A44670:34
A calm and sober enquiry concerning the possibility of a Trinity in the Godhead…
A calm and sober enquiry concerning the possibility of a Trinity in the Godhead in a letter to a person of worth : occasioned by the lately published considerations on the explications of the doctrine of the Trinity by Dr. Wallis, Dr. Sherlock, Dr. S--th, Dr. Cudworth, &c. ...
London: printed by J. Astwood for Tho. Parkhurst, 1694
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
VII. That if such an Union of three things (whether of like, or of different Natures) so as that they shall be truly one thing, and yet remain distinct, tho united, can be effected, (as one may with certainty pronounce, there is nothing more impossible, or unconceivable in it, than we find is actually done) then it is not intrinsically impossible, or objectively; it is not impossible in it self. No power can effect what is simply, and in it self impossible. There is therefore ⟨p. 23⟩no contradiction, no repugnancy, or inconsistency, as to the thing, nor consequently any shadow of absurdity in the conception hereof. Whereupon,
VII. That if such an Union of three things (whether of like, or of different Natures) so as that they shall be truly one thing, and yet remain distinct, tho united, can be effected, (as one may with certainty pronounce, there is nothing more impossible, or unconceivable in it, than we find is actually done) then it is not intrinsecally impossible, or objectively; it is not impossible in it self. No power can effect what is simply, and in it self impossible. There is therefore ⟨p. 23⟩no contradiction, no repugnancie, or inconsistencie, as to the thing, nor consequently any shadow of absurdity in the conception hereof. Whereupon,
VIII. If such an union with such distinction be not impossible in it self, so that by a competent power it is sufficiently possible to be effected, or made; we are to consider whether it will appear more impossible, or whether I shall have a conception in my own mind any thing more incongruous if I conceive such an union (with such distinction) unmade, or that is original and eternal, in an unmade, or uncreated being. For we are first to consider the thing in it self, abstractly from made or unmade, created or uncreated being. And if it pass clear of contradiction or absurdity, in its abstract notion, we are so far safe, and are not liable to be charged as having the conception in our minds of an impossible, absurd, or self-repugnant thing. So that clamour and cry of the Adversary must cease, or be it self absurd,