A44670:30
A calm and sober enquiry concerning the possibility of a Trinity in the Godhead…
A calm and sober enquiry concerning the possibility of a Trinity in the Godhead in a letter to a person of worth : occasioned by the lately published considerations on the explications of the doctrine of the Trinity by Dr. Wallis, Dr. Sherlock, Dr. S--th, Dr. Cudworth, &c. ...
London: printed by J. Astwood for Tho. Parkhurst, 1694
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
VI. Since we find this is a thing actually done, the making up of two things of so different Natures into one thing, that puts the matter out of doubt that this was a thing possible to be done, 'twas what God could do, for he hath done it. And if that were possible to him, to unite two things of so very different natures into one thing; let any colourable reason be assigned me why it should not be as possible to him, to unite two things of a like nature. i. e. If it were possible to him to unite a spirit and a body, why is it less possible to him to have united two spirits? And then I further enquire, If it were possible to him to unite two, would it not be as possible to unite three? Let Reason here be put upon its utmost stretch, and tell me what in all this is less possible than what we see is actually done! Will any man say two or three spirits united, being of the same nature, ⟨p. 20⟩will mingle, be confounded, run into one another, and lose their distinction? I ask, supposing them to pre-exist apart, antecedently to their Union; are they not now distinguished by their own individual essences, let them be as much united as our Souls and Bodies are, why should they not as much remain distinct by their singular essences? There is no more hazard of their losing their distinction, by the similitude of their natures, than of our Soul and Body's transmuting one another by their dissimilitude.
I know not but the dictates of so vogued an Author with many in this Age, as Spinosa, may signify somewhat with some into whose hands this may fall; who (with design bad enough) says, that, from whence one might collect the remaining distinction of two things of the same nature in such a supposed union, were the more easily conceivable of the two, i. e. than of two things of different natures. For in his ⟨p. 21⟩Posthumous Ethics, de Deo, He lays this down in Explication of his second Definition, [Cogitatio aliâ cogitation terminatur. At corpus non terminatur cogitatione, nec cogitatio corpore.] Some may regard him in this, and it would do our business. For my pat, I care not to be so much beholden to him; for it would, at the long run, overdo it; and I know his meaning. But I see not but two congenerous natures are equally capable of being united, retaining their distinction, as two of a different kind, and that sufficiently serves the present purpose.