A44687:178
The reconcilableness of God's prescience of the sins of men with the wisdom and…The reconcileableness of God's prescience of the sins of men with the wisdom and…
The reconcilableness of God's prescience of the sins of men with the wisdom and sincerity of his counsels, exhortations, and whatsoever other means he uses to prevent them / in a letter to the Honourable Robert Boyle Esq.The reconcileableness of God's prescience of the sins of men with the wisdom and sincerity of his counsels, exhortations, and whatsoever other means he uses to prevent them / in a letter to the Honorable Robert Boyle Esq.
London: printed for Brabazon Aylmer, 1677
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
And if yet it should be insisted, that in asserting God to will what by his Laws he hath made become Man's duty, even where it is not done, we shall herein ascribe to him, at least, an ineffectual ⟨p. 116⟩and an imperfect Will, as which doth not bring to pass the thing willed.
And if yet it should be insisted, that in asserting God to will what by his Lawes he hath made become Man's duty, even where it is not done, we shall herein ascribe to him, at least, an ineffectual ⟨p. 116⟩and an imperfect Will, as which doth not bring to pass the thing willed.
It is answered, that imperfection were with no pretence imputable to the Divine Will, merely for its not effecting every thing, whereto it may have a real propension. But it would be more liable to that imputation, if it should effect any thing, which it were less fit for him to effect, than not to effect it. The absolute Perfection of his Will stands in the proportion, which every act of it bears, to the importance of the things, about which it is conversant. Even as, with men, the perfection of any act of will is to be estimated, not by the mere peremptory sturdiness of it, but by its proportion to the goodness of the thing willed. Upon which ⟨p. 117⟩account, a mere velleity (as many love to speak) when the degree of goodness in the object claims no more, hath unconceivably greater perfection in it, than the most obstinate Volition.
It is answered, that imperfection were with no pretence imputable to the Divine Will, meerly for its not effecting every thing, whereto it may have a real propension. But it would be more liable to that imputation, if it should effect any thing, which it were less fit for him to effect, than not to effect it. The absolute Perfection of his Will stands in the proportion, which every act of it bears, to the importance of the things, about which it is conversant. Even as, with men, the perfection of any act of will is to be estimated, not by the meer peremptory sturdines of it, but by its proportion to the goodnes of the thing willed. Upon which