Morning, if they please. This will be but a small fault, though they do it when there is no occasion for it(*): and they may the better fast after, upon a full Stomach, till noon at least; but they need not stay so long, for they may drink every hour, or oftner if they will, and when ever they drink, they may eat something too, that the drink may not hurt them; and thus may break their fast every hour of the day, or more, and yet keep it the whole day well enough.
(*)Bonacin, de praecept. Eccles. q. 1. p. 3. n. 6. ibi. Angles. Naldus, & ally vid. p. 1. n. 8.Bonacin, de praecept. Eccles. q. 1. p. 3. n. 6. ibi. Angles. Naldus, & ali• vid. p. 1. n. 8.
For the quality of their fasting, meat (to say nothing that some flesh is allowed) they may use the most delicious, that they can compass; the most curious sweet meats, the choicest Wines, the rarest Fish, and that dressed after the most delicate mode, and this at Dinner, the meal most repugnant of all to fasting. O how gladly would Thousands of our People be condemned to such a maceration of the Flesh, for more days in a year, than the Romanists are, thus pitifully mortified; and never trouble Pope or Prelate for a dispensation? nay they would purchase a licence to fast, if any would accommodate them
Sylvester thinks it possible, that intemperance in drinking may be a sin: however it is lawful for those that fast, to drink often, on the same day; for drinking breaks not the fast, either before or after Dinner, so he after others. A man may wonder what can break this fast, since neither drinking nor eating so often, and so much, even to excess, and the gratifying of sensuality, in so high a degree can do it. It is Wine that they may drink so often when they fast; and yet they acknowledge that Wine is more contrary to the nature and end of a fast than flesh. Though Wine (says De
Graffijs) be more nutritive, and the drinking of Wine do more provoke to concupiscence, than the eating of Flesh according to that, Proverbs 10. Wine is a luxurious thing, and Eph. 5. Be not drunk with Wine in which is luxury: yet (says he) he that on a fast day often drinks Wine or Water, either sooner or later, does not break the fast.
For the quality of their fasting, meat (to say nothing that some flesh is allowed) they may use the most delicious, that they can compass; the most curious sweet meats, the choicest Wines, the rarest Fish, and that dres'd after the most delicate mode, and this at Dinner, the meal most repugnant of all to fasting. O how gladly would Thousands of our People be condemned to such a maceration of the Flesh, for more days in a year, than the Romanists are, thus pitifully mortified; and never trouble Pope or Prelate for a dispensation? nay they would purchase a licence to fast, if any would accommodate them ⟨p. 394⟩(d)with expedients to do it at such a rate. Besides their meats, they may drink freely; not only (e)at meals, but before or after, though they need it not, and be not thirsty, the drinking of Wine out of sensuality, breaks not the fast says Sylvester(f). And thus they may drink, before the meat they fast on be digested: for though that be intemperance in other cases, as Navar (g)tells us, it breaks not the fast. (h)Sylvester thinks it possible, that intemperance in drinking may be a sin: however it is lawful for those that fast, to drink often, on the same day; for drinking breaks not the fast, either before or after Dinner, so he after others. A man may wonder what can break this fast, since neither drinking nor eating so often, and so much, even to excess, and the gratifying of sensuality, in so high a degree can do it. It is Wine that they may drink so often when they fast; and yet they acknowledg that Wine is more contrary to the nature and end of a fast than flesh. Though Wine (says De (i)Graffijs) be more nutritive, and the drinking of Wine do more provoke to concupiscence, than the eating of Flesh according to that, Proverbs 10. Wine is a luxurious thing, and Eph. 5. Be not drunk with Wine in which is luxury: yet (says he) he that on a fastday often drinks Wine or Water, either sooner or later, does not break the fast.
(d)Immo et si ex sensualitate—secundum mentem Panormitani, quia sufficit non exire t•rminos consuetudinis. Sylv. ibid. n. 10.
(e)Utrum pluries bibere vinum vel aquam frangit jejunium Resp. Innocentius & Ricar. quod non, sive ante pastum sive post. Angel. sum. v. jejun. n. 4. They may drink it and that often for hunger as well as thirst. Navarre. cap. 21. n. 13.Utrum pluries bibere vinum vel aquam frangit jejunium Resp. Innocentius & Ricar. quod non, sive ante pastum sive post. Angel. sum. v. jejun. n. 4. They may drink it and that often for hunger as well as thirst. Navar. cap. 21. n. 13.
(f)Potus etiam vini & electuaria, &c. De quibus intelligitur, quod ex sensualitate sumpta, non frangunt jejunium. Ibid. Sylvest.
(g)Esto, quod venialiter peccaret, qui coepta & nondum finita digestione biberet, non quidem quod jejunium frangat, sed quia actum inordinatum agit, Navarre. ibid.Esto, quod venialiter peccaret, qui coepta & nondum finita digestione biberet, non quidem quod jejunium frangat, sed quia actum inordinatum agit, Navar. ibid.
(h)Licitum est jejunantibus pluries intra diem unam Potare, licet immoderantia circa hoc posset •sse peccatum. Sylv. ibid. n. 9. secundum S. Thom. idem dicit Albertus. Paludan. Richardus. quod po•us non solvit jejunium sive post, sive ante prandium. ibid.
(i)Etsi vinum sit nutritivum, & ad concupiscentiam magis provocet potus vini quam esus carnium, secundum illud Prov. 20. Luxuriosa res est vinum & ad Eph. 5. Nolite inebriari vino, in quo est luxuria, tamen qui Die jejunij saepius biberent vinum, aut aquam, & mane & vespere, jejunium non frangunt, quamvis hoc facerent ad sustentan•ium se, & famem sedandam. ita D. Th. 2. 2. q. 147. art. 6. ad 2. qui inquit, quod bene possunt peccare & meritdm jejunij perdere sicut si immoderate cibum sumerent; sed non ut j•junium frangatur; & ratio est quia jejunium est abstinentia a cibo tantum. Graft. l. 2. c. 36. n. 21. p. 215.Etsi vinum sit nutritivum, & ad concupiscentiam magis provocet potus vini quam esus carnium, secundum illud Prov. 20. Luxuriosa res est vinum & ad Eph. 5. Nolite inebriari vino, in quo est luxuria, tamen qui Die jejunij saepius biberent vinum, aut aquam, & mane & vespere, jejunium non frangunt, quamvis hoc facerent ad sustentan•ium se, & famem sedandam. ita D. Th. 2. 2. q. 147. art. 6. ad 2. qui inquit, quod bene possunt peccare & meritdm jejunij perdere sicut si immoderate cibum sumerent; sed non ut j•junium frangatur; & ratio est quia jejunium est abstinentia a cibo tantum. Graff. l. 2. c. 36. n. 21. p. 215.
Thus as they may eat like gluttons, so (by the Doctrine of their chief Authors) they may drink till they be drunk, and yet not break their fast, for no drinking (how excessive soever) can break it. The Church-fast (they tell us) consists not in abstinence from drink:—consequently be that drinks Wine, or other liquor before or after Dinner, breaks not the precept for fasting, though he sin against temperance, and drink excessively. So Bonacina after Aquinas. Abulensis. Navarre and others, telling us it is their common Doctrine(*).
