A44687:71
The reconcilableness of God's prescience of the sins of men with the wisdom and…The reconcileableness of God's prescience of the sins of men with the wisdom and…
The reconcilableness of God's prescience of the sins of men with the wisdom and sincerity of his counsels, exhortations, and whatsoever other means he uses to prevent them / in a letter to the Honourable Robert Boyle Esq.The reconcileableness of God's prescience of the sins of men with the wisdom and sincerity of his counsels, exhortations, and whatsoever other means he uses to prevent them / in a letter to the Honorable Robert Boyle Esq.
London: printed for Brabazon Aylmer, 1677
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
I am not altogether ignorant what attempts have been made to prove it impossible, Nor again, what hath been done to manifest the vanity of those attempts. But I must confess a greater disposition to wonder, that ever such a thing should be disputed, that dispute so plain a case. And that a matter whereupon all moral Government depends, both humane and divine, should not have been determined at the first sight.
'Tis not hard for a good Wit to have somewhat to say for any thing. But to dispute against the common sense of Mankind, we know before hand, is but to ⟨p. 39⟩trifle; as the essay to prove the impossibility of local motion.
The notion of the goodness and righteousness of God, methinks, should stick so close to our minds, and create such a sense in our Souls, as should be infinitely dearer to us than all our senses and powers. And that we should rather choose to have our sight, hearing, and motive power, or what not besides, disputed, or even torn away from us, than ever suffer our selves to be disputed into a belief, that the holy and good God should irresistibly determine the wills of men to, and punish, the same thing. Nor is it difficult to urge more puzzling sophisms against the former, than for this latter.
The notion of the goodnes and righteousnes of God, methinks, should stick so close to our minds, and create such a sense in our Souls, as should be infinitely dearer to us than all our senses and powers. And that we should rather choose to have our sight, hearing, and motive power, or what not besides, disputed, or even torn away from us, than ever suffer our selves to be disputed into a belief, that the holy and good God should irresistibly determine the wills of men to, and punish, the same thing. Nor is it difficult to urge more puzzling sophisms against the former, than for this latter.