The vanity of this mortal life, or, Of man, considered only in his present…

Now if we yet suppose there is actually no such state for man hereafter: It is our next business to view the ends for which, upon that supposition, he may be thought to have been made. Whence ⟨p. 32⟩we shall soon see, there is not any of them whereof it may be said, This is that he was created for, as his adequate End.

Now if we yet suppose there is actually no such state for man hereafter: It is our next business to view the ends for which, upon that supposition, he may be thought to have been made. Whence ⟨p. 32⟩we shall soon see, there is not any of them whereof it may be said, This is that he was created for, as his adaequate End.

And here we have a double Agent to be accommodated with a suitable End: Man now made. And God who made him.

1. Man himself. For it must be considered, that in as much as man is a Creature capable of propounding to himself an end, and of acting knowingly and with design towards it (and indeed uncapable of acting otherwise as a man): It would therefore not be reasonable to speak of him, in this discourse, as if he were merely passive, and to be acted only by another. But we must reckon him obliged, in subordination to his Maker, to intend and pursue (himself) the proper end for which he appointed and made him. And in reason we are to expect, that what God hath appointed to be ⟨p. 33⟩his proper end, should be such as is in it self most highly desirable, suitable to the utmost capacity of his nature, and attainable by his action, so carrying with it sufficient inducements, both of desire and hope, to a vigorous and rational prosecution of it. Thus we must, at least, conceive it to have been in the primitive institution of man's end (unto which the expostulation hath reference, Wherefore hast thou made all men in vain?)