Thus as they may eat like gluttons, so (by the Doctrine of their chief Authors) they may drink till they be drunk, and yet not break their fast, for no drinking (how excessive soever) can break it. The Church-fast (they tell us) consists not in abstinence from drink:—consequently be that drinks Wine, or other liquour before or after Dinner, breaks not the precept for fasting, though he sin against temperance, and drink excessively. So Bonacina after Aquinas. Abulensis. Navar and others, telling us it is their common Doctrine(*).
(*)Non violat praeceptum jejunij—quamvis peccet contra temperantiam, bibendo intemperanter. Tom. 2. p. 337. n. 7. & alij communiter.
I suppose this fast can never be broke, it will be a fast for ever, do what they can; if all they are allowed to do against it, cannot make it to be no fast: for so far as I can perceive, they may break their bellies, and yet not break their fast. If one in the ancient Church had spoke of his fasting after three such meals, and so much drinking, yea, or but eating a Dinner; he would have been thought out of his wits: yet they must not be accounted ridiculous, who tell us gravely, that this is fasting; and that they break not a fast, unless they (k)Dine twice on a fasting day. And indeed some of their Writers(l), seem ashamed of this good work, as they do it in their Church. But suppose this were a fast (when indeed it is no such thing), and observed by them [Greek or Hebrew] (as Epiphanius (m)explains it) and so that they tasted nothing till Three a clock, or till evening, as of old: yet by the Roman Order, it would be no good work. That it may be such, there must be something Religious (former abstinence has no more goodness in it, than eating); it cannot be Religious, unless it be subservient to some Religious design or employment: but they disjoin it from all things of that nature; we hear not a word from them, of ⟨p. 396⟩their taking notice of their sins, or confessing them, or afflicting their Souls for them, they need not so much as pray when they fast, either in public or private: yea they are not obliged to hear (n)Mass, though that be the employment of every day for worship; So that their fasts are no days for worship, or any religious exercise. They are discharged also from religious ends, two are commonly assigned, the taming of the flesh; and the elevating of the mind to God: but though the flesh be more unruly, and the mind move not in the least towards God on a fasting-day; though they never mind these ends in their abstinence, yet they entirely fulfil the precept of their Church for fasting, as they commonly (o)conclude upon this ground, because the end of the precept is not commanded. So that this practice which they call fasting, is a mere bodily exercise amongst them, and thus it is represented by Cajetan (p)applying that of the Apostle to it, 1 Tim. 4. 8. Bodily exercise profiteth little, &c.
I suppose this fast can never be broke, it will be a fast for ever, do what they can; if all they are allowed to do against it, cannot make it to be no fast: for so far as I can perceive, they may break their bellies, and yet not break their fast. If one in the antient Church had spoke of his fasting after three such meals, and so much drinking, yea, or but eating a Dinner; he would have been thought out of his wits: yet they must not be accounted ridiculous, who tell us gravely, that this is fasting; and that they break not a fast, unless they (k)Dine twice on a fasting day. And indeed some of their Writers(l), seem ashamed of this good work, as they do it in their Church. But suppose this were a fast (when indeed it is no such thing), and observed by them 〈non-Latin alphabet〉 (as Epiphanius (m)explains it) and so that they tasted nothing till Three a clock, or till evening, as of old: yet by the Roman Order, it would be no good work. That it may be such, there must be something Religious (formere abstinence has no more goodness in it, than eating); it cannot be Religious, unless it be subservient to some Religious design or imployment: but they disjoyn it from all things of that nature; we hear not a word from them, of ⟨p. 396⟩their taking notice of their sins, or confessing them, or afflicting their Souls for them, they need not so much as pray when they fast, either in publick or private: yea they are not obliged to hear (n)Mass, though that be the imployment of every day for worship; So that their fasts are no days for worship, or any religious exercise. They are discharged also from religious ends, two are commonly assigned, the taming of the flesh; and the elevating of the mind to God: but though the flesh be more unruly, and the mind move not in the least towards God on a fasting-day; though they never mind these ends in their abstinence, yet they intirely fulfill the precept of their Church for fasting, as they commonly (o)conclude upon this ground, because the end of the precept is not commanded. So that this practice which they call fasting, is a mere bodily exercise amongst them, and thus it is represented by Cajetan (p)
(k)Innocent. & Richard. (dicunt) quod prandere pluries in Die jejunij est contra consuetudinem probatam ecclesiae. Angel. sum. ibid. n. 3. Semel esse in Die prandendum seu manducandum: qui vero pluries, solvit jejunium. Toll. l. 6 c. 2. p. 989.Innocent. & Richard. (dicunt) quod prandere pluries in Die jejunij est contra consuetudinem probatam ecclesiae. Angel. sum. ibid. n. 3. Semel esse in Die prandendum seu manducandum: qui vero pluries, solvit jejunium. Tol. l. 6 c. 2. p. 989.
(l)Jejunia nostra, quae in vini copia natan•, & piscium varietate carnis delicias superant—veteribus omnibus non modo fuisse incognita, sed & intolerabilia adeoque abhominanda, constat. Lindan. Panopl. l. 3. c. 11. inanem tantum very jejunij retinet umbram. Cassand. defens. lib. de Offic. viri. p. 119.Jejunia nostra, quae in vini copia natan•, & piscium varietate carnis delicias superant—veteribus omnibus non modo fuisse incognita, sed & intolerabilia adeoque abhominanda, constat. Lindan. Panopl. l. 3. c. 11. inanem tantum veri jejunij retinet umbram. Cassand. defens. lib. de Offic. viri. p. 119.
(m)[Greek or Hebrew] Compend. Doctrine. Cathol. If they sleep the whole day, yet they accomplish the precept. Jo. Sanc. disp. 51. n. 2.〈non-Latin alphabet〉 Compend. Doctrin. Cathol. If they sleep the whole day, yet they accomplish the precept. Jo. Sanc. disp. 51. n. 2.
(n)Dixi festo: quia nemo ullo alio Die hoc praecepto (de audienda missa) tenetur, etiam clericus vel monachus, imo neque Episcopus—Nullo inquam, alio Die etiam jejunii & quadragesimae, &c. Navarre. cap. 21. n. 2. Rosel. v. miss. n. 13. Sylvest. v. miss. 2. n. 1.Dixi festo: quia nemo ullo alio Die hoc praecepto (de audienda missa) tenetur, etiam clericus vel monachus, imo neque Episcopus—Nullo inquam, alio Die etiam jejunii & quadragesimae, &c. Navar. cap. 21. n. 2. Rosel. v. miss. n. 13. Sylvest. v. miss. 2. n. 1.
(o)L•x quae praecipit aliquid, non obligat ad finem, sed ad media tendentia ad finem D. Tho. 1, 2. q. 100. art. 9. & 10. Unde lex non obligat ad carnis petulantiam compescendam, sed ad media quibus comprimi possit, sicuti est jejunium. Graff. l. 2. c. 36. n. 20. Licet ecclesia nos quadrigesimali observation extenuare in carne intendat, ut liberior mens spiritualibus accommodetur, tamen finis ille non est in praecepto, sed tantum ciborum abstinentia Soto. de nat. & gr. l. 1. c. 22. p. 57. Finis praecepti jejunij est elevatio mentis: si tamen quis jejanat & non elevatur mente, non est transgressor praecepti. Cajetan. Sum. v. matrim. p. 430. Nec si lex jubet quadrigesimae jejunium ut, mens elevetur in Deum; astringimur proinde ex hujus praecepti vigour mentem in Deum elevare. Canus. Relect. de pnit. pars. 4. p. 871. vid. Toll. instr. l. 4. c. 12. p. 623.
