A55305:578
The divine will considered in its eternal decrees, and holy execution of them. By…
The divine will considered in its eternal decrees, and holy execution of them. By Edward Polhill of Burwash in Sussex Esquire
London : printed, and are to be sold by Thomas Shelmerdine, at the sign of the Rose-Tree in Little-Britain, 1695
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
1. God never made the Will of Man to stand alone. ⟨p. 442⟩2. God never made it to go alone: both which may yet be, if it follow not the practical Understanding.
1. God never made the Will of Man to stand alone, but he would have it depend upon the Understanding: As he made the Sensitive Appetite to depend upon the Senses, so he made the Will to depend upon the Understanding. Hence the Will, which is in it self but caeca Potentia, a blind Power, in its dependence is [Greek or Hebrew], a rational Appetite. 1If the Will do not depend upon the Understanding, where doth it stand but upon the Base of its own Independency? You'll say, No, not so, for still it is under the guidance of Providence. I answer, That Providence, which rules all things in a sweet Congruity to their Natures, rules the Will, not as a Brute but as a rational Appetite; and how that can be without its dependence on the Understanding I know not.
1. God never made the Will of Man to stand alone, but he would have it depend upon the Understanding: As he made the Sensitive Appetite to depend upon the Senses, so he made the Will to depend upon the Understanding. Hence the Will, which is in it self but caeca Potentia, a blind Power, in its dependance is 〈non-Latin alphabet〉, a rational Appetite. 1If the Will do not depend upon the Understanding, where doth it stand but upon the Base of its own Independency? You'l say, No, not so, for still it is under the guidance of Providence. I answer, That Providence, which rules all things in a sweet Congruity to their Natures, rules the Will, not as a Brute but as a rational Appetite; and how that can be without its dependance on the Understanding I know not.