A55299:382
An answer to the discourse of Mr. William Sherlock, touching the knowledge of Christ,…
An answer to the discourse of Mr. William Sherlock, touching the knowledge of Christ, and our union and communion with him by Edward Polhill ..., Esquire.
London: printed for Ben. Foster, 1675
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
But now let us consider, 1whether in Law the Debtor and Surety are one person; no considering man can think it indifferent, who pays the debt, the Surety or the Debtor, or that they are both equally obliged to it; the Debtor is the immediate Debtor still, and the Surety only obliged in case of default, the Law doth not account it indifferent which of them pay it: For though it permit the payment to be exacted from the Surety, in case the Debtor refuse, yet it will look back again, and allow the surety an action against the debtor for such a refusal, which is an Argument that the Law doth not judge them one person: Thus it is in bail, the Law doth not judge them one person, for if the prisoner escape, the bail or surety shall be punished according to the nature of the fact; and yet the prisoner is not quitted by this means, but liable either to the arrest of the Surety; or in Criminal Causes to the Sentence of the Law, if ever he be retaken. Thus in Sureties for good behaviour (which sounds as if it were nearest a kin to the Imputation of Christ's Righteousness as our Surety) ⟨p. 421⟩though the Surety be never so innocent and virtuous, this will not serve him for whom he is Surety; but if he prove a Villain they shall be both punished: So that humane Laws are strangers to this Mystery of imputing the Righteousness of a Surety to a bad man; Suretyship doth not so unite their Persons, that whatever one doth, is always and to all purposes imputed to the other: And if this will not hold good among men, it is a very sorry foundation for this bargain and exchange betwixt Christ and Believers, that he should take their sins upon himself, and impute his Righteousness to them.
But now let us consider, 1whether in Law the Debtor and Surety are one person; no considering man can think it indifferent, who pays the debt, the Surety or the Debtor, or that they are both equally obliged to it; the Debtor is the immediate Debtor still, and the Surety only obliged in case of default, the Law doth not account it indifferent which of them pay it: For though it permit the payment to be exacted from the Surety, in case the Debtor refuse, yet it will look back again, and allow the surety an action against the debtor for such a refusal, which is an Argument that the Law doth not judge them one person: Thus it is in bail, the Law doth not judge them one person, for if the prisoner escape, the bail or surety shall be punished according to the nature of the fact; and yet the prisoner is not quitted by this means, but liable either to the arrest of the Surety; or in Criminal Causes to the Sentence of the Law, if ever he be retaken. Thus in Sureties for good behaviour (which sounds as if it were nearest a kin to the Imputation of Christ's Righteousness as our Surety)