A44670:44
A calm and sober enquiry concerning the possibility of a Trinity in the Godhead…
A calm and sober enquiry concerning the possibility of a Trinity in the Godhead in a letter to a person of worth : occasioned by the lately published considerations on the explications of the doctrine of the Trinity by Dr. Wallis, Dr. Sherlock, Dr. S--th, Dr. Cudworth, &c. ...
London: printed by J. Astwood for Tho. Parkhurst, 1694
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
And indeed this is no more than what, in effect, such as discourse upon this Subject do commonly say (tho' perhaps some may less consider the ducture and sequel of their own professed Sentiments) when they speak of the incomprehensibleness of God's Essence, and how ⟨p. 36⟩impossible it is a finite mind should form or receive a full and complete Idea of it; or when they therefore say, that any conceptions we can have of the Wisdom, Goodness, or any other Attribute of the Divine Being, are still but inadequate conceptions; whereby they must mean, when we consider for instance the Wisdom of God that we not only fall infinitely short of conceiving all that belongs to the Divine Being, in that kind, but that there is also infinitely more belonging thereto, in other kinds, than it is possible that conception can contain or express. And when we have the conception in our minds of the Divine Wisdom, do we not apprehend there is really somewhat else in the Divine Being, whereof that term hath no signification? or will we say his Wisdom and his Power are really the same thing? (as they must either be the same, or divers things:) If we say they are the same, we must, I doubt, confess our selves to say what we do not understand, especially ⟨p. 37⟩when, in the abstract, we affirm them of one another, and of God; and accordingly say that Wisdom is Power, and Power is Wisdom, and the one of these is God, and the other, God. I know a formal distinction is commonly admitted, i. e. that the conception of the one is not included in the conception of the other. But are these different conceptions true or false? If false, why are they admitted? if true, there must be somewhat in the Nature of the thing corresponding to them. But if we say they are distinct, but most intimately, and eternally united in the Divine Being, by a necessary, natural Union, or that it is not impossible so to be, what we say will, I think, agree with it self, and not disagree with any other conception we are obliged to have concerning the blessed God.
And indeed this is no more than what, in effect, such as discourse upon this Subject do commonly say (tho' perhaps some may less consider the ducture and sequel of their own professed Sentiments) when they speak of the incomprehensibleness of God's Essence, and how ⟨p. 36⟩