A37042:480
The dying man's testament to the Church of Scotland, or, A treatise concerning scandal…
The dying man's testament to the Church of Scotland, or, A treatise concerning scandal divided into four parts ... : in each of which there are not a few choice and useful questions, very shortly and satisfyingly discussed and cleared / by ... Mr. James Durham ... who being dead (by this) yet speaketh ; and published by John Carstares ... ; to which is prefixed an excellent preface of famous Mr. Blair ... ; together with a table of the contents of the several chapters of each part.
Edinburgh: printed by Christopher Higgins, 1659
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
In the fourth place, there are many things also in their power, in reference to these that are seducers or deluders, or actually deluded, which might be and ought to be improved for the Churches good; (not to speak now of any thing that may infer civil or capital punishment, upon men for their opinions, or any way look like the enforcing of Religion upon consciences) As, 1. Magistrates might and ought to put Ministers and Church-officers and others to their duty (in case they be negligent) in trying, discovering, convincing, &c. such as by their corrupt doctrine may hazard others. 2. They may and ought to discountenance such in their own persons, and, by their authority, inhibit them to vent any such thing; yea under certifications: yet this cannot be called a forcing of their conscience to any Religion, but is only the restraining of them from hurting of the consciences of others. 3. When such certifications are contravened, he may and ought to censure the contraveners, and so he may by his authority put them in an incapacity of having access to infect others; yet this is not the censuring of a mans opinion, for he might possess his opinion without censure, but it is the censuring of his disobedience, and the prejudice done by him to others: Nor is it the restraining of him from personal liberty, because of it, but because ⟨p. 255⟩he doth not, nor will not use his personal liberty without prejudice to the whole body, which is to be preferred to him: even as a man, infected with the pestilence, ought justly to be restrained, though against his will; yet cannot that be accounted a restraint of just liberty; for, it is no just liberty to have liberty to hurt others. 4. They may and ought to destroy such books as they use to spread for the infecting of others, and inhibit and stop printing of them, or actual selling, spreading or transporting of them, as they may stop carrying of suspected or forbidden goods. 5. They may and ought to restrain idle and vagabond travelling of such suspected persons, without representing of their necessary business to some, appointed for that effect, in which case their doing hurt by such a voyage, might be prevented, and they have a pass. Also, they might constrain them to follow some lawful occupation, and to be diligent therein;
In the fourth place, there are many things also in their power, in reference to these that are seducers or deluders, or actually deluded, which might be and ought to be improven for the Churches good; (not to speak now of any thing that may infer civil or capitall punishment, upon men for their opinions, or any way look like the enforcing of Religion upon consciences) As, 1. Magistrates might and ought to put Ministers and Church-officers and others to their duty (in case they be negligent) in trying, discoverring, convincing, &c. such as by their corrupt doctrine may hazard others. 2. They may and ought to discountenance such in their own persons, and, by their authority, inhibit them to vent any such thing; yea under certifications: yet this cannot be called a forcing of their conscience to any Religion, but is only the restraining of them from hurting of the consciences of others. 3. When such certifications are contraveened, he may and ought to censure the contraveeners, and so he may by his authority put them in an incapacity of having accesse to infect others; yet this is not the censuring of a mans opinion, for he might possesse his opinion without censure, but it is the censuring of his disobedience, and the prejudice done by him to others: Nor is it the restraining of him from personall liberty, because of it, but because