Tis true it must be understood not totally ⟨p. 36⟩to exceed the capacity of a creature, but it must fully come up to it. Should it quite transcend the Sphere of created nature, and surpass the model of an humane understanding (as the divine glory undoubtedly would, did not God consider us in the manner of exhibiting it to our view) it would confound not satisfy. A creature even in glory is still a Creature, and must be treated as such. After the blessed God hath elevated it to the highest pitch, he must infinitely condescend, it cannot otherwise know or converse with him. He must accommodate this glory to the weaker eye, the fainter and more languid apprehensions of a poor finite thing. I had almost said, nothing, for what is any creature, yea the whole creation in it's best state compared with the I AM, the being (as he justly appropriates to himself that name) the All in All. We must be careful then to settle in our own thoughts such a state of this glory (in forming that indeterminate notion we have now of it) as may render it (though confessedly above the measure of our present understandings as to a distinct knowledge of it) not manifestly incompetent to any created understanding whatsoever, and as may speak us duly shy of ascribing a Deity to a worm, of affixing any thing to the creature, which shall be found agreeing to the blessed God himself alone▪ Their expressions therefore, who over magnify (even deify) the creature assumed into glory, must be heard and rea• ⟨p. 37⟩with caution and abhorrency, as the high swelling words of blasphemous vanity. Is it not enough that perishing wretches,1 that were within one hands breadth of Hell, are saved except they be also deified too? that they become happy unless they also become Gods? The distance even of a glorified creature from the glorious God is still infinitely greater, than between it and the silliest worm. The minutest atom of dust.
Tis true it must be understood not totally ⟨p. 36⟩to exceed the capacity of a creature, but it must fully come up to it. Should it quite transcend the Sphere of created nature, and surpass the modell of an humane understanding (as the divine glory undoubtedly would, did not God consider us in the manner of exhibiting it to our view) it would cofound not satisfie. A creature even in glory is still a Creature, and must be treated as such. After the blessed God hath elevated it to the highest pitch, he must infinitely condescend, it cannot otherwise know or converse with him. He must accommodate this glory to the weaker eye, the fainter and more lang•id apprehensions of a poor finite thing. I had almost said, nothing, for what is any creature, yea the whole creation in it's best state compared with the I AM, the being (as he justly appropriates to himself that name) the All in All. We must be careful then to settle in our own thoughts such a state of this glory (in forming that indeterminate notion we have now of it) as may render it (though confessedly above the measure of our present understandings as to a distinct knowledge of it) not manifestly incompetent to any created understanding whatsoever, and as may speak us duly shy of ascribing a Deity to a worm, of affixing any thing to the creature, which shall be found agreeing to the blessed God himself alone▪ Their expressions therefore, who over magn•fie (even deifie) the creature assumed into glory, must be heard and rea• ⟨p. 37⟩with caution and abhorrency, as the high swelling words of blasphemous vanity. Is it not enough that perishing wretches,1 that were within one hands breadth of Hell, are saved except they be also deified too? that they become happy unless they also become Gods? The distance even of a glorified creature from the glorious God is still infinitely greater, than between it and the silliest worm. The minutest atome of dust.
- 1Not being willing to trouble a discourse wholly of another nature and design, with any thing of controversy: I have chosen only to annex a marginal digression, wherein, somewhat to animadvert upon the overbold disputes and definitions of the Scholastic generation, touching what we have now under consideration. Some of whose. Writings seem the very Springs of the putid conceits (there no• wanting those, that are offiicious enough to serve the illiterate, in accommodating things of that kind to their genius and language) o greedily imbib'd by modern Enthusiasts. Tis a Question much agitated among the School-men, whether the Divine Essence be exhibited to the view of the Blessed in Heaven, in it self, immediately, or, by the intervention of any […] or similitude. Had it been agreed to forbear looking within this veil (the […] attempt whereof, rather rents than draws it aside) and to shut up all discourse of this kind, in a modest awful silence; or had the Adventures some have made been foolish only, not […], this present labour had been spared. But when M•n speak of things ••ove their reach, not to no purpose barely, but to very bad; what they say ought to be considered. The Divine Essence, say the […] (and the Scotists here disagree not) is it self immediatedly united to the intellect of the blessed [in rat•on• Spec••i intellig•bilis] so as there is no place for any intervening likeness, or representation. Ipsa Dviaa Ess•ntia est, quae videtur & q•o v•d•tur. Them. Sum. p•imd pa•••, q 12. A•t. 2. 3 contr. Gentes c 51. Now they assert concerning the Species intelligibiles, in general, that they have not, Locum objects, intell•ctionem termi•a•tis (which they make the place and office of the verbum mentis per intellectionem productum) but formae […] & âctûs primi, and that the understanding so act, by them, as fire by it▪ proper form, Thom. Sum. primd part, q. 85. At. 2. (the contrary whereto is asserted by Scotus in 1. Sentent. distinct. 3. q. 6.) Yea and Cajt. affirms 1. p. q. 76. Art. 2. That the Intellect and the intelligible species are more one than the matter and form in the compositum. For, saith he, (or to that purpose, not having him now at hand (the matter is not turned into the form nor e contrà, but the intellect, which is in it self mere power, doth, in genere intelligibili turn into its very intelligible object; and the intelligible object it self is after a certain manner imbib'd in the intellect. So desma de Divin. perect. q. 3. Art. 5. Unum transit in aliud ex quo scqutur, qud unum sit aliud. And hence, say they, applying this doctrine to the present purpose, [& secundum illum dum, in conjunction illâ essabili divinae essentiae cum intellct creato, sit unum agens integrum, scil. intellectus creatus factus Dus mirabls modo] [Intellectus in visione beatificâ, est potentia jam deficata, per lumen gloriae, Cajet. primâ part q. 12. Art. 2. ex Ledes. q. 8. Art 8.] For besides this immediate union of the Divine Essence it self with the intellect they assert a lumen gloriae, an accident superadded, without which the vision cannot be performed; which additional the Scotists reject. Some, though they admit it, think the vision may be without it, and that it doth not implicare contradinem visionem beatificam fieri sine lumine gloriae, cum solo speciali […] auxilio, qod item asserunt multi ex scholasticis, Palud. in 4. dist. 49. q. 1. Ar. 3. Corel. 