A44687:69
The reconcilableness of God's prescience of the sins of men with the wisdom and…The reconcileableness of God's prescience of the sins of men with the wisdom and…
The reconcilableness of God's prescience of the sins of men with the wisdom and sincerity of his counsels, exhortations, and whatsoever other means he uses to prevent them / in a letter to the Honourable Robert Boyle Esq.The reconcileableness of God's prescience of the sins of men with the wisdom and sincerity of his counsels, exhortations, and whatsoever other means he uses to prevent them / in a letter to the Honorable Robert Boyle Esq.
London: printed for Brabazon Aylmer, 1677
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
Not the former; for it may well be thought sufficiently to salve the rights and privilege of the first Cause, to assert that no action can be done but by a power derived from it; which, in reference to forbidden actions, intelligent Creatures may use or not use as they please, without overasserting, that they must be irresistibly determined also, even to the worst of actions done by them. Besides, that it seems infinitely to detract from the Perfection of the ever Blessed God, to affirm he was not able to make ⟨p. 37⟩a Creature, of such a nature, as, being continually sustained by him, and supplied with power every moment suitable to its nature, should be capable of acting; unless whatsoever he thus enables, he determine (that is, for it can mean no less thing, impel) it to do also.
Not the former; for it may well be thought sufficiently to salve the rights and priviledg of the first Cause, to assert that no action can be done but by a power derived from it; which, in reference to forbidden actions, intelligent Creatures may use or not use as they please, without overasserting, that they must be irresistibly determined also, even to the worst of actions done by them. Besides, that it seems infinitely to detract from the Perfection of the ever Blessed God, to affirm he was not able to make ⟨p. 37⟩a Creature, of such a nature, as, being continually sustained by him, and supplyed with power every moment sutable to its nature, should be capable of acting; unless whatsoever he thus enables, he determine (that is, for it can mean no less thing, impel) it to do also.
And except it were affirmed impossible to God to have made such a Creature, (that is, that it implied a contradiction, which certainly can never be proved) there is no imaginable pretence why it should not be admitted he hath done it: Rather than so fatally expose the Wisdom, Goodness, and Righteousness of God, by supposing him to have made Laws for his reasonable Creatures, impossible, thorough his own irresistible counter-action, to