The dying man's testament to the Church of Scotland, or, A treatise concerning scandal…

Hence, the first doth follow, that whatever be a private persons account of such a profession, yet it is not considered by the Judicatory as the evidence of sincerity in their being satisfied with it: Because, 1. It can be no evidence thereof, as is said; and we would be necessitated then to say, (if sincerity were the account upon which a Church-judicatory were to be satisfied) that either they behoved to have that evidence proven, and made evident to them, or they behoved to proceed, without any certain, yea, or probable evidence: for, certainly, that which giveth a Judicatory warrant to proceed to declare a person to have right to any privilege, must both be a thing that is relevant in it self, and evident in the proof thereof, in reference to that party; But, none of these can be said: Therefore the judging such a thing to be sincere, is not the account on which they proceed. This cannot be said to be a certain proof of sincerity, yea, none will deny but it is difficult, if not impossible, for one to have infallible proof of an others sincerity: Then it must be said, that it is but a probable proof that can be given of sincerity. To which we reply, 1. That this profession formerly described, cannot be called such, as hath been shown, So it would follow, that a Church-judicatory doth account a man sincere, and doth admit him to such privileges as they ought to admit only such unto, and yet it was not made so much as probable to them that he was such. 2. Although it did probably evidence him to be such, yet that were not enough, if that were the alone account upon which they were to proceed, because no judicial procedure in determining a mans right, will go upon probabilities, because the Law decideth not upon a probable, but upon a real right: ⟨p. 98⟩and indeed, if in this case sincerity were the ground of procedure, no man could judge but doubtingly and upon conjecture, and so could he not have peace afterward, because it was still uncertain to him whether he had determined warrantably or not: yea, if it should be said, (which yet will not be sufficient) that it may give a man peace, if in his charity he account the person sincere, although indeed he be not so:

Hence, the first doth follow, that whatever be a private persons account of such a profession, yet it is not considered by the Judicatory as the evidence of sincerity in their being satisfied with it: Because, 1. It can be no evidence thereof, as is said; and we would be necessitated then to say, (if sincerity were the account upon which a Church-judicatory were to be satisfied) that either they behoved to have that evidence proven, and made vident to them, or they behoved to proceed, without any certain, yea, or probable evidence: for, certainly, that which giveth a Judicatory warrand to proceed to declare a person to have right to any priviledge, must both be a thing that is relevant in it self, and evident in the proof thereof, in reference to that party; But, none of these can be said: Therefore the judging such a thing to be sincere, is not the account on which they proceed. This cannot be said to be a certain proof of sincerity, yea, none will deny but it is difficult, if not impossible, for one to have infallible proof of an others sincerity: Then it must be said, that it is but a probable proof that can be given of sinceritity. To which we reply, 1. That this profession formerly described, cannot be called such, as hath been shown, So it would follow, that a Church-judicatory doth account a man sincere, and doth admit him to such priviledges as they ought to admit only such unto, and yet it was not made so much as probable to them that he was such. 2. Although it did probably evidence him to be such, yet that were not enough, if that were the alone account upon which they were to proceed, because no judiciall procedour in determining a mans right, will go upon probabilities, because the Law decideth not upon a probable, but upon a real right: