A calm and sober enquiry concerning the possibility of a Trinity in the Godhead…

3. We are not sure what that sufficient distinction is (wherein I find you saying with me over and over) But whereas you rightly make the word person applicable to God, but in a sense analogous to that which obtains of it with men; why may it not be said it may be fitly applicable, for ought we know, in a sense analogous to that notion of it among men, which makes a person signify an intelligent hypostasis; and so three distinct persons, three distinct intelligent hypostases.

4. But if that sufficient distinction can be no less, than that there be in the Godhead, three distinct intelligent hypostases, each having its own distinct singular intelligent nature, with its proper personality belonging to it, we know nothing to the contrary, but that the necessary eternal nature of the Godhead may admit thereof. If any can from plain Scripture testimony, or cogent reason evince the contrary, let the evidence be produced. In the mean time we need not impose upon our selves any formal denial of it.

5. If the contrary can be evidenced, and that hereupon it be designed to conclude that there can be but one intelligent hypostasis in the Godhead, and therefore that the Son, and the Holy Ghost are but creatures, the last refuge must be to deny the former consequence, and to allege that though the same finite singular nature cannot well be understood to remain entirely to one, and be communicated entirely to another, ⟨p. 127⟩and another, the case will not be the same speaking of an infinite Nature.

5. If the contrary can be evidenced, and that hereupon it be designed to conclude that there can be but one intelligent hypostasis in the Godhead, and therefore that the Son, and the Holy Ghost are but creatures, the last refuge must be to deny the former consequence, and to alledge that thô the same finite singular nature cannot well be understood to remain entirely to one, and be communicated entirely to another,