Where he denies it the character of a good work. And since it is neither a true fast, nor a good work, if they made it never so necessary, it would be no proof, that by their doctrine, there is any necessity, either of real fasting, or any good work. But indeed they declare their ⟨p. 397⟩pretended Fasts needless; for their best Writers (q)conclude it to be but a Venial fault not to observe them; so that there is no more necessity with them to Fast after their mode, than there is to avoid a Venial sin, which is none at all. 2They have so many ways to excuse men from Fasting, as leave no necessity of it. This one may serve any that have no mind to fast: If a man have tired himself with any employment (lawful or damnable) not only with honest labour, but with too much gaming; yea, or with excessive Whoring; he is thereby exempted from the obligation to Fast, though he so wearied himself on purpose, that he might be excused. But one thing herein is more intolerable, that this ridiculous piece of mockery, which they call Fasting, has the glory given it, which is peculiar to Christ alone, and is thought sufficient both to satisfy the Justice of God, and to merit by way of condignity, not only grace, but eternal glory. An opinion of such malignancy, as is enough to poison the best work in the world into deadly guilt. To hold that a person, because he eats not two Dinners, or abstains for a day from flesh, though he stuff himself with other delicacies; even to excess, should be worthy of the glorious prerogative of Christ, is a conceit to be entertained with scorn and laughter, if the horror of it did not call for another passion. Yet such are points of Faith in that Church. And this surely is enough to cloy any man with their Fasting.
Where he denys it the character of a good work. And since it is neither a true fast, nor a good work, if they made it never so necessary, it would be no proof, that by their doctrine, there is any necessity, either of real fasting, or any good work. But indeed they declare their ⟨p. 397⟩pretended Fasts needless; for their best Writers (q)conclude it to be but a Venial fault not to observe them; so that there is no more necessity with them to Fast after their mode, than there is to avoyd a Venial sin, which is none at all. 2They have so many ways to excuse men from Fasting, as leave no necessity of it. This one may serve any that have no mind to fast: If a man have tired himself with any imployment (lawful or damnable) not only with honest labour, but with too much gaming; yea, or with excessive Whoreing; he is thereby exempted from the obligation to Fast, though he so wearied himself on purpose, that he might be excused. But one thing herein is more intolerable, that this ridiculous piece of mockery, which they call Fasting, has the glory given it, which is peculiar to Christ alone, and is thought sufficient both to satisfie the Justice of God, and to merit by way of condignity, not only grace, but eternal glory. An opinion of such malignancy, as is enough to poison the best work in the world into deadly guilt. To hold that a person, because he eats not two Dinners, or abstains for a day from flesh, though he stuff himself with other delicacies; even to excess, should be worthy of the glorious prerogative of Christ, is a conceit to be entertained with scorn and laughter, if the horrour of it did not call for another passion. Yet such are points of Faith in that Church. And this surely is enough to cloy any man with their Fasting.
(q)Quantum est ex jure scripto nullum cognosco intervenire mortal peccatum in fraction jejunij Ecclesiae, si contemptus desit. Cajetan. ibid. p. 352. vid. Aquin. Antoninum. Archidiac. Paludan. Angelum. & alios in Sylvest. v. Jejun. n. 21. Communis opinio.Quantum est ex jure scripto nullum cognosco intervenire mortale peccatum in fractione jejunij Ecclesiae, si contemptus desit. Cajetan. ibid. p. 352. vid. Aquin. Antoninum. Archidiac. Paludan. Angelum. & alios in Sylvest. v. Jejun. n. 21. Communis opinio.
2(*) So Jo. Sancius afters others; Liberos a jejunio existimo, qui culpa sua ita defatigati redduntur—quod j•junare non valeant; ut qui defatigatus esset ludo pilae, aut nimis esset deditus faeminarum commistioni—docent Medina. Diana. Ledesma, Montesin, &c. disp. 54. n. 20. Nonnulli doctores ex•endunt ad eos qui defatigantur in ludis, aut in quaerenda meretrice, &c. Bonacin. Tom. 2. disp. 2. q. 8. punct. 1. n. 16.
Sect. 2. Come we to the next of their good works, that is Prayer; this unquestionably is a good work, but then sure it must be good praying; but they are so far from judging it necessary to pray well, that they conclude it sufficient to employ themselves about this work, in such a manner, as cannot upon a just account, be called praying at all. The ⟨p. 398⟩only public prayers necessary for the people by the Roman orders, are those of the Mass, but how they pray therein, I cannot apprehend. They use not the words, they need not hear them, they cannot understand them; now can it be imagined that he prays, who neither expresses, nor conceives any Petitions? they do it not themselves, they join not with the Priest, for no man can possibly concur with the words, or the sense of him whom he neither hears nor understands. They cannot concur with the Priest as men, with rational acts, much less as Christians. The Church of Rome has made it not only needless, but impossible for the people to pray in their public Service, they must think something sufficient for them, which is not praying. Let us see what account their Authors give of this. Sylvester proving that it is not needful to pray on the Lords Day, or any of their days, for public worship, tells us what will serve the people instead thereof. (r)It suffices that they stand hy the Priest praying in the Mass, and that's all that is requisite, by virtue of this Precept. So that the Church requires no more than the presence and posture of the body. And they that can make a prayer of this, may make an Image in the Church to pray: and if this would be a miracle, it would be as wonderful that the other should be praying; but thus it becomes those who will worship Images, as if they were God; to worship God, as if themselves were Images. Oh but they must concur with the Priest, (s)so far, as either actually or virtually to wish that his prayers may be heard. And if this be praying, a man may pray in the Church, while he is in his Bed at home; for actually he may wish this, if he be awake; and virtually, though he be asleep. There is no prayer, but what is either vocal or mental; what the people do in the Mass, is neither, they say nothing, nor do they understand any thing, nor need they mind any thing, of what is said;
Sect. 2. Come we to the next of their good works, that is Prayer; this unquestionably is a good work, but then sure it must be good praying; but they are so far from judging it necessary to pray well, that they conclude it sufficient to imploy themselves about this work, in such a manner, as cannot upon a just account, be called praying at all. The ⟨p. 398⟩only publick prayers necessary for the people by the Roman orders, are those of the Mass, but how they pray therein, I cannot apprehend. They use not the words, they need not hear them, they cannot understand them; now can it be imagined that he prays, who neither expresses, nor conceives any Petitions? they do it not themselves, they joyn not with the Priest, for no man can possibly concur with the words, or the sense of him whom he neither hears nor understands. They cannot concur with the Priest as men, with rational acts, much less as Christians. The Church of Rome has made it not only needless, but impossible for the people to pray in their publick Service, they must think something sufficient for them, which is not praying. Let us see what account their Authors give of this. Sylvester proving that it is not needful to pray on the Lords Day, or any of their days, for publick worship, tells us what will serve the people instead thereof. (r)It suffices that they stand hy the Priest praying in the Mass, and that's all that is requisite, by vertue of this Precept. So that the Church requires no more than the presence and posture of the body. And they that can make a prayer of this, may make an Image in the Church to pray: and if this would be a miracle, it would be as wonderful that the other should be praying; but thus it becomes those who will worship Images, as if they were God; to worship God, as if themselves were Images. Oh but they must concur with the Priest, (s)so far, as either actually or vertually to wish that his prayers may be heard. And if this be praying, a man may pray in the Church, while he is in his Bed at home; for actually he may wish this, if he be awake; and vertually, though he be asleep. There is no prayer, but what is either vocal or mental; what the people do in the Mass, is neither, they say nothing, nor do they understand any thing, nor need they mind any thing, of what is said;
(r)Unde sufficit astare oranti sacerdoti in missa, quantum est exvi hujus praecepti. Sum. v. Dominic. n. 8.
