A44686:47
A post-script to the late letter of the reconcilableness of God's prescience, &cA post-script to the late letter of the reconcileableness of God's prescience, &c
A post-script to the late letter of the reconcilableness of God's prescience, &c. by John Howe ...A post-script to the late letter of the reconcileableness of God's prescience, &c. by John Howe ...
London: printed for Brabazon Aylmer, 1677
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
Yea and the Authors he quotes (§. 11.) Aquinas and Scotus, tho every body may know they are against what was the notion of Durandus, yet are as much against himself, if he will directly oppose that Letter, and assert determinative concourse to wicked actions. They held immediate concourse, not determinative. The former, tho he supposes Divine help in reference to the elections of the human ⟨p. 30⟩will, yet asserts the elections themselves to be in mans own power, and only says that in the executions of those elections men can be hindered. That (whatsoever influence he asserts of the first cause) men still,1 habent se indifferentèr ad benè vel malè eligendum. The other, tho he also excludes not the immediate efficiency of God in reference to the actions of men, yet is so far from making it determinative, that the reason he gives why, in evil actions, man sins, and God doth not, is, that the former of these Causes, posset rectitudinem dare actui qam tenetur eam dare, tamen, qantum est ex se, daret, si voluntas creata cooperaretur; in the very place which himself refers to. Wherein they differ from this Author toto Coelo; and from me, in that they make ⟨p. 31⟩not determinative influence necessary in reference to good actions, which I expressly do.
Yea and the Authours he qotes (§. 11.) Aqinas and Scotus, tho every body may know they are against what was the notion of Durandus, yet are as much against himself, if he will directly oppose that Letter, and assert determinative concourse to wicked actions. They held immediate concourse, not determinative. The former, tho he supposes Divine help in reference to the elections of the human ⟨p. 30⟩will, yet asserts the elections themselves to be in mans own power, and only saies that in the executions of those elections men can be hindered. That (whatsoever influence he asserts of the first cause) men still,1 habent se indifferentèr ad benè vel malè eligendum. The other, tho he also excludes not the immediate efficiency of God in reference to the actions of men, yet is so far from making it determinative, that the reason he gives why, in evil actions, man sins, and God doth not, is, that the former of these Causes, posset rectitudinem dare actui qam tenetur eam dare, tamen, qantum est ex se, daret, si voluntas creata cooperaretur; in the very place which himself refers to. Wherein they differ from this Authour toto Coelo; and from me, in that they make