A55305:626
The divine will considered in its eternal decrees, and holy execution of them. By…
The divine will considered in its eternal decrees, and holy execution of them. By Edward Polhill of Burwash in Sussex Esquire
London : printed, and are to be sold by Thomas Shelmerdine, at the sign of the Rose-Tree in Little-Britain, 1695
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
1. This Objection carries in it a great Absurdity: If the Will being determined by the Understanding lose its Freedom, then it loseth its Freedom by an adhesion to the Root of its Freedom; and it cannot be free, unless it can turn Brute, which is a great Absurdity. You'll say, Is this so absurd? Doth not the Will turn Brute in closing with sensual Lusts? and doth not the Scripture call men Beasts upon that account? I answer, that the Will in closing with its sensual Lusts is brutish as to the ⟨p. 477⟩Matter of its choice, but not as to the Manner of it, because it hath an humane Understanding (though corrupt) going before it; but if it can turn away from the Understanding, it can turn Brute even as to the Manner of its Acting: for then its Act hath no Understanding at all at the bottom of it, no more than the Act of a Beast, which is very absurd in a rational Appetite.
1. This Objection carries in it a great Absurdity: If the Will being determined by the Understanding lose its Freedom, then it loseth its Freedom by an adhesion to the Root of its Freedom; and it cannot be free, unless it can turn Brute, which is a great Absurdity. You'l say, Is this so absurd? Doth not the Will turn Brute in closing with sensual Lusts? and doth not the Scripture call men Beasts upon that account? I answer, that the Will in closing with its sensual Lusts is brutish as to the ⟨p. 477⟩Matter of its choice, but not as to the Manner of it, because it hath an humane Unstanding (though corrupt) going before it; but if it can turn away from the Understanding, it can turn Brute even as to the Manner of its Acting: for then its Act hath no Understanding at all at the bottom of it, no more than the Act of a Beast, which is very absurd in a rational Appetite.
2. This Objection stands upon a false Notion of Liberty, viz. That the Liberty of the Will doth essentially consist in an [Greek or Hebrew] or [Greek or Hebrew], in an equilibrium or indeterminate Indifferency, whereby it may will or not will a thing; for why, according to this Objection, is the Will not free? Why, but because it is determined? And why is it not free, if determined? Because its Freedom doth consist essentially in such an equilibrium, as cannot stand with any determination but what is merely from it self. Now that this is a false Notion of Liberty doth appear many ways: For