A44434:1319
An exposition on the Lord's prayer with a catechistical explication thereof, by way of…
An exposition on the Lord's prayer with a catechistical explication thereof, by way of question and answer for the instructing of youth : to which is added some sermons on providence, and the excellent advantages of reading and studying the Holy Scriptures / by Ezekiel Hopkins ...
London: printed for Nathanael Ranew, 1692
TWO SERMONS Preached by the same AUTHOR. › Sermon 1: A Discourse upon Providenec.
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
This question requires much more time to answer it at large than I can allow it. Some seeing it a very difficult thing to reconcile Providence and Liberty, have presumed to deny that Providence intermeddles at all in such affairs as depend upon the free will of Man. And of this opinion Tully seems to have been; for which St. Austin chastiseth him as injurious to God; when he saith, Voluntatem dumb faceret liberam, fecit Sacrilegam. I shall not here stand to distinguish of a necessity of Coaction, and a necessity of Infallibility, and that the Providence of God doth not bring upon the will a necessity of Coaction, but only of infallibility, which very well consists with the liberty of the will. All that I shall at present answer, is, That God doth indeed efficaciously determine the will to do what it doth, yet this determination leaves it in a perfect State of liberty, because the liberty of the will doth not so much consist in indifferency to Act, or not to Act, as in a rational spontaneity. When we do what we have an appetite to do upon grounds that to us seem rational, then we Act freely. Now though God doth absolutely sway the will which way he pleaseth, yet he never forceth it contrary to its own inclinations. For that to which God determines it by his Providence seems at that present most rational to be done: and upon that representation of good in the Object, the will embraceth it and acts accordingly. So that its Providence is not violated by any boisterous and ⟨p. 286⟩compulsive sway, that the first cause hath over it, but God attracts it with such a powerful and insinuating sweetness, that though the will can incline to nothing but what it seems to have reason for; yet withal it wills nothing but what God by Providence over-rules it unto. So Austin De Civitate Dei, lib. 5. Cap. 9. Nos dicimus & Deum scire omnia antequam fiant, & voluntate nos facere quicquid à Nobis non nisi volentibus fieri sentimus & novimus. Though God foresees and decrees all things before they are, yet we do that with a free will, which we do not otherwise than willingly.
This question requires much more time to answer it at large than I can allow it. Some seeing it a very difficult thing to reconcile Providence and Liberty, have presumed to deny that Providence intermeddles at all in such affairs as depend upon the free will of Man. And of this opinion Tully seems to have been; for which St. Austin chastiseth him as injurious to God; when he saith, Voluntatem dum faceret liberam, fecit Sacrilegam. I shall not here stand to distinguish of a necessity of Coaction, and a necessity of Infallibility, and that the Providence of God doth not bring upon the will a necessity of Coaction, but only of infallibility, which very well consists with the liberty of the will. All that I shall at present answer, is, That God doth indeed efficaciously determine the will to do what it doth, yet this determination leaves it in a perfect State of liberty, because the liberty of the will doth not so much consist in indifferency to Act, or not to Act, as in a rational spontaneity. When we do what we have an appetite to do upon grounds that to us seem rational, then we Act freely. Now though God doth absolutely sway the will which way he pleaseth, yet he never forceth it contrary to its own inclinations. For that to which God determines it by his Providence seems at that present most rational to be done: and upon that representation of good in the Object, the will embraceth it and acts accordingly. So that its Providence is not violated by any boisterous and