The vanity of this mortal life, or, Of man, considered only in his present…

These things occur to our first notice, upon any (a more sudden and cursory) view of the nature of man. ⟨p. 28⟩And what should hinder, but we may infer from these that there is further in his nature,

These things occurr to our first notice, upon any (a more sudden and cursory) view of the nature of man. ⟨p. 28⟩And what should hinder, but we may infer from these that there is further in his nature,

3. A capacity of an immortal state, i. e. that his nature is such, that he may, if God so please, by the concurrent influence of his ordinary power, and providence, without the help of a miracle, subsist in another state of life, after this, even a state that shall not be liable to that impairment and decay that we find this subject to. More, is not (as yet) contended for; and so much methinks, none should make a difficulty to admit, from what is evidently found in him. For it may well be supposed that the admitting of this (at least) will seem much more easy, to any free and unprejudiced reason, than to ascribe the operations before instanced in, to alterable or perishable matter, or indeed to any matter at all. It being justly presumed, that none will ascribe to matter, as such, the powers of ratiocination or volition. For then every particle of matter must needs be rational, and intelligent (an high advance ⟨p. 33⟩to what one would never have thought at all active). And how unconceivable is it, that the minute particles of matter, in themselves, each of them destitute of any such powers, should by their mutual intercourse with one another, become furnished with them! That they should be able to understand, deliberate, resolve, and choose, being assembled and duly disposed in counsel together; but, apart, rest all in a deep and sluggish silence! Besides, if the particles of matter howsoever modified, and moved, to the utmost subtlety or tenuity, and to the highest vigour, shall then become intelligent and rational, How is it that we observe not, as any matter is more subtle, and more swiftly and variously moved, it makes not a discernably nearer approach, (proportionably) to the faculty and power of reasoning? And that nothing more of an aptitude or tendency towards intelligence and wisdom, is to be perceived in an aspiring Flame, or a brisk Wind, than in a clod or a stone? If to