A55305:581
The divine will considered in its eternal decrees, and holy execution of them. By…
The divine will considered in its eternal decrees, and holy execution of them. By Edward Polhill of Burwash in Sussex Esquire
London : printed, and are to be sold by Thomas Shelmerdine, at the sign of the Rose-Tree in Little-Britain, 1695
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
2. I argue from the Will it self, which may be considered two ways, either as it is in it self, or as it is in dependence upon the Understanding.
2. I argue from the Will it self, which may be considered two ways, either as it is in it self, or as it is in dependance upon the Understanding.
1. As it is in it self, and so it is an Appetite; its Object is Good real or at least apparent, (for malum, quà malum, non est appetibile) and that Good must be proposed by the Understanding, for that is instead of Eyes to the Will. Suppose then that the Understanding do show forth to the Will such a thing as good pro hîc & nunc, and that so good, that it is immediately to be embraced, and cannot without a present evil be neglected, no not for a moment; if in this Case the Will may refuse this Object, it may appetere malum sub ratione mali, that is, appetere non appetibile, and in so doing it may cease to be, what it essentially is, an Appetite.
1. As it is in it self, and so it is an Appetite; its Object is Good real or at least apparant, (for malum, quà malum, non est appetibile) and that Good must be proposed by the Understanding, for that is instead of Eyes to the Will. Suppose then that the Understanding do shew forth to the Will such a thing as good pro hîc & nunc, and that so good, that it is immediately to be embraced, and cannot without a present evil be neglected, no not for a moment; if in this Case the Will may refuse this Object, it may appetere malum sub ratione mali, that is, appetere non appetibile, and in so doing it may cease to be, what it essentially is, an Appetite.
2. As it is in dependence upon the Understanding, and so it is a rational Appetite, and (which results from thence) it is a free Appetite; the root of its Freedom is in the Understanding. Why hath a Will a liberty of Spontaneity to some Objects, but because the Understanding represents them as good pro hîc & nunc? Why a liberty of Contradiction to other Objects, but because the Understanding looks on them as matters of little or no moment? One would think so odious and detestable a thing as Sin, could not be chosen by