(s)Cum nemo teneatur ex praecepto audire, & minus intelligere verba sacerdotis, quia satis est, vel ex longinquo missanti adesse, & surgendo, genua flectendo, vel alias actualiter vel virtualiter exoptare, ut sacerdos qui pro omnibus orat & sacrificat, a Deo exaudiatur. Navar. cap. 21. n. 8.
and it is much, if a mans mind can be employed about that, which he not only understands not, but minds not at all. The ⟨p. 399⟩mind must necessarily attend actually(t), in mental prayer; but actual attention is not necessary to what they call praying. So it is neither vocal nor mental, not any at all, unless they can devise a mode of prayer without either voice or mind. They know not what to mind, nor whom, person or thing: they understand net whether the Priest be in confession, or at prayer, or in his Lauds; no, nor whether he be praying or reading, unless the dumb signification of a posture tell them; nor that way neither, for they need not see no more than hear the Priest. They know not whether he be addressing himself to God, or to a Creature, whether to another divine person than the Father (for they have prayers in the Mass to Christ and the Holy Ghost, though an ancient Council forbids it); they know not whether he be praying to an Angel or to a Saint; to a Man or to a Woman; to an Image or to a Crucifix; for they have addresses to all. They can in no wise be thought to pray, who do not, who cannot so much as say Amen to a prayer; and this they cannot say, who understand not what is prayed for, as (u)Aquinas himself assures us from the words of the Apostle.
and it is much, if a mans mind can be imployed about that, which he not only understands not, but minds not at all. The ⟨p. 399⟩mind must necessarily attend actually(t), in mental prayer; but actual attention is not necessary to what they call praying. So it is neither vocal nor mental, not any at all, unless they can devise a mode of prayer without either voyce or mind. They know not what to mind, nor whom, person or thing: they understand net whether the Priest be in confession, or at prayer, or in his Lauds; no, nor whether he be praying or reading, unless the dumb signification of a posture tell them; nor that way neither, for they need not see no more than hear the Priest. They know not whether he be addressing himself to God, or to a Creature, whether to another divine person than the Father (for they have prayers in the Mass to Christ and the Holy Ghost, though an ancient Council forbids it); they know not whether he be praying to an Angel or to a Saint; to a Man or to a Woman; to an Image or to a Crucifix; for they have addresses to all. They can in no wise be thought to pray, who do not, who cannot so much as say Amen to a prayer; and this they cannot say, who understand not what is prayed for, as (u)Aquinas himself assures us from the words of the Apostle.
(t)Cum ipsa eadem attentio sie ipsissima oratio. Soto de just. & jur. l. 10. q. 5. art. 5. p. 340.
(u)Quomodo enim dicet Amen cum quid orat nescit? quia non potest intelligere quid boni dicas. Comment. in 1 Cor. 14. Manifesta sunt verba Apostol•, cum qui • imperitiam, quod dicitur, non intelligit, fieri non poss•, ut ad alterius gratiarum ac•ionem Amen. respondeat. Cassand. Defens. lib. offic. pij▪ viri.
But the Priest, who celebrates, seems to pray, though the people at at Mass do not. He seems so, but the Church of Rome obliges not him to pray, unless he can be said to pray, who only reads the words of a form, without minding any thing else which they must necessarily be concerned in who pray indeed. Of the several sorts of attention, requisite in prayer, none, with them, is necessary, but that which respects the pronouncing of the words right. If the Priest mind but this only, so as to read the words right, it is sufficient, he does all the Church requires, and fully satisfies the Precept of saying Mass; this is their common doctrine. So that unless he can be said to pray, who neither minds the God he should pray to, nor the things to be prayed for, no nor the sense of the words he uses; their Church requires not the Priests to pray, even when they are saying their Mass-Prayers. Nor is it more needful on the same account, in the Canonical hours, as we ⟨p. 400⟩have seen before. So that praying indeed is not necessary for Priest or people, in all the public Service of the Romish Church, much less is it (x)needful in their private devotions, which are not enjoined; for there they declare it Lawful to be more neglectful of all the necessary concerns of prayer, than in public. Now that they who mind nothing but the bare saying the words of a prayer, do not pray indeed; they themselves will acknowledge, in their lucid intervals. Cajetan tells us, (y)that if one be corporally present at Mass, but lets his mind considerately wander after other things, he satisfies not the Precept, because he is but so there, as if he voluntarily slept at it; for to be far from the Mass by voluntary sleeping, and by voluntary wandering, are both alike. Hence it is clear, that Priest or people, whose minds voluntarily wander at Mass, do no more pray there than if they were voluntarily asleep; and consequently, if they wander carelessly, without observing it, they pray no more than if they were carelessly asleep: Yet many of them think the Church forbids not voluntary wanderings; he himself thinks, she forbids not careless wanderings; therefore all of them must believe that she thinks it sufficient to pray as they may do, who are fast asleep, one way or other: And yet none that are awake can well count sleeping to be praying.
But the Priest, who celebrates, seems to pray, though the people at at Mass do not. He seems so, but the Church of Rome obliges not him to pray, unless he can be said to pray, who only reads the words of a form, without minding any thing else which they must necessarily be concerned in who pray indeed. Of the several sorts of attention, requisite in prayer, none, with them, is necessary, but that which respects the pronouncing of the words right. If the Priest mind but this only, so as to read the words right, it is sufficient, he does all the Church requires, and fully satisfies the Precept of saying Mass; this is their common doctrine. So that unless he can be said to pray, who neither minds the God he should pray to, nor the things to be prayed for, no nor the sense of the words he uses; their Church requires not the Priests to pray, even when they are saying their Mass-Prayers. Nor is it more needful on the same account, in the Canonical hours, as we ⟨p. 400⟩have seen before. So that praying indeed is not necessary for Priest or people, in all the publick Service of the Romish Church, much less is it (x)needful in their private devotions, which are not injoyned; for there they declare it Lawful to be more neglectful of all the necessary concerns of prayer, than in publick. Now that they who mind nothing but the bare saying the words of a prayer, do not pray indeed; they themselves will acknowledge, in their lucid intervals. Cajetan tells us, (y)that if one be corporally present at Mass, but lets his mind considerately wander after other things, he satisfies not the Precept, because he is but so there, as if he voluntarily slept at it; for to be far from the Mass by voluntary sleeping, and by voluntary wandring, are both alike. Hence it is clear, that Priest or people, whose minds voluntarily wander at Mass, do no more pray there than if they were voluntarily asleep; and consequently, if they wander carelesly, without observing it, they pray no more than if they were carelesly asleep: Yet many of them think the Church forbids not voluntary wandrings; he himself thinks, she forbids not careless wandrings; therefore all of them must believe that she thinks it sufficient to pray as they may do, who are fast asleep, one way or other: And yet none that are awake can well count sleeping to be praying.
