A44670:85
A calm and sober enquiry concerning the possibility of a Trinity in the Godhead…
A calm and sober enquiry concerning the possibility of a Trinity in the Godhead in a letter to a person of worth : occasioned by the lately published considerations on the explications of the doctrine of the Trinity by Dr. Wallis, Dr. Sherlock, Dr. S--th, Dr. Cudworth, &c. ...
London: printed by J. Astwood for Tho. Parkhurst, 1694
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
XXVIII. But I reckon they that go the more Metaphysical way, and content themselves with the modal distinction of three Persons in the Godhead, say nothing herein that can be proved absurd or contradictious. As to what is commonly urged, that if there be three Persons in the Deity, each Person must have its distinct individual Essence, as well as its distinct personality. I would deny the consequence, and say, that tho' this be true in created Persons (taking Person in the strict Metaphysical sense) it is not necessary to be so in uncreated. That the reason is not the same between finite things and infinite; and would put them to prove, if they can, that the same infinite Essence cannot be whole and undivided in three several Persons; ⟨p. 74⟩knowing there can be nothing more difficult urged in the Case, than may against the Divine Omnipresence; which irrefragable reasons, as well as the plainest testimony of Scripture will oblige us to acknowledge.
XXVIII. But I reckon they that go the more Metaphysical way, and content themselves with the modal distinction of three Persons in the Godhead, say nothing herein that can be proved absurd or contradictious. As to what is commonly urged, that if there be three Persons in the Deity, each Person must have its distinct individual Essence, as well as its distinct personality. I would deny the consequence, and say, that tho' this be true in created Persons (taking Person in the strict Metaphysical sense) it is not necessary to be so in uncreated. That the reason is not the same betvveen finite things and infinite; and would put them to prove, if they can, that the same infinite Essence cannot be whole and undivided in three several Persons; ⟨p. 74⟩knowing there can be nothing more difficult urged in the Case, than may against the Divine Omnipresence; which irrefragable reasons, as well as the plainest testimony of Scripture will oblige us to acknowledge.
But I think, tho' this Hypothesis abstractly considered, and by it self, is not indefensible; it doth not altogether so well square with the Christian Economy, nor so easily allow that distinction to the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, which seems requisite to found the distinct attributions that are severally given them in the Holy Scriptures.