First, Surely there is a distinction between good and evil, and all acts are not in their own nature indifferent, that was a monstrous conceit of Carpenter and others, contrary to the common sense of man. If this were true, the chastness of Lucretia should not be more to be prized, than the lightness of Lais; not the virtue of Cato, than the dissoluteness of Sardanapalus; and it would be as indifferent for a Man to kill his Father as his Neighbours Dog; to rob in the Woods, as to hunt a Deer or Hare; to lye with his Fathers Wife, as to contract honest Matrimony; to forswear and lye, as to be sincere in all our words and proceedings. Now whose heart doth not rise within them at such an apprehension! If this be thought to be only custom and received opinion, that begets this abhorrence, I would ask, Whence cometh it that we all desire to be, if not really, yet seemingly honest? The most wicked are offended, when they are taken for such as they are; and endeavour, as much as they can, to clothe their actions with the appearance of probity and uprightness. If men were not sensible that vice were blame-worthy, and virtue commendable, why should such a desire so universally possess the heart of man? were there not a natural sense of good and evil, and an essential difference between the one and the other, which we are sensible of, Nature it self valuing and esteeming the one, and blasting the other with severe marks of her improbation and hatred. And I do with the more confidence urge this Argument, because there is difficulty in the exercise of Virtue, because of the conflict of the sensual appetite; and on the other side, many delights and pleasures accompanying Vice, by which it gets an easy entrance into our souls, and dominion over our desires. Why should a thing so much against the bent and hair be accounted worthy of praise, and the contrary, which hath such a compliance with our natural desires, be accounted worthy of blame? And were there only Custom and Tradition for it, would men so universally conspire to decree honours for that which is contrary to their corrupt Nature, and to disapprove what is suitable to it? It cannot be. Would they desire the reputation of Virtue, when their desires choose Vice, and impel them to it, and hold them under it, if they were not sensible that the one hath a comeliness, and the other a turpitude in it?
First, Surely there is a distinction between good and evil, and all acts are not in their own nature indifferent, that was a monstrous conceit of Carpender and others, contrary to the common sense of man. If this were true, the chastness of Lucretia should not be more to be prized, than the lightness of Lais; not the vertue of Cato, than the dissoluteness of Sardanapalus; and it would be as indifferent for a Man to kill his Father as his Neighbours Dog; to rob in the Woods, as to hunt a Deer or Hare; to lye with his Fathers Wife, as to contract honest Matrimony; to forswear and lye, as to be sincere in all our words and proceedings. Now whose heart doth not rise within them at such an apprehension! If this be thought to be only custome and received opinion, that begets this abhorrence, I would ask, Whence cometh it that we all desire to be, if not really, yet seemingly honest? The most wicked are offended, when they are taken for such as they are; and endeavour, as much as they can, to clothe their actions with the appearance of probity and uprightness. If men were not sensible that vice were blame-worthy, and vertue commendable, why should such a desire so universally possess the heart of man? were there not a natural sense of good and evil, and an essential difference between the one and the other, which we are sensible of, Nature it self valuing and esteeming the one, and blasting the other with severe marks of her improbation and hatred. And I do with the more confidence urge this Argument, because there is difficulty in the exercise of Vertue, because of the conflict of the sensual appetite; and on the other side, many delights and pleasures accompanying Vice, by which it gets an easie entrance into our souls, and dominion over our desires. Why should a thing so much against the bent and hair be accounted worthy of praise, and the contrary, which hath such a compliance with our natural desires, be accounted worthy of blame? And were there only Custome and Tradition for it, would men so universally conspire to decree honours for that which is contrary to their corrupt Nature, and to disapprove what is suitable to it? It cannot be. Would they desire the reputation of Vertue, when their desires chuse Vice, and impel them to it, and hold them under it, if they were not sensible that the one hath a comeliness, and the other a turpitude in it?