(x)Ubi autem libere & eitra obligationem oratur; sola est culpa venialis indecenter orare: quare destractio, etiam meditata, nisi contemptio adsit, nunquam erit mortalis, Soto de just. & jur. l. 10. q. 5. art. 5. p. 341. fine. vid. Angel. Sum. v. horae. n. 27. Gabriel de Can. Miss. Lect. 22. Graft. l. 2. cap. 51. n. 11.Ubi autem libere & eitra obligationem oratur; sola est culpa venialis indecenter orare: quare destractio, etiam meditata, nisi contemptio adsit, nunquam erit mortalis, Soto de just. & jur. l. 10. q. 5. art. 5. p. 341. fine. vid. Angel. Sum. v. horae. n. 27. Gabriel de Can. Miss. Lect. 22. Graff. l. 2. cap. 51. n. 11.
(y)Si quis corporaliter praesens sit missae, sed mentem advertenter a missa divertat ad al•a, non satisfacit praecepto missae: quoniam ita ibi est, ac si voluntarie ibi dormiret, paria namque sunt longe a missa fieri per voluntarium somnum, & per voluntariam diversionem mentis ad alia. Sum. v. fest. p. 305.
(z)Bellarmine reckoning the several sorts of prayer, one, (says he) is mental, another is both mental and vocal. But when he would add that which is vocal only, he will not have that accounted prayer: a third member of the division ought not to be added, to wit, that which is Vocal only: and gives good reason, for that, says he, is of no use to please God, but rather to provoke him to anger, according to ⟨p. 401⟩that Isaiah 29. This people honour me with their lips, &c. Yet such is the praying in the Roman Church, and no other needful in their divine Service, as the Cardinal himself declares sufficiently in the same Book. And if no other praying be needful, no prayer that is a good work is necessary by their doctrine.
(z)Alia est oratio tantum mentalis, alia mentalis simul & vocalis, neque debet addi tertium membrum (id est) vocalis tantum. Ea siquidem non est utilis ad placandum Deum, sed magis ad provocandum ad iram, juxta illud, Populus hic labiis me honorat, cor autem eorum. longe est a me, Is•i. 29. De bonis oper. l. 1. cap. 2. p. 974.
Sect. 3. Proceed we to the last sort of their good works, to wit, acts of Mercy, or Charity, comprised in Alms-deeds for the relief of the Indigent; and we can scarce discover, that these will ever be necessary by their doctrine. Cardinal Cajetan (one represented as more favourable to these acts of Charity than divers others) tells us, (a)that to omit them is no mortal sin, (and therefore to do them,, will not be necessary by any command) but only in two cases: First, when one hath superfluities, both in respect of nature and state; that is, more than either nature, or the quality of the person requires. Secondly, When the Poor are in extreme necessity (not in common want only, but such as is extraordinary). And these two are so described to us, that themselves confess they very seldom fall out, and we may think, hardly ever; so that rarely, or never will this good work be necessary. For the former, that a person (b)may be judged to have any thing superfluous, (without which he is not bound to relieve others) it must be considered what is requisite for the honourable expenses of himself, his Children and Family, and what for the munificence of his state and magnificence too; what for common events and casualties, to provide against them, and other things of this nature. Upon which he concludes, it will rarely fall out that a man living splendidly, according to his quality, will have any thing superfluous. And so very rarely, (if he had said never, the premises would have borne it) will it be the duty of such as have enough to live gloriously, to spare any thing for the poor. Less pride and vain-glory, or prodigality, than they allow them to have without ⟨p. 402⟩any mortal guilt, will leave nothing superfluous, and so quite excuse them from these good works. Navarre is of the same mind, and tells us, (c)there are few rich men who have any thing superfluous, since neither Kings, nor great Princes can be thought to have superfluities; having said a little before, that it cannot easily be judged that any secular person hath more than is needful for his condition. For he may heap up moneys to purchase more, or to advance his condition higher; and so still have no more than is requisite for his state, and nothing at all will be due for charitable acts.
Sect. 3. Proceed we to the last sort of their good works, to wit, acts of Mercy, or Charity, comprized in Alms-deeds for the relief of the Indigent; and we can scarce discover, that these will ever be necessary by their doctrine. Cardinal Cajetan (one represented as more favourable to these acts of Charity than divers others) tells us, (a)that to omit them is no mortal sin, (and therefore to do them,, will not be necessary by any command) but only in two cases: First, when one hath superfluities, both in respect of nature and state; that is, more than either nature, or the quality of the person requires. Secondly, When the Poor are in extreme necessity (not in common want only, but such as is extraordinary). And these two are so described to us, that themselves confess they very seldom fall out, and we may think, hardly ever; so that rarely, or never will this good work be necessary. For the former, that a person (b)may be judg'd to have any thing superfluous, (without which he is not bound to relieve others) it must be considered what is requisite for the honourable expences of himself, his Children and Family, and what for the munificence of his state and magnificence too; what for common events and casualties, to provide against them, and other things of this nature. Upon which he concludes, it will rarely fall out that a man living splendidly, according to his quality, will have any thing superfluous. And so very rarely, (if he had said never, the premises would have borne it) will it be the duty of such as have enough to live gloriously, to spare any thing for the poor. Less pride and vain-glory, or prodigality, than they allow them to have without ⟨p. 402⟩any mortal guilt, will leave nothing superfluous, and so quite excuse them from these good works. Navar is of the same mind, and tells us, (c)there are few rich men who have any thing superfluous, since neither Kings, nor great Princes can be thought to have superfluities; having said a little before, that it cannot easily be judg'd that any secular person hath more than is needful for his condition. For he may heap up moneys to purchase more, or to advance his condition higher; and so still have no more than is requisite for his state, and nothing at all will be due for charitable acts.
(a)Eleemosynam non facere est peccatum morale in duobus solummodo casibus, primus est si quis habet de superfluo naturae & personae—secundus est quum apparet pauper in extrema necessitate constitutus, juxta illud. Pasce fame morientem, Sum. v. Elemos. p. 134.
(b)Superfluum in tali latitudine consistens, judicandum est consideratis sumtibus honaribilibus etiam filiorum, familiae, status munificentia, magnificentia, communibus eventibus, haeredibus, & aliis ejusmodi: ita ne raro videatur contingere, ut homo secundum st• tum gloriose vivens, superfluum habeat. Idem. ibid.
(c)Sequitur item Rosellam sine justa ratione dixisse, paucos divitum confessarios salvatum iri, si eleemosyna in praedictis duobus casibus de praecepto foret; non enim •ot sunt, quot putat, hujusmodi divites, quibus sit superfluum status, cum nec reges & magni principes—superflua habere censeantur cap. 24. n. 6. Facile judicandum non esse, aliquem Jaecularem plura, quam quae suo statui necessaria sunt, habere. Cum etiam ille qui ad aliquod dominium emendum, & mutandum suum statum in alium majorem, ad quem idoneus est, pecunias congerit, non habet plus quam suum statum deceit, ibid.Sequitur item Rosellam sine justa ratione dixisse, paucos divitum confessarios salvatum iri, si eleemosyna in praedictis duobus casibus de praecepto foret; non enim •ot sunt, quot putat, hujusmodi divites, quibus sit superfluum status, cum nec reges & magni principes—superflua habere censeantur cap. 24. n. 6. Facile judicandum non esse, aliquem Jaecularem plura, quam quae suo statui necessaria sunt, habere. Cum etiam ille qui ad aliquod dominium emendum, & mutandum suum statum in alium majorem, ad quem idoneus est, pecunias congerit, non habet plus quam suum statum deceat, ibid.