2. Thom. de Agent. q. 2. Art. 1. Major. q. 4. Hnr. quibet 7. Zumel. 1. p. q. 12. Art. 5. disp. 2. cncl. 3. Ita O tuphr. de virtute poetenti. Whether there be any vebum creatum, the product of intellection, The Thomists are themselves divided. Their more common opinion is, that there is none, as Ledesma assures us; telling us also his reason, why he conceives there can be none. Beati no format verbum in videndo Deo, sed plus vident quam verb creato dicere pssunt—nam beatus per visionem beatam quamvis non vieat [infinitè] videt tamen infinitum.—(which is their great argument against any intelligible species) & he further addes, sicut visio Dei quae est in ipso Deo hbet pro principio & specie intelligibili ipsam Divinam Essentiam; & protermino ipsm Divinam Essentiam visio beatorum est ità supernaturalis, & divini ordinis, & participatio diviae visionis ita perfecta, ut ipsa etiam habeat pro principio & specie intelligbili, divinâ Esseniā, & potermino sive verbo producto, ipsammet divinā Essntiā. So that the principle and term of this vision are own'd to be nothing else, but the simple Divine Essence. Concerning the formal act it self, it is much disputed, whether the creatures intellect do at all effectively concur to it, or whether God himself, be not the only efficient or agent in this vision. Some stick not to airm the latter, Marsil. in 3. q. 1. Palud. in 4. dist. 49, q. 1. At. 2. (referent Ledsâ) and say plainly, that the action of the ineriour agent wholly ceases, and the superior only acts, the same thing that D. M. Causabon in his Enthusiasm charges one Mximus with, who in a book entitled [Greek or Hebrew] writes thus; [Greek or Hebrew]. Tat the Soul taken into immediate union […] Go, loses all us knowing power (though this be not distinctively spoken of the state of glory, And what doth this amount to? but that while they are eagerly contending about the Saints blessedness, and too curiously labouring to explicate the manner of their seeing God, they unawares destroy the subject of the question, and deny that they see him at all; and so upon the whole, dispute themselves into a worse than Pganish infidelity. And even the rest, that agree in the sense of the passages above recited, will not be easily able to avoid the charge of as intolerable consequences; which it is my business, here, only to discover, and not to determine any thing in this controversy, whiles I tax the too much boldness of others, who adventure it. And here not to insist on the absurdity of what they say concerning the intelligible species in general, let it be considered. 1. That the Divine Essence is said to be united to the intellect of the blessed, as an intelligible species. 2. That the intelligible species, in the business of intellection, and the intellect, become one another, do not remain distinct things united, but are identified. 3. That hence in understanding God, the intellect is deified and becomes God, which naturally follows from the two former; and is moreover expressly asserted in plain words. What need is there to press this Doctrine with hard consequencies? or how can it look worse than it doth already, with its own natural face? Nor can I apprehend which way it should be made look better. For should it lay claim to that favour, to be understood according to the usual sense of the peripat […] maxim, Intellectus, intelligendo, sit omnia; it will be found manifestly to have precluded it self: That maxim is wont to be understood thus; that the intellect becomes that which it understands […], by putting on the species or likeness of its Object, the representation of it. For instance, when I form in my mind the notion of a mountain, my understanding becomes an Ideal or Spiritual mountain: it becomes that species (which is liable to more exception too than I shall now insist on, and looks more like the language of a Poet than a Philosopher) that is now formed there; and not the material mountain it self. But how shall this assertion [The understanding by its act of understanding God becomes Go] be capable of that interpretation, i. e. It becomes his likeness, his Idea, his representation now formed in it, when any such intervening likeness or representation is utterly denied; and that supposed species is said to be the simple Divine essence it self and if the Divine essence it self be that species by which 'tis understood, will it not follow from that other Aristtan axiom (which with them must signify as much as a Text from Saint Paul) sibyl & […]: That our very knowledge of God must be God too, or would they disown that maxim, sure, when once the faculty is supposed deified, the act immanent in it, cannot be a created accident; nor can that maxim (understood of the […] or the […] denied by them: And sure. if the Saints knowledge of God; the likeness of him in their […] be God; their holiness, the likeness of him in their harts, must be so too. How absurd then would it be, to use that Scripture language, and speak of these under the names of Gods image or likeness, when […] and […], are notion so vastly disagreeing; and since a Saints knowledge and holiness here and in heaven differ but in degree; they can be, here on earth, nothing but God dwelling in them. And supposing that Scotus have better defended than his adversaries impugned the real identity of the soul and its faculties, that must be deified too. However, wht could be imagined more absurd, than that the substance of the soul should be a creature, and its faculty God? Whence then do we think that modern familists have fetch their admired non-sense? Whom have they had their original instructors? or who have taught them that brave magnificent language of being Godded with God, and Christed with Christ but these? Nor sure need they blush to be found guilty of so profoundly learned inconsistencies, or to speak absurdly after such Patrons. And what should occasion these men so to involve themselves, I cannot find, or divine more than this, that they were not able to fasten upon any more tolerable sense of the word [Greek or Hebrew]
