A48160:31
A letter to a friend concerning a postscript to the Defence of Dr. Sherlock's…A letter to a friend concerning a postscript to the Defense of Dr. Sherlock's…
A letter to a friend concerning a postscript to the Defence of Dr. Sherlock's notion of the Trinity in unity, relating to the Calm and sober enquiry upon the same subjectA letter to a friend concerning a postscript to the Defense of Dr. Sherlock's notion of the Trinity in unity, relating to the Calm and sober enquiry upon the same subject
London: printed by J. Astwood for Tho. Parkhurst, 1694
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
He adds, for this reason he disputes earnestly against the universal absolute omnimodous simplicity of the divine Nature, and will not allow that Wisdom, Power, and Goodness, are the same thing in God, and ⟨p. 21⟩distinguished into different Conceptions by us, only through the weakness of our understandings, which cannot comprehend an infinite Being in one thought, and therefore must, as well as we can, contemplate him by parts.
I know not what he means by earnestly, the matter was weighty, and it is true, he was in writing about it in no disposition to jest. But it's said he disputed against the universal, absolute, omnimodous simplicity of the Divine Nature. I hope the Defender in this means honestly, but he speaks very improperly, for it supposes him to think that the universal, absolute, omnimodous simplicity, so earnestly disputed against, did really belong to the Divine Nature, but I can scarce believe him to think so, and therefore he should have said, his disputation tended to prove it not to belong. If he (viz. the Defender, or the Dean) did really think it did, they, or he, must be very singular in that sentiment. I would have them name me the man ⟨p. 22⟩that ever laid down and asserted such a position. Some I know have said of that Sacred Being, that it is summè simplex, or more simple than any thing else, but that imports not universal, absolute, omnimodous simplicity, which is impossible to be a perfection, or therefore to belong to the Divine Nature. No man that ever acknowledged a Trinity of persons even modally distinguished, could ever pretend it, for such simplicity excludes all modes. Nay, the Antitrinitarians themselves can never be for it, as the Calm Discourse hath shown.1 And if the Dean be, he is gone into the remotest extreme from what he held (and plainly enough seems still to hold) that ever man of sense did.
I know not what he means by earnestly, the matter was weighty, and it is true, he was in writing about it in no disposition to jeast. But it's said he disputed against the universal, absolute, omnimodous simplicity of the Divine Nature. I hope the Defender in this means honestly, but he speaks very improperly, for it supposes him to think that the universal, absolute, omnimodous simplicity, so earnestly disputed against, did really belong to the Divine Nature, but I can scarce believe him to think so, and therefore he should have said, his disputation tended to prove it not to belong. If he (viz. the Defender, or the Dean) did really think it did, they, or he, must be very singular in that sentiment. I would have them name me the man