A44434:1317
An exposition on the Lord's prayer with a catechistical explication thereof, by way of…
An exposition on the Lord's prayer with a catechistical explication thereof, by way of question and answer for the instructing of youth : to which is added some sermons on providence, and the excellent advantages of reading and studying the Holy Scriptures / by Ezekiel Hopkins ...
London: printed for Nathanael Ranew, 1692
TWO SERMONS Preached by the same AUTHOR. › Sermon 1: A Discourse upon Providenec.
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
I Answer. In respect of God it is true, there is nothing casual nor contingent in the World. A thing may be casual in respect of particular causes; but in respect of the universal, and first cause nothing is such. If a Master should send a Servant to a certain place, and command him to stay there till such a time, and presently after should send another Servant to the same, the meeting of these two is wholly casual in respect of themselves, but ordained and foreseen by the Master that sent them. So is it in all fortuitous events here below: They fall out unexpectedly as to us, but not so as to God; he foresees and he appoints all the vicissitudes of things, and all the surprises of humane ⟨p. 285⟩Accidents. So that you see there may be contingencies in the World, though God's Providence be most particular and punctual.
Fourthly, Some may object that this would destroy the liberty of Man's will, and subject all things to a fatal necessity, even humane actions themselves. For if Man can do nothing but what God hath by his Providence fore-appointed shall be done, how then is Man free either to do, or not to do?
This question requires much more time to answer it at large than I can allow it. Some seeing it a very difficult thing to reconcile Providence and Liberty, have presumed to deny that Providence intermeddles at all in such affairs as depend upon the free will of Man. And of this opinion Tully seems to have been; for which St. Austin chastiseth him as injurious to God; when he saith, Voluntatem dumb faceret liberam, fecit Sacrilegam. I shall not here stand to distinguish of a necessity of Coaction, and a necessity of Infallibility, and that the Providence of God doth not bring upon the will a necessity of Coaction, but only of infallibility, which very well consists with the liberty of the will. All that I shall at present answer, is, That God doth indeed efficaciously determine the will to do what it doth, yet this determination leaves it in a perfect State of liberty, because the liberty of the will doth not so much consist in indifferency to Act, or not to Act, as in a rational spontaneity. When we do what we have an appetite to do upon grounds that to us seem rational, then we Act freely. Now though God doth absolutely sway the will which way he pleaseth, yet he never forceth it contrary to its own inclinations. For that to which God determines it by his Providence seems at that present most rational to be done: and upon that representation of good in the Object, the will embraceth it and acts accordingly. So that its Providence is not violated by any boisterous and