The substance of this whole Discourse, is no more but this; that because the Inference upon a Supposition, may be a Consequence Logically true, though the Supposition be false, or feigned: therefore the Consequent, or thing inferred also is really true, and a man must fly in the air, as you say, like another Bird. But Sir, though every Consequence be true Logically, that is lawfully inferred from its premises, be they true or false; and so must in Disputation be allowed: Yet where the Consequent is the thing in Question, to suppose that if the Consequence be lawfully educed from the premises, that it also must be true, is a fond surmise. And therefore they know qui nondum aere lavantur, that the way to disappoint the conclusion of an hypothetic Syllogism, is to disprove the Category included in the supposition, when reduced into an Assumption from whence it is to be inferred. For instance, if the thing in question be, Whether a man can fly in the air (as you say) like another Bird; and to prove it, you should say, if he has wings he can do so: the way I think to stop your progress, is to deny that ⟨p. 317⟩he hath wings. And if you should continue to wrangle that your Inference is good, if he hath wings, he may fly like another Bird, you would but make your self ridiculous. But if you may be allowed to make false and absurd suppositions, and must have them taken for granted, you are very much to blame if you infer not Conclusions unto your own purpose. And this in general is your constant way of dealing: unless we will allow you to suppose your selves to be the Church, and that all the excellent things which are spoken of the Church, belong unto you alone, with the like groundless presumptions you are instantly mute, as if there had appeared unto you Harpocrates digito qui significat St. But if in the case in agitation between us, I should permit you without control to make what suppositions you please, and to make Inferences from them, which must be admitted for truth, because Logically following upon your suppositions, what man of Art I might have appeared unto you, I know not: I fear with others, I should scarcely have preserved the reputation of Common sense or understanding.
The substance of this whole Discourse, is no more but this; that because the Inference upon a Supposition, may be a Consequence Logically true, though the Supposition be false, or faigned: therefore the Consequent, or thing inferred also is really true, and a man must fly in the ayre, as you say, like another Bird. But Sir, though every Consequence be true Logically, that is lawfully inferred from its premises, be they true or false; and so must in Disputation be allowed: Yet where the Consequent is the thing in Question, to suppose that if the Consequence be lawfully educed from the premises, that it also must be true, is a fond surmize. And therefore they know qui nondum aere lavantur, that the way to disappoint the conclusion of an hypothetick Syllogisme, is to disprove the Category included in the supposition, when reduced into an Assumption from whence it is to be inferred. For instance, if the thing in question be, Whether a man can fly in the ayre (as you say) like another Bird; and to prove it, you should say, if he has wings he can do so: the way I think to stop your progress, is to deny that ⟨p. 317⟩he hath wings. And if you should continue to wrangle that your Inference is good, if he hath wings, he may fly like another Bird, you would but make your self ridiculous. But if you may be allowed to make false and absurd suppositions, and must have them taken for granted, you are very much to blame if you inferr not Conclusions unto your own purpose. And this in general is your constant way of dealing: unless we will allow you to suppose your selves to be the Church, and that all the excellent things which are spoken of the Church, beloog unto you alone, with the like groundless presumptions you are instantly mute, as if there had appeared unto you Harpocrates digito qui significat St. But if in the case in agitation between us, I should permit you without controul to make what suppositions you please, and to make Inferences from them, which must be admitted for truth, because Logically following upon your suppositions, what man of Art I might have appeared unto you, I know not: I fear with others, I should scarcely have preserved the reputation of Common sense or understanding.
