3. This Definition is proportionable to both the Acts of the Will. There is Actus imperatus, an Act commanded by the Will, such as Speaking or Walking, or the like; there is Actus elicitus, an Act produced in ⟨p. 484⟩the Will, such is the Act of willing. Now quoad Actum imperatum, the Definition says, that a Man can do as much as he wills; and quoad Actum elicitum, it says, that he can will as much as he judges fit to be willed. These two Acts must be carefully distinguished, for the Will is not alike free in both: As to the imperate Act, the Will is the Mistress and Commandress of that, that proceeds from it per modum imperii, and it is truly said to be done quia volumus; but as to the elicit Act, the Will is not properly the Mistress or Commandress of that, that proceeds not from it per modum imperii; for then it should be Actus imperatus rather than elicitus; neither can we be said truly to will quia volumus, for so the same Act of willing should be the Cause of it self: Wherefore the Liberty of the Will, as to the Act of willing, doth not consist in a Self-motion, for the Will doth not move it self. To which purpose I shall quote two testimonies, one out of Camero, Nulla mera potentia semetipsam propellit in actum; quicquid enim ejusmodi est, id in actu esse necesse est. Voluntas autem (id est, volendi facultas) mera potentia est; ergò non potest semetipsam excitare ad agendum: Si enim hoc facit, facit per aliquem actum; at ⟨p. 485⟩quod est in mera potentia, illud non agit. And again; Non potest dici quae sit Voluntatis seipsam determinantis actio; non est volitio ipsa, est enim volitio ipse terminus; ergo non ipsa determinatio. Another out of the French Divines in their Theses Salmurienses; Nulla potentia sesemet educit in actum; Sensus moventur à rebus sensibilibus, Phantasia à phantasmatibus, Intellect us ab object is intellectualibus, locomotiva à Voluntate, voluntas quîpote à seipsa? And indeed, if the Will do move it self to the Act of Willing, then (because it cannot move it self, as quiescent) it must move it self by some Act, and what is that Act but an Act of willing? Therefore by an Act of willing it moves it self to an Act of Willing, which is very absurd. Wherefore the Will is free in the Act of willing, not in respect of its Self-motion, but in respect of its lubency and spontaneity;
3. This Definition is proportionable to both the Acts of the Will. There is Actus imperatus, an Act commanded by the Will, such as Speaking or Walking, or the like; there is Actus elicitus, an Act produced in ⟨p. 484⟩the Will, such is the Act of willing. Now quoad Actum imperatum, the Definition says, that a Man can do as much as he wills; and quoad Actum elicitum, it says, that he can will as much as he judges fit to be willed. These two Acts must be carefully distinguished, for the Will is not alike free in both: As to the imperate Act, the Will is the Mistress and Commandress of that, that procedes from it per modum imperii, and it is truly said to be done quia volumus; but as to the elicite Act, the Will is not properly the Mistress or Commandress of that, that procedes not from it per modum imperii; for then it should be Actus imperatus rather than elicitus; neither can we be said truly to will quia volumus, for so the same Act of willing should be the Cause of it self: Wherefore the Liberty of the Will, as to the Act of willing, doth not consist in a Self-motion, for the Will doth not move it self. To which purpose I shall quote two testimonies, one out of Camero, Nulla mera potentia semetipsam propellit in actum; quicquid enim ejusmodi est, id in actu esse necesse est. Voluntas autem (id est, volendi facultas) mera potentia est; ergò non potest semetipsam excitare ad agendum: Si enim hoc facit, facit per aliquem actum; at ⟨p. 485⟩quod est in mera potentia, illud non agit. And again; Non potest dici quae sit Voluntatis seipsam determinantis actio; non est volitio ipsa, est enim volitio ipse terminus; ergo non ipsa determinatio. Another out of the French Divines in their Theses Salmurienses; Nulla potentia sesemet educit in actum; Sensus moventur à rebus sensibilibus, Phantasia à phantasmatibus, Intellect us ab object is intellectualibus, locomotiva à Voluntate, voluntas quîpote à seipsa? And indeed, if the Will do move it self to the Act of Willing, then (because it cannot move it self, as quiescent) it must move it self by some Act, and what is that Act but an Act of willing? Therefore by an Act of willing it moves it self to an Act of Willing, which is very absurd. Wherefore the Will is free in the Act of willing, not in respect of its Self-motion, but in respect of its lubency and spontaneity;
