A44701:105
A view of that part of the late considerations adderest to H.H. about the…A view of that part of the late considerations addrest to H.H. about the…
A view of that part of the late considerations adderest to H.H. about the Trinity which concerns the sober enquiry, on that subject : in a letter to the former friend.A view of that part of the late considerations addrest to H.H. about the Trinity which concerns the sober enquiry, on that subject : in a letter to the former friend.
London: printed for Tho. Parkhurst, 1695
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
But let us see how much to the purpose our Author uses it in the present case.
The Enquirer had represented three really distinct Subsistents in the Godhead as possible, for ought we know, not presuming to determine herein, this way or that, beyond what is plain in it self, or plainly revealed. And so still he thinks ⟨p. 61⟩it may be, for ought he knows; for he professes not to know any thing to the contrary. Yes (saith the Considerator) but I do. No doubt, if any Man. But say I, how know you? I know, saith he, they can neither be finite, nor infinite, therefore there can be no such thing at all.
But, say I, Do you know what infinite is, or can you comprehend it? Yes, very well,1 says he; for I have an infinite all-comprehending Mind. What a Cyclopic understanding is this? Nay, and he pretends he can comprehend the very Being of God (otherwise all Religion must cease) after he had granted, we (including himself) cannot comprehend the least spire of Grass. And yet that Being of God is nothing else with him, but Existence, (i. e. not to be nothing) which he there vafrously inserts, but very imprudently; for every one sees he said it only to avoid the purpose he was to speak to, and ⟨p. 62⟩so said it not to any present good purpose at all? As if it had been the Bishop's word, and all one with God's Being. 'Tis true that his Being includes his Existence: But hath he therefore a clear, distinct and adequate conception what God is, because he, indistinctly, conceives a Being, vulgarly signified by the Name of God, doth exist? Bring the matter to Creatures, and because he knows, as he may by the sight of his Eye, that such a Creature exists, doth he therefore understand its Nature? Existence is to be extra causas, and this is common to all Creatures; as to be necessarily, and without a cause, is peculiar to God. If therefore Existence, and their Being be all one, all Creatures are the same, and differ not from one another; for to be extra causas is that wherein they all agree. And extend it further, as Existence is to be, in rerum naturâ, abstracting from being caused, or uncaused; and so God, and Creatures will be all one. And see whether