The dying man's testament to the Church of Scotland, or, A treatise concerning scandal…

2. It may be supposed, that a gracious man, of whose graciousness there is no question in the charity of any, doth fall in some Scandal, what is to be accounted satisfying in him, must be satisfying in others. Now, it is not any conviction of the graciousness of his state that can be satisfying in this case, nor yet is that the account upon which we can proceed, because that is never questioned even when he is under the offence. If it be said, it must be the sincerity and graciousness of his particular act of repentance. Answ. 1. It is difficult to give judgement of the state of the person, but more difficult to give judgement of the graciousness of a particular act. 2. Suppose such a person had a particular acknowledgement so circumstantiated as is formerly described in this moral sincerity, would not that be sufficiently satisfying? And if it be satisfying in one, in reference to a particular offence, why not in another? Because, 1. There is one rule given by Jesus Christ to all. 2. The removing of […] offence relateth to the offence given, and not to the state of the person who gave it. Therefore if that satisfaction be sufficient to remove that particular offence in one, it must also be so in reference ⟨p. 101⟩to another, because the question […] […] not what may be sufficient to evidence a person to be gracious, but what may be sufficient in a person to remove such a particular offence? If it be said, that it is accepted of that gracious person as satisfying, because he is accounted to be gracious, it may still be urged, The Question is not, whether the person be gracious, but whether that act of repentance of his be so, or not? for, it cannot be denied, but a gracious person may have acts of hypocrisy, and in particular acts be carnal: either then such a person must be excluded though he be gracious, and in this respect seriously doth profess repentance, which were hard to do; or, he must be upon that profession admitted, and so that must be sufficient for Church-satisfaction, as is said.

2. It may be supposed, that a gracious man, of whose graciousnesse there is no question in the charity of any, doth fall in some Scandal, what is to be accounted satisfying in him, must be satisfying in others. Now, it is not any conviction of the graciousnesse of his state that can be satisfying in this case, nor yet is that the account upon which we can proceed, because that is never questioned even when he is under the offence. If it be said, it must be the sincerity and graciousnesse of his particular act of repentance. Answ. 1. It is difficult to give judgement of the state of the person, but more difficult to give judgement of the graciousnesse of a particular act. 2. Suppose such a person had a particular acknowledgement so circumstantiated as is formerly described in this morall sincerity, would not that be sufficiently satisfying? And if it be satisfying in one, in reference to a particular offence, why not in another? Because, 1. There is one rule given by Jesus Christ to all. 2. The removing of offence relateth to the offence given, and not to the state of the person who gave it. Therefore if that satisfaction be sufficient to remove that particular offence in one, it must also be so in reference