For what he adds, That the Soul and Body in a Man are not united into one Substance or Essence, nor possibly can be; The Cause indeed depends not on it, but lies remote from it. Methinks however it is very feat, and shows him pinched, that he can be brought to this! Hath a Man no Substance? Is he a shadow? Or hath he no Essence? Is he a Non-entity? Or is his Essence a Body? Then a Body is a Man. Or is his Essence a Spirit? Then, a Spirit is a Man. If he say either of these, I wish he would tell us the quantity of those Propositions, that we may know whether he means that every Body is a Man, or every Spirit is a Man? I am sure where the Essence is, there must be the Essentiatum. Or whether Soul and Body ⟨p. 83⟩united, make nothing different from either, or both disunited? Or whether a Man be only such a thing as a Pie? Or why might not a Pudding serve as well, if made up of several Ingredients? He hath greatly indeed obliged Mankind for such an Honour done them! If indeed the Cause depended on it, he would have good store of Philosophers to confute, and all that have any concern for their own kind, before he could disprove the possibility of the supposed Union in the Deity, and you have nothing for it but his bare word: Which (at least, without the addition of his Name) will not do the business. Nor, if he could also bring us a demonstration against the Union of Soul and Body, can he thereby prove such an Union as we suppose in the Godhead impossible. The case is quite another. The Union of the Soul and Body was never by me called essential; for I well know, if they were essentially united, in the strict sense ⟨p. 84⟩they could never be disunited. But 'tis commonly called a substantial Union, and I called it natural in respect of the Principle, Nature, in contradistinction to Art. As for the supposed Union we speak of in the Deity, that, being necessary, original, eternal, it must be essential, or none; but with such distinction as before was supposed. For it was Union, not Identity, that was meant, which Union, with such distinction, till they be proved impossible, the Enquirer's Cause is untouched. And is certainly to any such purpose, not in the least touched by the Considerator.
For what he adds, That the Soul and Body in a Man are not united into one Substance or Essence, nor possibly can be; The Cause indeed depends not on it, but lies remote from it. Methinks however it is very feat, and shews him pinch't, that he can be brought to this! Hath a Man no Substance? Is he a shadow? Or hath he no Essence? Is he a Non-entity? Or is his Essence a Body? Then a Body is a Man. Or is his Essence a Spirit? Then, a Spirit is a Man. If he say either of these, I wish he would tell us the quantity of those Propositions, that we may know whether he means that every Body is a Man, or every Spirit is a Man? I am sure where the Essence is, there must be the Essentiatum. Or whether Soul and Body ⟨p. 83⟩united, make nothing different from either, or both disunited? Or whether a Man be only such a thing as a Pye? Or why might not a Pudding serve as well, if made up of several Ingredients? He hath greatly indeed oblig'd Mankind for such an Honour done them! If indeed the Cause depended on it, he would have good store of Philosophers to confute, and all that have any concern for their own kind, before he could disprove the possibility of the supposed Union in the Deity, and you have nothing for it but his bare word: Which (at least, without the addition of his Name) will not do the business. Nor, if he could also bring us a demonstration against the Union of Soul and Body, can he thereby prove such an Union as we suppose in the Godhead impossible. The case is quite another. The Union of the Soul and Body was never by me called essential; for I well know, if they were essentially united, in the strict sense ⟨p. 84⟩they could never be disunited. But 'tis commonly call'd a substantial Union, and I called it natural in respect of the Principle, Nature, in contradistinction to Art. As for the supposed Union we speak of in the Deity, that, being necessary, original, eternal, it must be essential, or none; but with such distinction as before was supposed. For it was Union, not Identity, that was meant, which Union, with such distinction, till they be proved impossible, the Enquirer's Cause is untoucht. And is certainly to any such purpose, not in the least touch'd by the Considerator.
