A44670:37
A calm and sober enquiry concerning the possibility of a Trinity in the Godhead…
A calm and sober enquiry concerning the possibility of a Trinity in the Godhead in a letter to a person of worth : occasioned by the lately published considerations on the explications of the doctrine of the Trinity by Dr. Wallis, Dr. Sherlock, Dr. S--th, Dr. Cudworth, &c. ...
London: printed by J. Astwood for Tho. Parkhurst, 1694
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
X. I might add, as that which may be expected to be significant with such as do seriously believe the Doctrines both of the Incarnation, and the Trinity (tho' I know it will signify nothing with them, who with equal contempt reject both) that the union of the two Natures, the humane (made up of an humane Body and an humane Soul, which are two exceedingly different Natures) with the divine (which is a third and infinitely more different from both the other) in one Person, viz. of the Son of God, cannot certainly appear to any considering Person more conceivable or possible, than that which we now suppose (but assert not) of three distinct Essences united in the One Godhead, upon any account, but this only, that this ⟨p. 26⟩is supposed to be an unmade, eternal union, the other made and temporal; which renders not the one less conceivable than the other, as it is union, but only as in the several terms of this union it is supposed eternally to have place in the Being of God; whereas that other union, in respect of one of its terms is acknowledged de novo to have place there.
X. I might add, as that which may be expected to be significant with such as do seriously believe the Doctrines both of the Incarnation, and the Trinity (tho' I know it will signifie nothing with them, who with equal contempt reject both) that the union of the two Natures, the humane (made up of an humane Body and an humane Soul, which are two exceedingly different Natures) with the divine (which is a third and infinitely more different from both the other) in one Person, viz. of the Son of God, cannot certainly appear to any considering Person more conceivable or possible, than that which we now suppose (but assert not) of three distinct Essences united in the One Godhead, upon any account, but this only, that this ⟨p. 26⟩is supposed to be an unmade, eternal union, the other made and temporal; which renders not the one less conceivable than the other, as it is union, but only as in the several terms of this union it is supposed eternally to have place in the Being of God; whereas that other union, in respect of one of its terms is acknowledg'd de novo to have place there.