A44687:196
The reconcilableness of God's prescience of the sins of men with the wisdom and…The reconcileableness of God's prescience of the sins of men with the wisdom and…
The reconcilableness of God's prescience of the sins of men with the wisdom and sincerity of his counsels, exhortations, and whatsoever other means he uses to prevent them / in a letter to the Honourable Robert Boyle Esq.The reconcileableness of God's prescience of the sins of men with the wisdom and sincerity of his counsels, exhortations, and whatsoever other means he uses to prevent them / in a letter to the Honorable Robert Boyle Esq.
London: printed for Brabazon Aylmer, 1677
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
As, that it were, indeed, most repugnant to the notion of a Deity, to suppose any thing, which includes in it no contradiction, impossible to God, considered according to that Single Attribute of Power, only.
But yet we must add, That this were a very unequal way of estimating what God can do, that is to consider him as a mere Being of Power. For the notion of God so conceived, were very inadequate ⟨p. 125⟩to him, which taken entirely, imports the comprehension of all Perfections. So that they are two very distant questions, What the Power of God alone could do; And, What God can do. And whereas to the former the answer would be, Whatsoever is not in it self repugnant to be done. To the latter, it must only be, Whatsoever it becomes, or is agreeable to a Being every way perfect to do. And so it is to be attributed to the excellency of his Nature, if amongst all things not simply impossible, there be any, which it may be truly said be cannot do. Or, it proceeds not from the imperfection of his Power, but from the concurrence of all other Perfections in him. Hence his own Word plainly affirms of him, that he cannot lye. And by common consent it will be acknowledged, ⟨p. 126⟩that he cannot do any unjust act whatsoever.
But yet we must add, That this were a very uneqal way of estimating what God can do, that is to consider him as a meer Being of Power. For the notion of God so conceiv'd, were very inadeqate ⟨p. 125⟩to him, which taken entirely, imports the comprehension of all Perfections. So that they are two very distant qestions, What the Power of God alone could do; And, What God can do. And whereas to the former the answer would be, Whatsoever is not in it self repugnant to be done. To the latter, it must only be, Whatsoever it becomes, or is agreeable to a Being every way perfect to do. And so it is to be attributed to the excellencie of his Nature, if amongst all things not simply impossible, there be any, which it may be truly said be cannot do. Or, it proceeds not from the imperfection of his Power, but from the concurrence of all other Perfections in him. Hence his own Word plainly affirms of him, that he cannot lye. And by common consent it will be acknowledged,