A39697:158
Vindiciæ legis & fœderis
Vindiciæ legis & fœderis: or, A reply to Mr. Philip Cary's Solemn call Wherein he pretends to answer all the arguments of Mr. Allen, Mr. Baxter, Mr. Sydenham, Mr. Sedgwick, Mr. Roberts, and Dr. Burthogge, for the right of believers infants to baptism, by proving the law at Sinai, and the covenant of circumcision with Abraham, were the very same with Adam's covenant of works, and that because the gospel-covenant is absolute. By John Flavel minister of the gospel in Dartmouth
London: printed for M. Wolton, 1690
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
(1.) What we mean by a Condition in the Gospel-Covenant. By a Condition of the Covenant, we do not mean in the strictest rigid Sense of the Word, such a Restipulation to God from Man of perfect Obedience in his own Person, at all times, so as the least Failure therein forfeits all the mercies of the Covenant: That's rather the condition of Adam's Covenant of Works, than of the Evangelical Covenant; nor do we assert any meritorious condition, that in the nature of an impulsive Cause, shall bring Man into the Covenant and its Privileges, or continue him in when brought in. This we renounce as well as you; but our Question is about such a Condition, as is neither in the Nature of it, an Act perfect in every degree, nor meritorious in the least of the Benefit conferred, nor yet done in our own strength. But plainly and briefly; our Question is, Whether there be not something as an Act required of us in point of Duty, to a Blessing consequent by virtue of a promise? Such a thing, whatever it be, hath the nature of a Condition, inasmuch as it is antecedent to the Benefit of the Promise, and the Mercy or Benefit granted is suspended, ⟨p. 62⟩until it be performed. The Question is not, Whether there be any intrinsical worth or value in the thing so required, to oblige the Disposer to make or perform the Grant or Promise: but merely that it be antecedent to the enjoyment of the benefit; and that the disposer of the benefit do suspend the benefit, until it be performed. Thus an Act or Duty of ours, which hath nothing at all of Merit in it, or answerable value to the benefit it relates to, may be in a proper Sense a Condition of the said benefit. For what is a Condition in the true Notion of it, but *the Suspension of a Grant until something future be done? or †as others to the same purpose, the adding of words to a Grant for the future of a suspending quality, according to which the Disposer will have the benefit he disposeth to be regulated. This properly is a Condition, though there be nothing of equivalent value or merit in the thing required: ⟨p. 63⟩And such your Brethren in their Narrative, pag. 14.