A53737:341
A vindication of the Animadversions on Fiat lux
A vindication of the Animadversions on Fiat lux wherein the principles of the Roman church, as to moderation, unity and truth are examined and sundry important controversies concerning the rule of faith, papal supremacy, the mass, images, &c. discussed / by John Owen.
London: printed for Ph. Stephens, 1664
A Vindication of the Animadversions on Fiat Lux. › Chapter 14
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
On the first head you tell me that your Discourse concerned Reason to be excluded from the employment of framing Articles of Religion. It is true, you talk somewhat to that purpose; and you were told that Protestants were no way concerned in that Discourse. And it is no less true, that you dispute against the use and exercise of Reason in our choice of or adhering unto any Religion, or any way or practice in Religion; that is the Liberty of a mans rational judgement in determining what is right, and what is wrong, what true, what false, in the things that are proposed unto him, as belonging unto Religion, guided, bounded, and determined by the only Rule measure and last umpire in and about such things; This you oppose and that directly; and that to this end, to show unto Protestants that they can come unto no certainty in Religion by this exercise of their Reason, in and about the things of God. That men should by the use of Reason endeavour to find out and frame a Religion, is fond to imagine. They who ever attempted any such thing, knew it was not Religion but a pretence to some other end, that they were coining. To make the reason of a man proceeding and acting upon it its own light and inbred Principles, the absolute and Sovereign judge of the things that are proposed to be believed or practised in Religion, so as that it should be free for him to receive or reject ⟨p. 364⟩them according as they answer and are suited thereunto, is no less absurd and foolish; and who ever will assert it must build his Assertion on this supposition, that a man is capable of comprehending fully and clearly, whatsoever God can reveal of himself; which is contrary to the prime Dictates of Reason in reference unto the simplicity and infiniteness of Gods being, and so would imply a contradiction in its first admission. It is no less untrue, that a man in the lapsed depraved condition of nature, can by the light thereof and the utmost improvement of his reason, come to a saving, sanctifying perception of the things themselves, that God hath revealed concerning himself his will and worship, which is the peculiar effect of the spirit and grace of Christ.
On the first head you tell me that your Discourse concerned Reason to be excluded from the employment of framing Articles of Religion. It is true, you talk somewhat to that purpose; and you were told that Protestants were no way concerned in that Discourse. And it is no less true, that you dispute against the use and exercise of Reason in our choise of or adhering unto any Religion, or any way or practice in Religion; that is the Liberty of a mans rational judgement in determining what is right, and what is wrong, what true, what false, in the things that are proposed unto him, as belonging unto Religion, guided, bounded, and determined by the only Rule measure and last umpire in and about such things; This you oppose and that directly; and that to this end, to shew unto Protestants that they can come unto no certainty in Religion by this exercise of their Reason, in and about the things of God. That men should by the use of Reason endeavour to find out and frame a Religion, is fond to imagine. They who ever attempted any such thing, knew it was not Religion but a pretence to some other end, that they were coyning. To make the reason of a man proceeding and acting upon it its own light and inbred Principles, the absolute and Soveraign judge of the things that are proposed to be believed or practised in Religion, so as that it should be free for him to receive or reject