A44687:48
The reconcilableness of God's prescience of the sins of men with the wisdom and…The reconcileableness of God's prescience of the sins of men with the wisdom and…
The reconcilableness of God's prescience of the sins of men with the wisdom and sincerity of his counsels, exhortations, and whatsoever other means he uses to prevent them / in a letter to the Honourable Robert Boyle Esq.The reconcileableness of God's prescience of the sins of men with the wisdom and sincerity of his counsels, exhortations, and whatsoever other means he uses to prevent them / in a letter to the Honorable Robert Boyle Esq.
London: printed for Brabazon Aylmer, 1677
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
§. V.
On the other hand also, as it cannot but seem to us an higher perfection to know all things at once, than gradually to arrive to the knowledge of one thing after another; and so proceed from the ignorance of some things to the knowledge of them; and that nothing is more certain, than that all possible perfection must agree to God; So we find his own Word asserting to him that most perfect knowledge which seems to exclude the possibility of increase; or that any thing should succeed into his knowledge. For how plainly is it affirmed of him that he knows all things. And even concerning ⟨p. 25⟩such future things as about which our present enquiry is conversant, The affirmation is express and positive.1 I am God, and there is none like me, declaring the end from the beginning, and from ancient times the things that are not yet done.
On the other hand also, as it cannot but seem to us an higher perfection to know all things at once, than gradually to arrive to the knowledg of one thing after another; and so proceed from the ignorance of some things to the knowledg of them; and that nothing is more certain, than that all possible perfection must agree to God; So we find his own Word asserting to him that most perfect knowledg which seems to exclude the possibility of increase; or that any thing should succeed into his knowledg. For how plainly is it affirmed of him that he knows all things. And even concerning ⟨p. 25⟩such future things as about which our present enqirie is conversant, The affirmation is express and positive.1