Answ. To this I Answer in the Third place; We are not bound to abstain from what they are offended at, unless they produce some probable Grounds and Reasons for their Offences. It is not enough to oblige our Consciences, that they tell us they imagine such a thing to be evil, unless they show some Grounds for their Imagination; nor is it here required, that the Grounds they produce should be demonstrative; but it is enough if they be probable Grounds, though they amount not to prove the things that appear evil to them, to be in themselves evil; yet if they prove these things carry in them a probable presumption of evil, this is sufficient to oblige us to abstain from them. Hereupon it was that the Apostle forbid the Corinthians to eat Meat offered unto Idols; if any took offence at that Meat, others were not to eat thereof in their presence and company, and that because their offence had some probable show of Reason to judge ⟨p. 147⟩that they thought they had too much communion with Idols, because they did eat of those things that were sacrificed to them: And upon this ground the Apostle himself resolves, in 1 Cor. 8. ult. That if Meat made his Brother to offend, he would eat no Flesh while the World stood; that is (as I take it) no Flesh offered to Idols; for that is the Subject of which he had been treating all along that Chapter. Though it was lawful in it self considered, yet because the weak had probable Grounds and Reasons to show why Flesh offered to Idols, might not be eaten, therefore he would abstain from it whilst the World stood. And so in like manner, if any except against what we do, and bring this Reason for it, That it is too like the Custom of wicked Men, that none do thus and thus but the generality of the •ooser and profaner sort; this is such a Ground, that though the Thing is it self be not sinful, yet we ought hereupon to abstain from it, being a probable ground of Evil, though the Thing in it self be not evil. But now, if there be no such probable Reasons produced as carry in them a Show and Appearance, ⟨p. 148⟩that probably that is evil which we do, then we are not bound to abstain merely because such a Man saith or thinks such an Action is evil: As for instance;
Answ. To this I Answer in the Third place; We are not bound to abstain from what they are offended at, unless they produce some probable Grounds and Reasons for their Offences. It is not enough to oblige our Consciences, that they tell us they imagine such a thing to be evil, unless they shew some Grounds for their Imagination; nor is it here required, that the Grounds they produce should be demonstrative; but it is enough if they be probable Grounds, though they amount not to prove the things that appear evil to them, to be in themselves evil; yet if they prove these things carry in them a probable presumption of evil, this is sufficient to oblige us to abstain from them. Hereupon it was that the Apostle forbid the Corinthians to eat Meat offered unto Idols; if any took offence at that Meat, others were not to eat thereof in their presence and company, and that because their offence had some probable shew of Reason to judge ⟨p. 147⟩that they thought they had too much communion with Idols, because they did eat of those things that were sacrificed to them: And upon this ground the Apostle himself resolves, in 1 Cor. 8. ult. That if Meat made his Brother to offend, he would eat no Flesh while the World stood; that is (as I take it) no Flesh offered to Idols; for that is the Subject of which he had been treating all along that Chapter. Though it was lawful in it self considered, yet because the weak had probable Grounds and Reasons to shew why Flesh offered to Idols, might not be eaten, therefore he would abstain from it whilst the World stood. And so in like manner, if any except against what we do, and bring this Reason for it, That it is too like the Custom of wicked Men, that none do thus and thus but the generality of the •ooser and prophaner sort; this is such a Ground, that though the Thing is it self be not sinful, yet we ought hereupon to abstain from it, being a probable ground of Evil, though the Thing in it self be not evil. But now, if there be no such probable Reasons produced as carry in them a Shew and Appearance, ⟨p. 148⟩that probably that is evil which we do, then we are not bound to abstain merely because such a Man saith or thinks such an Action is evil: As for instance;
