We commonly excuse our aversion to Die, by alleging that Nature regrets it. But we do not ⟨p. 111⟩enough consider that in such a compounded sort of creature as we are; the word Nature must be ambiguous. There is in us a sensitive Nature that regrets it; but taking the case as it is now stated, can we think it tolerable, that it should be regretted by the reasonable Nature? unto which, if we appeal, can we suppose it so untrue to its self, as not to assert its own Superiority? or to judge it fit that an intelligent, immortal Spirit, capable of so great things, in another World, should be content with a long abode here. Only to keep a well-figured piece of Flesh from putrefying, or give it the satisfaction of tasting meats, and drinks, that are grateful to it, for a few years! And if for a few, why not for many? and when those many were expired, why not for as many more? And ⟨p. 112⟩the same reason always remaining, why not for always? The case is thus put, because the common meaning of this allegation, that Nature regrets or abhors this dissolution; is not that they are concerned for their Souls how it may fare with them in another World, which the most little mind or trouble themselves about; but that they are to have what is grateful to them in this World. And was this the end a reasonable Spirit, was made for, when, without reason, sense were alike capable of the same sort of gratifications? What Law, what Equity? what rule of Decency can oblige the Soul of a Man, capable of the Society, and Enjoyments of Angels, to this piece of Self-denial▪ for the sake of his incomparably baser Body? Or can make it fit that the nobler and ⟨p. 113⟩more excellent Nature, should be eternally subservient to the meaner, and more ignoble? Especially, considering that if (according to the case supposed) the two last foregoing directions be complied with, there is a sort of Divine Nature superadded to the whole Humane Nature, that cannot but prompt the Soul ennobled by it, to aspire to suitable, even to the highest, operations and enjoyments, whereof it is capable, and, which are not attainable in this present bodily state.
VVe commonly excuse our aversion to Die, by alledging that Nature regrets it. But we do not ⟨p. 111⟩enough consider that in such a compounded sort of creature as we are; the word Nature must be ambiguous. There is in us a sensitive Nature that regrets it; but taking the case as it is now stated, can we think it tolerable, that it should be regretted by the reasonable Nature? unto which, if we appeal, can we suppose it so untrue to its self, as not to assert its own Superiority? or to judge it fit that an intelligent, immortal Spirit, capable of so great things, in another World, should be content with a long abode here. Only to keep a well-figured piece of Flesh from putrifying, or give it the satisfaction of tasting meats, and drinks, that are grateful to it, for a few years! And if for a few, why not for many? and when those many were expired, why not for as many more? And ⟨p. 112⟩the same reason always remaining, why not for alwaies? The case is thus put, because the common meaning of this allegation, that Nature reg•ets or abhors this dissolution; is not that they are concerned for their Souls how it may fare with them in another World, which the most little mind or trouble themselves about; but that they are to have what is grateful to them in this World. And was this the end a reasonable Spirit, was made for, when, without reason, sense were alike capable of the same sort of gratifications? VVhat Law, what Equity? what rule of Decency can oblige the Soul of a Man, capable of the Society, and Enjoyments of Angels, to this piece of Self-denial▪ for the sake of his incomparably baser Body? Or can make it fit that the nobler and ⟨p. 113⟩more excellent Nature, should be eternally subservient to the meaner, and more ignoble? Especially, considering that if (according to the case supposed) the two last foregoing directions be complyed with, there is a sort of Divine Nature superadded to the whole Humane Nature, that cannot but prompt the Soul ennobled by it, to aspire to suitable, even to the highest, operations and enjoyments, whereof it is capable, and, which are not attainable in this present bodily state.