He expresses it more fully (d)elsewhere, and concludes for all this, he cannot be said to have any such superfluities, that he should be obliged by any command to give to the poor. So that unless a man have so much as he neither has at present, nor may have for the future occasion to use; that is, unless he has so much, as no man will, or can believe he hath; an act of Charity will not be his duty. If he do but desire to have more than he now has; or do but design to rise any higher than he now is; though but in such a degree as is found in all, and may innocently be in any: at least, if he have but any thing of Covetousness or Ambition, though far less than they determine he may have, without any deadly guilt (and so without any considerable danger) he is discharged from all obligation to this good work.
(d)Cap. 23. n. 74. Nec ob id dicitur habere tale superfluum, quod de praecepto pauperibus teneatur erogare.
The other case will make Charity no more necessary; it is when the Poor are in extreme necessity; and this is (*)only when it is apparent ⟨p. 403⟩they will dye for want of necessaries, if we relieve them not. Now such a case rarely happens, and a man may never meet with one in such extremity, all his life; but if he do, yet he may be excused for want of evidence that his necessity is so great, he need not take the party's word for it, no, not though in public places there seem to be also clear signs of it; he need not take the word of any other, no not. the judgment of his parish Priest, or Confessor (though upon their opinion he may safely venture upon acts of wickedness) unless they can assure him thereof as eye witnesses, (*)or if he be morally certain of the extremity; yet if there be a probability that any other will relieve the person ready to starve, he may leave him to the mercy of others, without doing any thing himself towards his relief (for that is another limitation (e)which they add in the case). For example, if he thought it likely, that a Protestant would relieve the perishing party, a Papist by their doctrine of good works might reserve his Money and Charity for another world; nor would it be necessary to exercise one act thereof while he lives. Or amongst themselves, while each one expects that another may do it, the Poor may perish, and all that might relieve them are excused. Besides, in this case, they conclude it lawful for the person in extremity to (f)Steal, either secretly or openly from those that have enough; so that acts of Charity will not be necessary among them, but when Theft is Lawful; and no man need to relieve the Indigent with any thing he hath, till they may justly take it from him. But if it were possible, in these cases, whereto they confine it, to find any place for the necessity of this duty; yet one thing more, added by their prime Doctors, dashes all, for they teach that it is not ⟨p. 404⟩required to relieve the Necessitous, (g)by giving them any thing; but it is sufficient to Let, or Sell, or Lend to them. Navarre concludes it lawful (h)to buy persons in extreme Necessity, and lawful for them to consent to it; his reasons among others, are, because a Father in time of extreme Hunger, may sell his Son; also, because no man is bound to relieve one, though in extreme Necessity gratis, if he can do it sufficiently by loan, exchange, &c.
The other case will make Charity no more necessary; it is when the Poor are in extream necessity; and this is (*)only when it is apparent ⟨p. 403⟩they will dye for want of necessaries, if we relieve them not. Now such a case rarely happens, and a man may never meet with one in such extremity, all his life; but if he do, yet he may be excused for want of evidence that his necessity is so great, he need not take the party's word for it, no, not though in publick places there seem to be also clear signs of it; he need not take the word of any other, no not. the judgment of his parish Priest, or Confessor (though upon their opinion he may safely venture upon acts of wickedness) unless they can assure him thereof as eye witnesses, (*)or if he be morally certain of the extremity; yet if there be a probability that any other will relieve the person ready to starve, he may leave him to the mercy of others, without doing any thing himself towards his relief (for that is another limitation (e)which they add in the case). For example, if he thought it likely, that a Protestant would relieve the perishing party, a Papist by their doctrine of good works might reserve his Money and Charity for another world; nor would it be necessary to exercise one act thereof while he lives. Or amongst themselves, while each one expects that another may do it, the Poor may perish, and all that might relieve them are excused. Besides, in this case, they conclude it lawful for the person in extremity to (f)Steal, either secretly or openly from those that have enough; so that acts of Charity will not be necessary among them, but when Theft is Lawful; and no man need to relieve the Indigent with any thing he hath, till they may justly take it from him. But if it were possible, in these cases, whereto they confine it, to find any place for the necessity of this duty; yet one thing more, added by their prime Doctors, dashes all, for they teach that it is not ⟨p. 404⟩required to relieve the Necessitous, (g)by giving them any thing; but it is sufficient to Let, or Sell, or Lend to them. Navar concludes it lawful (h)
(*)In sententiam Cajetan. & Navarre. inclinant Sotus & Sarmientus. Vasques. Opusc. Moral. de Eleemosgu. dub. 3. n. 20. Asserunt non esse praecepti obligationem ullam, extra tempus extremae necessitatis proximi, quantumvis divitiae superfluant non tantum naturae, sed statui etiam congruae sustentationi, Gabriel, Alexander, Major, Gerson—reputant probabilem Antoninus, Conradus, Durandus. Durandus asserit se non audere dicere esse aliud tempu• praecepti extra extremam necessitatem, ne •ot divites condemnet, Idem. ibid. n. 11. & Jo. Medina. in Sa. v. Elecmosyn.In sententiam Cajetan. & Navar. inclinant Sotus & Sarmientus. Vasques. Opusc. Moral. de Eleemosgu. dub. 3. n. 20. Asserunt non esse praecepti obligationem ullam, extra tempus extremae necessitatis proximi, quantumvis divitiae superfluant non tantum naturae, sed statui etiam congruae sustentationi, Gabriel, Alexander, Major, Gerson—reputant probabilem Antoninus, Conradus, Durandus. Durandus asserit se non audere dicere esse aliud tempu• praecepti extra extremam necessitatem, ne •ot divites condemnet, Idem. ibid. n. 11. & Jo. Medina. in Sa. v. Elecmosyn.
(*)Bonacin. 1. precept d. 3. q. 4. p. 6. n. 3.Bonacin. 1. praecept d. 3. q. 4. p. 6. n. 3.
(e)Extreme egere dicitur, non solum qui jam animam agit vel spirat: sed etiam cum indicia probabilia apparent eo deventurum, nisi ei subveniatur, & non se offert nec expectatur probabiliter alius, qui ei subveniat, juxta S. Thom. & declarat Cajetan. Idem cap. 24. n. 5.
