A55305:584
The divine will considered in its eternal decrees, and holy execution of them. By…
The divine will considered in its eternal decrees, and holy execution of them. By Edward Polhill of Burwash in Sussex Esquire
London : printed, and are to be sold by Thomas Shelmerdine, at the sign of the Rose-Tree in Little-Britain, 1695
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
3. I argue from the Effect, which shows much of harmony between the Posture of the Understanding and the Posture of the Will. Is the Understanding determinate? So is the Will: Hence if the Understanding represent a thing as good, the Will ⟨p. 446⟩embraces it as such, if as a greater good, it embraces it the more, if as a summum bonum, it embraces it summo conatu. On the other hand, if the Understanding represent a thing as evil, the Will starts back from it; if as a greater evil, it flies yet further from it; if as malum maximum, it can never fly far enough from it. Is the Understanding pendulous? So is the Will too: Hence if the Understanding represent a thing as a matter indifferent, having little or nothing of moment in it, one way or other, the Will doth not infallibly will it as it doth the good, nor nill it as it doth the evil, but in a pendulous way it hangs off and plays on, because the Understanding doth not pronounce it good or evil, but only indifferent. The Will observes every motion of the practical Judgment; if that say, Yonder is such a good, the Will cleaves to it as Ruth to Naomi; if that say, There is such an evil, the Will flies from it as Moses from the Serpent; if that say, Such a thing is indifferent, the Will stands as the King of Babylon, at the parting of the way, Ezek. 21. 21. it may will or not will; for there is an equilibrium in the Will answering the equilibrium in the Understanding.
3. I argue from the Effect, which shews much of harmony between the Posture of the Understanding and the Posture of the Will. Is the Understanding determinate? So is the Will: Hence if the Understanding represent a thing as good, the Will ⟨p. 446⟩embraces it as such, if as a greater good, it embraces it the more, if as a summum bonum, it embraces it summo conatu. On the other hand, if the Understanding represent a thing as evil, the Will starts back from it; if as a greater evil, it flies yet further from it; if as malum maximum, it can never fly far enough from it. Is the Understanding pendulous? So is the Will too: Hence if the Understanding represent a thing as a matter indifferent, having little or nothing of moment in it, one way or other, the Will doth not infallibly will it as it doth the good, nor nill it as it doth the evil, but in a pendulous way it hangs off and plays on, because the Understanding doth not pronounce it good or evil, but only indifferent. The Will observes every motion of the practical Judgment; if that say, Yonder is such a good, the Will cleaves to it as Ruth to Naomi; if that say, There is such an evil, the Will flies from it as Moses from the Serpent; if that say, Such a thing is indifferent, the Will stands as the King of Babylon, at the parting of the way,