XII. If we should suppose three spiritual necessary beings, the one whereof were mere Power (or furious might) destitute of either wisdom, or goodness; another mere wisdom (or craft rather) destitute of either goodness or power; a third mere goodness (or fond and fruitless kindness) destitute of either power or wisdom, existing separately and apart from each other. This triple conception would overthrow it self, and must certainly allow little ease to any considering mind. Nor could any of these be God. But if we conceive essential power, wisdom, and goodness concurring in one spiritual necessarily existent Being, in which are each of these, not only, by the [Greek or Hebrew], usually acknowledged in the three Persons, totally permeating one another (which signifying but mere presence, as we may express it, is in comparison, a small thing) but really and vitally ⟨p. 32⟩united, by so much a nearer, and more perfect union than hath ever come under our notice among created beings, of partly corporeal, partly incorporeal natures, by how much beings of purest Spirituality may be apter to the most intimate union, than when one is quite of a different nature from the other, and as whatsoever union is supposable to be, originally, eternally, and by natural necessity, in the most perfect being, may be thought inexpressibly more perfect than any other. And if, hereupon, we further conceive the most entire, perpetual, everlasting intercourse and communion of these three, so originally united, that what is conceivable of perfection, or excellency in any one of these, is as much the others, for whatsoever exercises or operations, as his own; I cannot apprehend what there is of repugnancy, contradiction, or absurdity in this supposition; nor any thing that, by any measures he hath given us to govern our conceptions of him, appears unbecoming, or ⟨p. 33⟩unworthy of God. There is, 'tis true, less Simplicity, but more perfection ascribed hereby to the divine Being, entirely considered; and more intelligibly, than if you go about to impose upon your self the notion of most absolute omnimodous simplicity therein. There would be yet more absolute simplicity ascribed unto an eternal Being, if you should conceive in it mere power exclusive of wisdom, and goodness—and so of the rest; but infinitely less perfection.
XII. If we should suppose three spiritual necessary beings, the one whereof were meer Power (or furious might) destitute of either wisdom, or goodness; another meer wisdom (or craft rather) destitute of either goodness or power; a third meer goodness (or fond and fruitless kindness) destitute of either power or wisdom, existing separately and apart from each other. This triple conception would overthrow it self, and must certainly allow little ease to any considering mind. Nor could any of these be God. But if we conceive essential power, wisdom, and goodness concurring in one spiritual necessarily existent Being, in which are each of these, not only, by the 〈non-Latin alphabet〉, usually acknowledged in the three Persons, totally permeating one another (which signifying but meer presence, as we may express it, is in comparison, a small thing) but really and vitally ⟨p. 32⟩united, by so much a nearer, and more perfect union than hath ever come under our notice among created beings, of partly corporeal, partly incorporeal natures, by how much beings of purest Sprituality may be apter to the most intimate union, than when one is quite of a different nature from the other, and as whatsoever union is suposeable to be, originally, eternally, and by natural necessity, in the most perfect being, may be thought inexpressibly more perfect than any other. And if, hereupon, we further conceive the most entire, perpetual, everlasting intercourse and communion of these three, so originally united, that what is conceivable of perfection, or excellency in any one of these, is as much the others, for whatsoever exercises or operations, as his own; I cannot apprehend what there is of repugnancy, contradiction, or absurdity in this supposition; nor any thing that, by any measures he hath given us to govern our conceptions of him, appears unbecoming, or ⟨p. 33⟩unworthy of God. There is, 'tis true, less Simplicity, but more perfection ascribed hereby to the divine Being, intirely considered; and more intelligibly, than if you go about to impose upon your self the notion of most absolute omnimodous simplicity therein. There would be yet more absolute simplicity ascribed unto an eternal Being, if you should conceive in it meer power exclusive of wisdom, and goodness—and so of the rest; but infinitely less perfection.