A view of that part of the late considerations adderest to H.H. about the…A view of that part of the late considerations addrest to H.H. about the…

But if he say, tho Existence abstractly taken, distinguishes not God from Creatures; yet his Existence doth distinguish him. Very true; but that leads us back to the Consideration of his Being, of what sort that is. Which therefore, if he had pleased, he might as well have let stand before as it was; and might have considered that Existence, and that which doth exist, are not of the same import. Or that it is not all one, to say that God doth exist, and what he is that doth exist.

But it will be worth the while to examine a little further this Author's comprehension of Infinites. He says it is to have a clear, distinct, and adequate conception of them, so he comprehends the infinite Attributes of God. His Eternity, i. e. that Duration, by which he is without all beginning, and end. This tells us what it is not. But doth it tell us what it is? q. d. An infinite Duration is a ⟨p. 64⟩boundless Duration: A Grammatical Definition! Or rather a mere Translation of Latin into English. And so he might teach a mere Latinist what boundless is, by turning the English back again into Latin. And greatly hath he edified his Disciple! As much as he should, without such change of Language, by saying Invasion is Invasion. And doth he give any better account of infinite Wisdom and Power? Are his Conceptions of them clear and distinct. 'Tis possible to know much, and not be very wise. I do not think that therefore, which he gives, a very good account of Wisdom. Again, knowing is doing somewhat. He speaks not now of making this or that, but more generally of doing any thing. Nor doth any one know any thing, but what he can know. Therefore his Wisdom is Power; for so is an ability to know, Power, as truly, as an ability to do any thing else. Here is confusion, therefore, instead of distinction. And to the comprehending any thing, I should think it ⟨p. 65⟩as requisite a Man's Conception be true, as distinct. Now when he pretends to have distinct Conceptions of God's infinite Wisdom and Power, if also his Conceptions be true, those infinite Attributes are distinct. I am sure he comprehends them not, if, whereas he clearly conceives them distinct, they are not so. But if they are distinct, they are distinct, what? Substances? or Accidents? If the former, according to him, distinct Divine Substances must be distinct Gods. If the latter, let him weather the Difficulties as he can of admitting Accidents in the Divine Being. Either way, he must as little pretend to believe an omnimodous simplicity there, as the Enquirer. But would he then have him give better and fuller Conceptions of these infinite Attributes, or rather of the Infinity of them, which is his present business? No, no, that is none of the Enquirer's part. He pretends not to comprehend Infiniteness. 'Tis enough for One, among Mortals, to offer at