The immortality of mans soul, proved bothThe immortality of mans soule, proved both

Secondly, let us consider that brute beasts which §2have this sensitive part as well as we, if we have no more then that, how comes it to pass, that a little child driveth whole flocks and herds of them, whether he listeth, & sometimes whether they would not? whereof cometh it, that many of them in their kind, do all live, nestle, and sing after one sort: whereas men have their Laws, Common-wealths, manners of buildings, and forms of reasoning, not only divers, but also commonly contrary? now what can harbour these contrarieties together, but only that which hath not any thing contrary to it: and wherein all things do lay away their contrariety? Surely, it is not the sense can do it, whose proper and peculiar object is most contrary to sense. Beside this (as I said before) whereas we conceive wisdom, skill and virtue, and such other things, as are all bodiless: our senses can work upon nothing, but the qualities of bodily substances: and whereas we make universal rules of particular things, the senses attain no further, then the particular things themselves: and whereas we conclude of the causes by the effects, our senses perceive ⟨p. 47⟩nothing but the bare effects, so that he that denieth, that besides the common sense, there is a reason, or understanding in Man, distinct and severed from sense, is void both of understanding and sense.

Secondly, let us consider that bruit beasts which §2have this sensitive part as well as we, if wee have no more then that, how comes it to passe, that a little child driveth whole flocks and herds of them, vvhether hee listeth, & sometimes whether they would not? wherof commeth it, that many of them in their kind, doe all live, nestle, and sing after one sort: whereas men have their Laws, Common-wealths, manners of buildings, and formes of reasoning, not only divers, but also commonly contrary? now what can harbour these contrarieties together, but only that which hath not any thing contrary to it: and wherein all things doe lay away their contrariety? Surely, it is not the sence can doe it, whose proper and peculiar object is most contrary to sence. Beside this (as I said before) whereas we conceive wisedome, skill and vertue, and such other things, as are all bodilesse: our sences can worke upon nothing, but the qualities of bodily substances: and whereas wee make universall rules of particular things, the sences attaine no further, then the particular things themselves: and whereas wee conclude of the causes by the effects, our sences perceive