A34675:213
A defence of Mr. John Cotton from the imputation of self contradiction, charged on…A defence of Mr. John Cotton from the imputation of selfe contradiction, charged on…
A defence of Mr. John Cotton from the imputation of self contradiction, charged on him by Mr. Dan. Cawdrey written by himself not long before his death ; whereunto is prefixed, an answer to a late treatise of the said Mr. Cawdrey about the nature of schism, by John Owen ...A defence of Mr. John Cotton from the imputation of selfe contradiction, charged on him by Mr. Dan. Cavvdrey written by himselfe not long before his death ; whereunto is prefixed, an answer to a late treatise of the said Mr. Cavvdrey about the nature of schisme, by John Owen ...
Oxford: printed by H. Hall for T. Robinson, 1658
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
2. The first Subject of any Power, as it hath immediately Received it: so it may immediately exercise it: as Fire (the first subject of Heat) can Heat without Intervention of any other subject.
2. The first Subject of any Power, as it hath immediately Received it: so it may immediately exercise it: as Fire (the first subject of Heate) can Heate without Intervention of any other subject.
But the Church hath not Power immediately to exercise Pastoral Preaching, or Administration of the Sacraments, 'till it have procured and chosen, and called forth some or other Gifted Persons to exercise the same.
But the Church hath not Power immediately to exercise Pastorall Preaching, or Administration of the Sacraments, 'till it have procured and chosen, and called forth some or other Gifted Persons to exercise the same.
3. I might Add a third Reason to ⟨p. 53⟩both the former. Whatsoever is properly the first Subject of any Power, It hath that same Power, or some other equivalent, and analogical to it, not only radicaliter and virtualiter, but Formaliter also. And because formaliter, therefore radicaliter and virtualiter. For whatsoever is in any Subject Firstly, (whether it be proper Adjunct, or proper effect, or any other proper Argument) it either floweth from the form, or from the matter so formed; As for instance, capacity of Learning, or Risibility is in Man, as in the first subject. The former floweth from the Reasonable soul: the latter from the matter of a man so formed. But neither of these are in man radicaliter or virtualiter, but only because they are in a man formally, and so either flow from the form, or from the matter so formed. Take another Instance, and of another sort. The People that have power to elect a King, though they have not formally kingly power, yet have they a formal Power, to submit