A53669:201
A brief declaration and vindication of the doctrine of the Trinity as also of…
A brief declaration and vindication of the doctrine of the Trinity as also of the person and satisfaction of Christ / accommodated to the capacity and use of such as may be in danger to be seduced, and the establishment of the truth by J. Owen.
London: printed by R.W. for Nath. Ponder, 1669
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
4. The very foundation of all their Objections and Cavils against this truth, is destructive of as fundamental principles of reason, as are in the world. They are all at best reduced to this; it cannot be thus in things finite; the same Being cannot in one respect be one, in another three, and the like, and therefore it is so in things Infinite. All these reasonings are built upon this supposition, that that which is finite can perfectly comprehend that which is Infinite. An assertion absurd, foolish and contradictory unto it self! Again, it is the highest reason in things of pure Revelation, to captivate our understandings to the Authority of the Revealer, which ⟨p. 129⟩here is rejected. So that by a loud specious pretence of Reason, these men by a little captious Sophistry endeavour not only to countenance their unbelief, but to evert the greatest principles of Reason it self.
5. The Objections these men principally insist upon, are merely against the Explanations we use of this Doctrine; not against the Primitive Revelation of it, which is the principal object of our faith, which how preposterous and irrational a course of proceeding it is, hath been declared.
5. The Objections these men principally insist upon, are meerly against the Explanations we use of this Doctrine; not against the Primitive Revelation of it, which is the principal object of our faith, which how preposterous and irrational a course of proceeding it is, hath been declared.
6. It is a Rule among Philosophers; that if a man on just grounds and reasons have embraced any opinion or persuasion, he is not to desert it, merely because he cannot answer every Objection against it. For if the Objections wherewith we may be entangled, be not of the same weight and importance, with the reason on which we embraced the