A44686:41
A post-script to the late letter of the reconcilableness of God's prescience, &cA post-script to the late letter of the reconcileableness of God's prescience, &c
A post-script to the late letter of the reconcilableness of God's prescience, &c. by John Howe ...A post-script to the late letter of the reconcileableness of God's prescience, &c. by John Howe ...
London: printed for Brabazon Aylmer, 1677
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
I again say, Was it impossible to God to make such a creature that can, in this case, act or not act? It is here oddly enough said, that the Author gives no demonstration hereof. Of what? Why that it can never be proved (as the reference to the foregoing word shows) that it implies a contradiction, &c. It seems it was expected that Author should have proved by demonstration, that it can never be proved, that it implies a contradiction, for God to make a Creature, ⟨p. 24⟩which should be capable of acting (as he feigns him to have said) without immediate concourse. By what rule of reasoning was he obliged to do so? But if the proving there is such a creature, as, in the case before expressed, can act without determinative concourse, will serve turn to prove, that it cannot be proved, it implies a contradiction there should be such a One: I may think the thing was done. And may think it sufficiently proved, that there is such a creature; If it appear (whereof there is too much proof) that there are such actions done by creatures, as, for the reasons that were before alleged, it could not stand with the Nature of God to determine them unto.
I again say, Was it impossible to God to make such a creature that can, in this case, act or not act? It is here odly enough said, that the Author gives no demonstration hereof. Of what? Why that it can never be proved (as the reference to the foregoing word shewes) that it implies a contradiction, &c. It seems it was expected that Authour should have proved by demonstration, that it can never be proved, that it implies a contradiction, for God to make a Creature, ⟨p. 24⟩which should be capable of acting (as he feigns him to have said) without immediate concourse. By what rule of reasoning was he obliged to do so? But if the proving there is such a creature, as, in the case before expressed, can act without determinative concourse, will serve turn to prove, that it cannot be proved, it implies a contradiction there should be such a One: I may think the thing was done. And may think it sufficiently proved, that there is such a creature; If it appear (whereof there is too much proof) that there are such actions done by creatures, as, for the reasons that were before alledged, it could not stand with the Nature of God to determine them unto.