(f)Soto de just. & jur. l. 4. q. 7. art. 1. Licet alienum arripere sine peccato in extrema necessitate. Sotus, Cajetan, Navarre, Adrian. Armilla. Covarruvius. Et in urgenti Sylvest. Angelus. in Vasq. ibid. dub. 7. n. 28. in gravi licitum esse. Sylvest. Medina. Angel. Navarre. Pet. Navarra, Malderus & plures alij apud Dian. p. 2. tr. 3. Res. 29. Bannes in 2. 2. q. 66. art. 7.Soto de just. & jur. l. 4. q. 7. art. 1. Licet alienum arripere sine peccato in extrema necessitate. Sotus, Cajetan, Navar, Adrian. Armilla. Covarruvius. Et in urgenti Sylvest. Angelus. in Vasq. ibid. dub. 7. n. 28. in gravi licitum esse. Sylvest. Medina. Angel. Navar. Pet. Navarra, Malderus & plures alij apud Dian. p. 2. tr. 3. Res. 29. Bannes in 2. 2. q. 66. art. 7.
So that if a man were in such extremity for want of Food, that he might sell his Son to get it, for the saving of his Life; yet no Christian, in that case, were bound to give him relief freely; by their doctrine it would suffice to let him have Money, or Meat by the sale of his Child. We cannot expect they will ever find it a duty, To give to the Indigent, if not in such circumstances, and 'tis a plain case, where there is no obligation to give, there's no necessity to give Alms.
But if they did make it necessary to give Alms, yet is it not needful by their doctrine to do it so, as it will be a good work (or so, to Fast, or Pray, or do any other act, which have any goodness in them, or pretend to it) so good works will, by their principles, be still unnecessary. For that any work may be good, it must be from a right principle, and for a good end; but both these they make needless. As to the former, there's no necessity, as they teach, to act out of (*)love to God; for though this be the intention of God, and the design of the Law in all good acts, as they acknowledge from that Tim. 5. Rom. 13. yet they have a maxim generally received, (i)the intention of the command is not commanded; herein they follow Aquinas: and hence they ⟨p. 405⟩conclude that (k)such a mode of acting out of love to God, is not required in any command of the divine Law; but the whole, and every part of it, may be fulfilled, & sin avoided; if (*)that which is required be done, though not out of Love to God at all. And particularly, Soto takes much pains to argue us out of the love of God in all our actings, and to prove that it is not necessary. And all generally conclude that it is not needful in any acts of Piety, Mercy, or Charity, required on their days for worship; since there, they determine that there is no need of any act of love, as was showed before.
But if they did make it necessary to give Alms, yet is it not needful by their doctrine to do it so, as it will be a good work (or so, to Fast, or Pray, or do any other act, which have any goodness in them, or pretend to it) so good works will, by their principles, be still unnecessary. For that any work may be good, it must be from a right principle, and for a good end; but both these they make needless. As to the former, there's no necessity, as they teach, to act out of (*)love to God; for though this be the intention of God, and the design of the Law in all good acts, as they acknowledge from that Tim. 5. Rom. 13. yet they have a maxim generally received, (i)the intention of the command is not commanded; herein they follow Aquinas: and hence they ⟨p. 405⟩conclude that (k)such a mode of acting out of love to God, is not required in any command of the divine Law; but the whole, and every part of it, may be fulfilled, & sin avoyded; if (*)that which is required be done, though not out of Love to God at all. And particularly, Soto takes much pains to argue us out of the love of God in all our actings, and to prove that it is not necessary. And all generally conclude that it is not needful in any acts of Piety, Mercy, or Charity, required on their days for worship; since there, they determine that there is no need of any act of love, as was shew'd before.
(i)Ex D. Thom. & graviorum autorum sententia, ad finem legislatoris minime teneamur, sed ad media, &c. Canus, Relect, de paenit part. 4. Soto de nat. & gr. supra.
(k)Modus talis charitatis non cadit sub praecepro, &c. Soto de just. & jur. lib. 2. q. 3. art. 10.
(*)Hinc ergo patet adimplentem praeceptum per actum ex aliqua circumstantia malum satisfacere praecepto, etiamsi non adimpleat Modum, aut etiam sinem a legislator intentum. Bonacin. Tom. 2. disp. 1. q. 1. punct. 9.Hinc ergo patet adimplentem praeceptum per actum ex aliqua circumstantia malum satisfacere praecepto, etiamsi non adimpleat Modum, aut etiam sinem a legislatore intentum. Bonacin. Tom. 2. disp. 1. q. 1. punct. 9.
'Tis no wonder therefore, (as to the second,) if they conclude it needless to act for God, in what we do, and make him alone our chief end. In the Theory indeed, they determine that an act is not good, unless there be a concurrence of all conditions requisite thereto, and that the end is the principal (as much in morals, as the form is in naturals); so that without (l)a good end, that act must be naught, and no end good where God is not chief; yet for practice, they discharge them from any necessity to make God their principal end; they conclude it lawful for a man to act (m)principally for his own advantage; yea, they account it but a Venial fault to do the best act, principally, for (n)a sinful end. Now to avoid a Venial sin, they hold it not necessary, by any command of God; and therefore it will not be needful to do any thing but principally for an end so far sinful; and consequently, unless the work can be good, whose principal end is sin, no good work at all will be necessary. But it is a more wicked end, which they openly avow; when they design by what they do, to merit grace and glory, and make satisfaction to divine justice. This is to make Christ a leg, while they attempt his Crown; and to offer him a Rush, with ⟨p. 406⟩an intent thereby to invest themselves in his prerogative. They should show us how it is possible such acts can be good before they pretend to account good works necessary.
'Tis no wonder therefore, (as to the second,) if they conclude it needless to act for God, in what we do, and make him alone our chief end. In the Theory indeed, they determine that an act is not good, unless there be a concurrence of all conditions requisite thereto, and that the end is the principal (as much in morals, as the form is in naturals); so that without (l)a good end, that act must be naught, and no end good where God is not chief; yet for practice, they discharge them from any necessity to make God their principal end; they conclude it lawful for a man to act (m)principally for his own advantage; yea, they account it but a Venial fault to do the best act, principally, for (n)a sinful end. Now to avoid a Venial sin, they hold it not necessary, by any command of God; and therefore it will not be needful to do any thing but principally for an end so far sinful; and consequently, unless the work can be good, whose principal end is sin, no good work at all will be necessary. But it is a more wicked end, which they openly avow; when they design by what they do, to merit grace and glory, and make satisfaction to divine justice. This is to make Christ a legg, while they attempt his Crown; and to offer him a Rush, with ⟨p. 406⟩an intent thereby to invest themselves in his prerogative. They should shew us how it is possible such acts can be good before they pretend to account good works necessary.
(l)Omne opus cujus finis est malus, ipsum quoque malum est, Navar. cap. 12. n. 30.
(m)Sylvest. Sum. v. Charitas. n. 5. Navarre. supra.Sylvest. Sum. v. Charitas. n. 5. Navar. supra.
(n)Cajetan. Sylvest. Navarre. supra. The precept may be fully accomplished where the manner and end is naught, Bonacin. ibid. & apud eum, Aquinas, Sotus, Navarre, Medina, & alij.Cajetan. Sylvest. Navar. supra. The precept may be fully accomplished where the manner and end is naught, Bonacin. ibid. & apud eum, Aquinas, Sotus, Navar, Medina, & alij.
