A48160:41
A letter to a friend concerning a postscript to the Defence of Dr. Sherlock's…A letter to a friend concerning a postscript to the Defense of Dr. Sherlock's…
A letter to a friend concerning a postscript to the Defence of Dr. Sherlock's notion of the Trinity in unity, relating to the Calm and sober enquiry upon the same subjectA letter to a friend concerning a postscript to the Defense of Dr. Sherlock's notion of the Trinity in unity, relating to the Calm and sober enquiry upon the same subject
London: printed by J. Astwood for Tho. Parkhurst, 1694
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
But hath he in all this fervent bluster a present concern at this time for the Honour of the Divine Being? (as God forbid I should think he never hath) what is that he supposes injurious to it? Is it the words, parts and compounds? or is it the things supposed to be united in the Divine Being? The words he knows to be his own, and let him dispose of them more ineptly if he can tell how: parts that were never put together, never parted, nor ever shall be the one or other; i. e. that never were or will be parts: And a compound of such parts! But now for the things upon which he would obtrude these words [three Essences, natures, (or if you please, Infinite minds or spirits) signified by the Names of Father, Son and Holy Ghost, in eternal union, but distinct in the Being of God.] Let us consider his disputation against them united, or in union, according to its double aspect: First, upon the Hypothesis or Supposition ⟨p. 33⟩of them: Secondly, upon himself.
First, Consider his Disputation as levelled against the Hypothesis or supposition of such distinct essences, natures, minds, spirits, in necessary, eternal Union in the Divine Being. And one of his arguments against it, is in those words of his One principal argument against it (here put out parts and composition which are his own, and we have no more to do with them) is, that God is eternal and unmade, and whatsoever (hath parts, says he) hath such essences in it, must have a maker. And here let him prove his consequence, and his business is done, viz. both ways, as will be seen by and by. But let him show the inconsistency between a things having such distinct essences naturally and necessarily united in it, (as the supposition to be argued against is, and before ought to have been justly stated) and it's being eternal and unmade. But how that is to be evinced I can not so much as ⟨p. 34⟩guess; confident affirmation, against the most obvious Tenor of Gods own Word, is of little account, who shall ascend into the heavens? or fathom the depths? or can have that perspection of God's incomprehensible nature, as without (and visibly against) his own revelation to be able, without great rashness, to pronounce so concerning him? But so toyish an Argument as here follows, is worse than the Position; i. e. when one shall say, that for ought we know there may be three distinct Essences by an eternal unmade union, united into one, in the Being of God; any man should say, and be so vain as to expect to be regarded, that because they are united by an eternal and unmade union, therefore they are not united by an eternal and unmade union! If there be not a Contradiction in the terms to disprove a thing, by it self, is to say nothing, or is all one with proving a thing by it self. He proceeds, to what