Sect. 4. But though they find no necessity of good works, by virtue of any divine Precept ordinarily; yet they seem to make some when they will have the Priest to enjoin them for Penance; (and 'tis like, in this, as in other cases, they leave so little or nothing needful that God has commanded, to render their own devices more necessary.) But good works, being enjoined as penance, become punishments; and it signifies, the Church of Rome is no good friend to good works, when she counts or makes them punishments; for punishment is properly evil to us, and not to be done, but suffered; and thus she will have good works neither to be good, nor to be done. To be sure, thus they cannot be done so as to be good, or as becomes Christians to do them; for he that must think it a suffering to do them, does them with the spirit of a Slave, not of a Christian. But let us suppose they may be good works, and well done too by way of Penance, yet they are not necessary at all in their Church, upon this account, and so no way. For first, the Priest (o)needs not enjoin good works as penance, he may enjoin (p)nothing at all if he pleases, or some (q)slight thing, that which is good for nothing, or that which is worse; or (r)what the Confitent must have done if he had not sinned; or he may dismiss him with this general (s)all the good thou doest, or evil thou sufferest, let it serve for satisfaction; or he may commend something by way of (t)Counsel, without obliging him by any injunction; or he may require him only to avoid ⟨p. 407⟩the sin he confesses for a while (u)(and when he shrives the woman that he has (x)sinned with, it is like he may not prove very rigorous this way): Or Secondly, if he should enjoin this, or any good work, the Confitent (y)need not accept of, or submit to it, as many of their chief Doctors determine: Or Thirdly, if he do accept it, yet he needs not perform it for all that; he may be released by himself. (z)To omit it will be but a small fault (such as he needs not regard, be the good work little or great), if it be not out contempt. Or (a)another may undertake it, and satisfy by suffering it for him. Or a Priest may release him, either he that enjoined it, (b)or another. However, Indulgences will do it effectually; these serve to sweep away all good works, (all necessity of them), on this account, for ever.
Sect. 4. But though they find no necessity of good works, by vertue of any divine Precept ordinarily; yet they seem to make some when they will have the Priest to injoyn them for Penance; (and 'tis like, in this, as in other cases, they leave so little or nothing needful that God has commanded, to render their own devices more necessary.) But good works, being injoyned as penance, become punishments; and it signifies, the Church of Rome is no good friend to good works, when she counts or makes them punishments; for punishment is properly evil to us, and not to be done, but suffered; and thus she will have good works neither to be good, nor to be done. To be sure, thus they cannot be done so as to be good, or as becomes Christians to do them; for he that must think it a suffering to do them, does them with the spirit of a Slave, not of a Christian. But let us suppose they may be good works, and well done too by way of Penance, yet they are not necessary at all in their Church, upon this account, and so no way. For first, the Priest (o)needs not injoyn good works as penance, he may injoyn (p)nothing at all if he pleases, or some (q)slight thing, that which is good for nothing, or that which is worse; or (r)what the Confitent must have done if he had not sinned; or he may dismiss him with this general (s)all the good thou doest, or evil thou sufferest, let it serve for satisfaction; or he may commend something by way of (t)Counsel, without obliging him by any injunction; or he may require him only to avoyd ⟨p. 407⟩the sin he confesses for a while (u)(and when he shrives the woman that he has (x)sin'd with, it is like he may not prove very rigorous this way): Or Secondly, if he should injoyn this, or any good work, the Confitent (y)need not accept of, or submit to it, as many of their chief Doctors determine: Or Thirdly, if he do accept it, yet he needs not perform it for all that; he may be released by himself.
(o)Vid. Sylv. v. Confess. 4. n. 2. Suarez. 3. tom. 4. disp. 38. Sect. 6. n. 4.
(p)Cajetan. Navarre. ibid. Sect. 3. n. 4.Cajetan. Navar. ibid. Sect. 3. n. 4.
(q)D. Thomas, Soto. & alii communiter, ibid. Sect. 4. n. 4.
(y)Scotus, Gabriel. Hostiensis, Panormitan. Medina. Sylvester. Armilla. Navarre. in Suar. ibid. Sect. 7. n. 1.Scotus, Gabriel. Hostiensis, Panormitan. Medina. Sylvester. Armilla. Navar. in Suar. ibid. Sect. 7. n. 1.
(z)Omittere satisfactionem est peccatum sed non mortale, si desit contemptus: quia non omittitur aliquid necessarium ad salutem, Cajetan. Sum. v. satisfact. p. 520.
(a)Communis sententia theologorum est, poss• paenitentem implere per alium satisfactionem sibi impositam. Ita D. Thom. Paludanus, Sylvester, Alensis in Suar. ibid. Sect. 9. n. 1.
(b)Opinio communis est quam tenet Sylvest, Angelus, Navarre, Rosella, Victoria, Le desma, Medina, ibid. Sect. 10. n. 4.Opinio communis est quam tenet Sylvest, Angelus, Navar, Rosella, Victoria, Le desma, Medina, ibid. Sect. 10. n. 4.
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applying that of the Apostle to it, 1 Tim. 4. 8. Bodily exercise profiteth little, &c.
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L•x quae praecipit aliquid, non obligat ad finem, sed ad media tendentia ad finem D. Tho. 1, 2. q. 100. art. 9. & 10. Unde lex non obligat ad carnis petulantiam compescendam, sed ad media quibus comprimi possit, sicuti est jejunium. Graff. l. 2. c. 36. n. 20. Licet ecclesia nos quadrigesimali observatione extenuare in carne intendat, ut liberior mens spiritualibus accommodetur, tamen finis ille non est in praecepto, sed tantum ciborum abstinentia Soto. de nat. & gr. l. 1. c. 22. p. 57. Finis praecepti jejunij est elevatio mentis: si tamen quis jejanat & non elevatur mente, non est transgressor praecepti. Cajetan. Sum. v. matrim. p. 430. Nec si lex jubet quadrigesimae jejunium ut, mens elevetur in Deum; astringimur proinde ex hujus praecepti vigore mentem in Deum elevare. Canus. Relect. de p•nit. pars. 4. p. 871. vid. Tol. instr. l. 4. c. 12. p. 623.
(p)Sum. v. jejuniurn. p. 348. opera utriusque misericordiae meliora sunt quam jejunii: juxta illud Apostoli, corporalis exercitatio ad modicum utilis est: pietas autem ad omnia valet.
to buy persons in extream Necessity, and lawful for them to consent to it; his reasons among others, are, because a Father in time of extream Hunger, may sell his Son; also, because no man is bound to relieve one, though in extreme Necessity gratis, if he can do it sufficiently by loan, exchange, &c.
Adrian 4. de restit. Navar. cap. 17. n. 61. & cap. 24. n. 6. In quibus tamen duobus non est de praecepto subvenire donando, sed satis est subvenire commodando vel mutuando, Vid. Bellarm. de bon. operibus, l. 3. c. 8. haec doctrina vera & non solum a S. Thom, sed etiam ab aliis Theologis communiter tradi soleat. Vid. plures in Vasq. ibid. dub. 6. n. 50.
(h)Licet eos emero & illis emptioni suae consentire, c. 23. n. 75. quia pater tempore famis extremae fi jum vendere potest—tum quia nemo tenetur ad gratis subveniendum, egenti etiam extreme, modo commodando, vel mutuando satis ei succurrat. ibid.Licet eos emero & illis emptioni suae consentire, c. 23. n. 75. quia pater tempore famis extremae fi ium vendere potest—tum quia nemo tenetur ad gratis subveniendum, egenti etiam extreme, modo commodando, vel mutuando satis ei succurrat. ibid.
